

Military Intelligence

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Military Intelligence

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**United States
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from the Commander



Training and the EPMS Shoe

by Brigadier General James A. Teal, Jr.

All things being equal, an Army should fight as it has been trained. If it has been well trained, it will fight well. At the US Army Intelligence Center and Schools it is our mission to produce well trained Soldiers who are also intelligence professionals capable of meeting the commander's requirements.

There are many facets to our training responsibilities. Some of these include: the use of the Life Cycle Management Model in both the development of training for Major Army Systems, and the identification of requirements for meeting terminal learning objectives;

assessing and performing the training for appropriate skill levels; developing and providing Soldier's Manuals, Job Books, technical materials and testing to insure standardization and the opportunity for skills enhancement. Additionally, the requirement exists for determining and verifying our consumer's everchanging requirements and then being flexible enough to change.

Doctrinally, the Enlisted Personnel Management System (EPMS) is an effective management tool. It impacts on the Soldier's training, continuing proficiency, career pro-

gression and promotion opportunities. Furthermore, it has brought the schoolhouse trainer and the field commander (in his training capacity) more closely together than ever before. Through the Skill Qualification Test (SQT) and other EPMS training tools, the Army CAN track and assess the individual Soldier's progress more accurately. The possibilities of uniformity and standardization offered by EPMS are at once the most attractive aspects and potentially elusive to accomplish.

Within the intelligence community, EPMS encompasses three Enlisted Career Management fields, embracing more than 20 occupational specialties. Compounding the already considerable school training mission is the great variety of assignments our graduates encounter and must be trained for. For example, a 33S (Electronic Intercept Equipment Repairman) can be sent from repairing a TLQ-17 in a Division Collection and Jamming Platoon to maintaining a one-of-a-kind piece of equipment housed at a fixed installation. In today's high intensity electronics environment, there is a schism between skills taught in the schoolhouse as determined by budgeted training time and the skills required as a result of equipment variability—no small challenge to the training developers and EPMS managers. It is this diversity of missions and the limited training base that makes the EPMS shoe difficult to fit within Army Intelligence. It also emphasizes the important role of the commander as trainer.

In summary, a big factor in success on the battlefield is training and the maintenance of skills proficiency. USAICS is dedicated to insuring the presence of that factor in the personnel engaged on the next battlefield. The training developer, the trainer, and the trained must all remember that training alone will not insure the victory, but the lack of training can insure defeat.

Editor,

I very much enjoyed the article "CEWI in the Reserves" (October–December 1980). The authors' acute observations clearly point out the constraints faced by tactical intelligence elements in the reserve components. Furthermore, they have made positive suggestions rather than just gripe.

One important facet of RC CEWI development that seems to have been overlooked, however, is that of unit assignment. We must remember that the assembly of all intelligence and electronic warfare resources in one command was the **second** major recommendation of the Ursano Study. The first recommendation was **Assign CEWI resources to the commander they serve**.

Back in the dark ages, when tactical intelligence assets were "owned" by field army and outside major commands, active Army forces suffered the problems pointed out in the Ursano Study. There was mutual lack of understanding between the supported commands and the intelligence community. Intelligence assets responded primarily to their own parochial objectives rather than the tactical commander's needs. Mutual ignorance was equalled only by mutual antipathy.

The danger of these problems is an order of magnitude greater in the RC.

CEWI units must be **assigned** to the commands they support, not left floating around who knows where in the force structure, orphans. Assignment of an organic CEWI element to an RC brigade or division will make the commander sharply aware of intelligence, OPSEC and EW. He will be responsible for the readiness of his CEWI unit—personnel recruiting and retention, equipment availability and maintenance, training, and integration into his own C3 systems. CEWI unit personnel will wear the same patch and will be part of the same social and military community as the troops they support.

There will be difficulties to overcome, but the RC commands have overcome similar problems in other technical areas. They can and must learn how to manage their CEWI functions. M-Day is too late for the integration of CEWI into the combined arms force.

Edward M. McClure, Jr.
CPT, EN, NCARNG

Editor,

In the article entitled **CEWI For Special Forces In Europe** (October–December 1980), by MAJ Edward J. Lorentzen, Major Lorentzen stated on page 9, "The SOD's field intercept unit is the three man Special Operations Team Alpha

(SOTA), the Army's only airborne, man-portable intercept unit." I respectfully submit that the 313th MI Battalion (CEWI) (Abn) has, by TOE, four airborne, man-portable intercept teams, referred to as Low Level Voice Intercept (LLVI) teams. When the 313th MI Battalion (CEWI) (Abn) converts to TOE 34-265H, the five company concept, there will be nine airborne LLVI teams in the 82nd Abn Div, one per airborne infantry battalion. Additionally, we in the 313th MI Bn (CEWI) (Abn) prefer to use the Watkins-Johnson 8640 receiver vice the TOE authorized AN/TRQ-30 for obvious reasons.

Steven A. Epkins
MAJ, MI
S3, 313th MI Bn (CEWI) (Abn)

Theme Change

The theme for the July–September 1981 issue of *Military Intelligence* has been changed to **Counterintelligence**. Possible topics include:

- CI Support to the Division from the MI Group (CEWI)
- OPSEC in the Division
- HUMINT on the Battlefield
- Strategic HUMINT in Support of the Tactical Commander
- CI in ASAS
- Document Control and Accountability—The Case for More Control

Due to the change of theme, articles may be submitted by July 1 instead of June 1.

Personnel with Counterintelligence training and/or work experience are encouraged to consider the topics listed above or to discuss other areas of interest in CI.

Articles may vary from 300–2,000 words in length and should be submitted with a short biographical sketch and black and white, head and shoulders photograph.

Corrections

In the article **CEWI for Special Forces in Europe** October–December 1980, by MAJ Edward J. Lorentzen, the first paragraph in column 2, page 10, should read:

The concepts of organization and operations embodied in the Combat Intelligence Company currently envisioned are not consistent with the realities of a European war of high intensity in which the US may eventually achieve air parity, except for the SOTAs, company personnel will **not** be infiltrated into the denied area.

In addition, in **Collection Management**

Feedback

at Division and Corps Level by COL William E. Harmon, columns 1 and 2, page 25, were transposed in paste-up.

OPFOR Training Literature Update

Editor,

This is intended to give the reader an update on some of the OPFOR literature discussed in the July–September 1980 issue of MI Magazine.

Recent tasking of time-sensitive projects has resulted in a revision of OPFOR Division priorities. Thus, although **FM 34-70, OPFOR Training Module: Soviet Military Forces Europe** is now projected for coordinating draft circulation in the third quarter of FY81, it is quite possible that completion of this draft will be delayed one quarter. It is difficult at this time to determine whether this will affect the scheduled camera-ready mechanical completion date of third quarter FY82. **FM 34-71** remains on schedule with camera-ready mechanicals expected by the end of second quarter FY81. The Individual Training Manual, Unit Training Manual, and Post Training Evaluation are being incorporated into a single document, **FM 34-75 OPFOR Unit Training Manual**. A final draft of this manual is scheduled for circulation in the fourth quarter FY81. It is believed that such a composite document will be much easier to relate to specific unit training objectives.

Charles Moses
2LT, MI
OPFOR Division/DTD, USAICS

(continued from page 19)

a grave enough threat to the stability of the Warsaw Pact) the Poles will face them alone, with no hope of outside aid.

Within the time of a single generation, from 1914 to 1945, three major wars raged across Poland. Only in recent years has Poland begun to recover economically from the devastation of the Second World War. No one could possibly wish further hardships upon this long-suffering nation. And yet, no other country in Eastern Europe can threaten the Soviet Empire as Poland can.

It must be remembered that the dissolution of the British Empire began with the Easter Uprising in Dublin in 1916. Should another tragedy befall Poland, it can be hoped that Poland will prove to be the agent by which another empire crumbles from within.

Authors

Page 6. Mr. Cal Carnes



Cal Carnes has been a professional intelligence specialist for the Defense Intelligence Agency for 10 years. He graduated from Indiana University with an AB in Political Science and from Georgetown University with an MA in National Security Studies. Mr. Carnes was on active duty with the US Navy for five years and is presently assigned to a naval reserve unit in the Washington, DC area as an Intelligence Officer. He has been on the Executive Board of the National Military Intelligence Association since 1977 and is the national secretary of the organization.

Page 11. CPT (P) William C. Spracher



CPT(P) William C. Spracher is an assistant professor in the Department of Social Sciences, US Military Academy, where he teaches American politics and comparative

government. He has previously served as Battalion S2 in the 1st Armored Division, Operations Officer at the US Army Intelligence Agency, and has commanded at the platoon, company and detachment levels, most recently as Commander, Administrative Support Detachment, USAINTA. A graduate of the Armor Officer Basic Course, the Tactical Intelligence Officer Course, and the Postgraduate Intelligence Course at the Defense Intelligence School, he holds a BS degree from West Point and an MA in International Relations from Yale University.

Page 16. Mr. Fred H. Fernengel

Mr. Fred H. Fernengel is Chief, Tactical Surveillance Branch, Collective Training Division, USAICS. He is a graduate of Command and General Staff College and received a BS from Murray State University. He served on active duty as an infantry officer and is currently assigned to the 297th MI Detachment (Special Forces), USAR, as Chief, Combat Intelligence Section.

Page 18. Capt. Dennis Mroczkowski

Capt. Dennis Mroczkowski, a Major selectee in the US Marine Corps Reserve, is currently an Intelligence Support Officer and Security Manager with FMFLant Augmentation Unit at Force Headquarters, Atlantic Fleet, Norfolk, VA. He received his Master of Arts degree in American Civilization from George Washington University in 1976. Capt. Mroczkowski is currently the Director of the Transportation Museum in Fort Eustis, VA.

Page 41. 1LT Richard N. Warne



1LT Richard N. Warne has a BA in political science and an MA in public administration from Brigham Young University. A graduate of the MI Officer Basic Course and the Tactical Surveillance Officer Course, 1LT Warne has served as the Motor Officer for the 1st Military Intelligence Battalion (ARS), 525 Military Intelligence Group, Fort Bragg, NC. He is currently the Commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 525 MI Group.

Page 47. CW2 William T. Rich

CW2 Rich entered the Army in March, 1966 as a 98J (non communications intercept-analyst). His assignments have included ASA Field stations at Shemya, Alaska; Asmara, Ethiopia; and Berlin, Germany. He was appointed WO1 while serving with the ASA SIGSEC Activity, Vint Hill, Virginia, in April 1976. Subsequent assignments have included the 329th ASA Co, 2d Infantry Division, Korea; the 522d CEWI Bn, 2d Armored Division, Fort Hood, TX; and the European Defense Analysis Center, Stuttgart, Germany. In addition to basic 98J training, WO1 Rich has completed the Instructor Training Course and 2GF17 at Fort Devens, MA; Telemetry Analysis and Senior Military Cryptologic Supervisor's Course at Fort Meade, MD; and MIWOAC at Fort Huachuca, AZ. He holds a BS Degree in Management from the University of Maryland.

Page 53. COL Serge P.C. Demyanenko



Colonel Demyanenko holds a BA in History from the University of California, Berkeley, where he was an ROTC Distinguished Military Graduate, and an MPA from the University of Oklahoma. His military education includes the Basic and Advanced Infantry Officer's Courses; Airborne, Ranger and Jumpmaster Courses; Special Forces Officer's Course; Armed Forces Staff College; and Industrial College of the Armed Forces. Colonel Demyanenko is currently the Chief of Plans, Training, and Resource Management Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Headquarters, United States Army Europe, and Seventh Army. He came to his USAEUR assignment from OACSI where he was the Chief of the Tours Branch. His awards include the Bronze Star, Meritorious Service Medal with 3 OLC, Joint Service Commendation Medal, Army Commendation Medal, and Armed Forces Honor Medal, 1st Class.

Page 55. LTC Jack W. McGuinness and CPT (P) Frederick E. White



LTC McGuinness is the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). He received his Bachelor's Degree from St. Anselm's College, NH, in 1961, a Master's degree in Public Service, Western Kentucky University in 1975, and graduated from the College of Naval Command and Staff in 1977. Previous assignments include Special Forces assignments in Okinawa and Vietnam, MACSOG, Project 404—Laos, G2 Operations, Brigade S2, Executive Officer of 1-503 Infantry Battalion, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), and Executive Officer/Operations Officer, US Army Operational Group, INSCOM.



CPT(P) White is the Assistant G2, Operations, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). A graduate of the MI Officer Advance Course, he received a BS from West Point in 1970, an MBA from University of Utah in 1976, and Masters degrees in Mathematics and Operations Research and Statistics from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute in 1977. CPT(P) White's previous assignments included Battalion S2, Strategic Intelligence Officer, Company Commander in Federal Republic of Germany and Assistant Professor of Mathematics at USMA.

Army's New Ultra VEAP Offers \$13,400—\$20,100 for College Aid

In a concerted effort to attract high school graduates, the US Army has launched a pilot one-year test program, known as **Ultra VEAP** (Veteran's Educational Assistance Program), it offers higher education benefits ranging from \$13,400—\$20,100 for qualified soldiers, depending on term of enlistment.

LTC John P. Fanning, Commanding Officer of the US Army Long Island District Recruiting Command, headquartered at Fort Hamilton, NY, said that his district is one of 10 pilot districts nationwide to offer the expanded educational incentive program. The other nine districts are: Fort Monmouth, Newburgh, Atlanta, Miami, Kansas City, Cincinnati, Minneapolis, Sacramento and San Francisco.

Ultra VEAP is part of the Army's latest campaign to enhance enlistments through college tuition assistance bonuses. With 43 specific Army occupations open, thousands of jobs are available to eligible men and women. Previously, VEAP offered a "kicker" with benefits of \$7,400, \$12,100 and \$17,100 for two, three and four year enlistments in certain Army military occupational specialties (MOS).

Ultra VEAP matches two for one the contributions of participating soldiers (\$50—\$75 a month) toward college education or vocational or technical training. During a two-year enlistment, a soldier contributing \$75 a month will save up \$1,800. The Veterans Adminis-

tration, pays \$3,600 and **Ultra VEAP** adds \$8,000 for a total of \$13,400. A three-year enlistment matches an enlistee contribution of \$2,700 with the VA's \$5,400 and \$12,000 from **Ultra VEAP** for a total of \$20,100. A four-year enlistment for specified occupations entitles the participant to a cash bonus of up to \$3,000, for a grand total of \$23,100.

Participants in **Ultra VEAP** who enroll in a VA-approved school program receive tax-free monthly allowances of up to \$558 (depending upon their dollar contribution, length of enlistment and full or part-time academic status).

High school graduates who pass qualifying physical and mental requirements and college students who may not be able to continue their schooling due to lack of funds are eligible for **Ultra VEAP**. High school seniors who sign up in the Army's Delayed Entry Program (DEP) are also eligible.

Ultra VEAP is seeking specialists capable of mastering skills and knowledge in intelligence, telecommunications, chemical, atomic and nuclear operations fields.

If the one-year pilot program is successful, **Ultra VEAP** may well be adopted nationwide by the Army. In a few years, this would have a significant positive impact on the level of education in the country.

For more information contact: Bill Gottlieb at the US Army Long Island District Recruiting Command.

Extending Army Basic Training

Men and women coming into the Army will soon face longer and tougher basic training (BT). Plans for a tougher eight-week program instead of the current seven weeks have been announced by the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

The plans, outlined by Army Chief of Staff Edward C. Meyer on Sept. 5, 1980, call for more demanding physical conditioning, training in additional soldier skills and the raising of standards for courses at all training installations.

The new program will go into effect at some training installations in the 1981 Fiscal Year (FY) and will include all training installations by the end of FY 82.

The revamped BT program leans heavily on the belief that a physically fit Army begins with tough, demanding standards established in BT and continues through all phases of a soldier's professional growth. Increased emphasis will be placed on basic soldier skills and new technical subject materials

such as map reading and communications will be added.

The changes are aimed at developing better-trained and disciplined soldiers who, after assignment to their new units, can contribute more quickly to Army unit effectiveness.

The new BT Program of Instruction (POI) will contain 405 hours, an increase of 97 hours over the current POI.

The added 97 hours will allow for more physical training, weapons familiarization and qualification, individual tactical training, marches and bivouacs, and basic rifle marksmanship (BRM).

Besides communications and map reading, new subjects in the POI will be identification of opposing forces (OPFOR), and obstacle courses for confidence and conditioning.

Plans also call for the combat arms-oriented One Station Unit Training (OSUT) courses to be expanded by one week in FY 82.

Soviet Military Intelligence: How Significant?

by Mr. Cal Carnes

Introduction

In 1974, John Barron wrote an authoritative book on the major Soviet intelligence and security service, the Committee for State Security, or KGB. Titled **KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents**, it is considered by many the best unclassified work on the subject. The book outlines some exceptional KGB case histories showing the extraordinary role of that service, both in Soviet society and abroad while presenting some extremely valuable facts on KGB organization.

In his discussion of the rival intelligence service the military's Chief Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet General Staff (the GRU), however, Barron made some misleading statements, among them the statement that the GRU "functions essentially as an appendage of the KGB."¹ In his section on Soviet military intelligence, Barron writes: "... the GRU has fallen so completely under the domination of the KGB that attempts to consider it as a separate entity are really an academic exercise."² He adds that "through [KGB] authority over personnel and informants, [KGB] exercises an invisible but real control over the GRU at all levels ... the GRU must be regarded as a subsidiary of the KGB."³ Barron goes on to explain, "The KGB in Moscow remains aware of and reaps the benefits of all GRU operations."⁴ This article will examine why Barron's statements are in error.

The functions of the KGB are indeed many. It is the primary counterintelligence arm for the Soviet Union and the Communist Party, with responsibilities for any activity against "counterrevolutionaries," both foreign and domestic. This includes keeping watch over all military units, including the GRU itself. The KGB has always had the right to screen military intelligence personnel and has maintained its own informers within the ranks of the GRU. The agency also has major responsibilities in the area of foreign espionage. Its responsibilities in external and internal spying

have made it extremely powerful. The KGB's purview transcends these roles however, in so-called "active measures"—secret intervention in the affairs of other countries—through assassinations, kidnappings, disinformation and other covert action operations. The KGB is thus a multi-purpose clandestine arm of power to carry out any act assigned to it by the Communist Party.

It is important to remember that the multi-faceted KGB, although aggressive and terroristic, is first and foremost a counterintelligence agency. When Lenin first proposed the creation of a state security apparatus, he advocated only "extraordinary measures" against counterrevolutionaries: espionage abroad was not an official assignment. Even when the Foreign Department, the INO, was established in 1921, it was primarily targeted against émigrés, and remained a basically defensive operation. While the organization now conducts espionage against foreign countries, it still is preoccupied with general surveillance of Soviet citizens abroad.

I contend that the GRU is an integral part of the Soviet espionage apparatus and an extremely valuable agency in its own right. I believe it is a rival and competitor of the KGB with separate traditions, accomplishments and operations. In addition, the GRU coordinates much of the activity of other Soviet military intelligence components in the armed forces and has an independent informational channel to the Soviet leadership. The purpose of this article is to examine Soviet military intelligence in an effort to determine its overall importance and effectiveness, particularly *vis-a-vis* the KGB.

Functions and Organization

The GRU's major function is to gather strategic intelligence on foreign nations on behalf of the Soviet General Staff in order to estimate their willingness and ability to wage war. Marshal of the Soviet Union V. D. Sokolovskiy, in **Soviet Military Strategy**, has stated: "Strategic intelligence, both in peacetime and wartime, systematically

procures political, military, economic, scientific, and technical data concerning possible enemies and studies their military possibilities."⁵ Colonel Oleg Penkovskiy, in describing the functions of his organization, the GRU, related that: "We are collecting intelligence always and everywhere. When I say 'military' it does not mean we are engaged only in military espionage. We conduct technical, scientific, and economic espionage as much as military—we operate in all directions."⁶

Penkovskiy also expanded on the strictly strategic intelligence functions of the GRU, stating: "Not only do we of the GRU conduct military, political, economic, and scientific intelligence, but we are engaged in propaganda activities, provocation, blackmailing, terroristic acts, and sabotage."⁷ Major Akhmedov, a former officer of the GRU, related what his commanding officer told him as he was undergoing training in the 1930s:

We do not just collect and disseminate intelligence data. We do that, of course, but we must also do much more ... our whole intelligence system is not limited to classic espionage ... but also comprises the sum total of active clandestine actions directed toward the destruction of the capitalistic system ... for us that means not just classic espionage, but also sabotage, terror, kidnappings, assassinations, penetrations into foreign governments and political parties in order to manipulate them from within, the organization of small and big disorders, strikes and protests, the conduct of psychological warfare, provocations and disinformation. These are the normal weapons in our arsenal.⁸

Thus, it appears that the GRU, in some instances, may have the same capabilities for extraordinary measures available to the KGB.

The GRU is a world-wide intelligence collection and analytical organization.

Unlike the KGB, however, the GRU exists for foreign espionage operations and has no counterintelligence or security functions. On this point, Penkovskiy said, "The difference between us and the KGB is only that we do not work against the Soviet people, we do not spy on them; but as far as foreign intelligence work is concerned, we do the same as the KGB."⁹

Like the KGB, the GRU has its own operations and spaces in Soviet embassies including "legal" and "illegal" intelligence officers. "Legal" agents make no attempt to conceal their Soviet citizenship and generally are based in a Soviet Embassy or consulate or at the United Nations. On the other hand, "illegals," lacking the cover of a diplomatic mission, work under false identities.

Organizationally, the GRU very closely resembles the military intelligence departments of other major world powers. It is a subordinate echelon of the Ministry of Defense and functions somewhat as a G2 of the General Staff. All Soviet military attachés abroad are also controlled by the GRU, much like other military intelligence services.

The GRU is staffed entirely by military officers, most of whom have advanced military education and all the prestige and pride of most officer

corps.¹⁰ A former GRU officer related that:

The KGB boasted—still does—that they are the trusted ones, the elite, and as such have the right to supervise and control everything. My organization boasted that they were the military professionals and as such knew the business.¹¹


There are thought to be six major divisions within GRU headquarters in Moscow, with about 4,000 officers.¹² The first two are Operations Directorates organized on a geographic basis with direct "legal," including military attaché, and "illegal" operations. Target areas probably cover western Europe, the Far East, the US and United Kingdom and the Middle East.¹³ The Operations Directorate is also responsible for operating intelligence posts in Soviet military districts bordering foreign countries. The GRU supervises the intelligence collection effort of these posts: operations from them go up to 100 miles into adjacent nations.¹⁴ So-called "PRPs," or frontier intelligence points, pass agents back and forth across the borders.¹⁵

The next major section is the Scientific Technical Intelligence Directorate

which is responsible for the procurement of technical intelligence material.¹⁶ A Directorate for Communications and Radio Intelligence is closely connected to this directorate. It is responsible for the coding and decoding of intercepted communications, as well as for codes and ciphers.

A separate Information Directorate processes, evaluates and passes on the strategic information acquired by the GRU and the intelligence components of the Soviet armed forces. Undoubtedly, some input is provided by military intelligence sections of other Warsaw Pact countries, and some sort of liaison directorate exists for that purpose.

There is a "training schools section" with a school called the Military Diplomatic Academy which trains GRU officers for assignments in strategic intelligence.¹⁷ The GRU also maintains several separate schools in and around Moscow for training "illegals." Another section is responsible for training "diversionists," or agents for sabotage operations. This school receives large numbers of Latin American and African trainees who will be engaged in revolutionary activities. In addition, the GRU trains personnel for the support of insurgent movements in Africa, Latin America and Asia.



Russian Army Antecedents

Although very little has been published about Russian military intelligence, it is known that separate intelligence organizations for secret political police, counter-intelligence and military intelligence did exist.¹⁸ The Russian Ministry of War, however, appeared to have mixed success in intelligence activities. In the early 1900s, it was able to build up its cryptographic capabilities and, in fact, pioneered some encipherment techniques. A Colonel Andreiev, in charge of the Russian Army's cipher bureau, perfected a new and secret cipher.¹⁹

Before World War I, Russian military attachés set up spy networks in Germany and Austria-Hungary. Upon the outbreak of the war, they had to move out although they were still able to build up networks in four other countries to spy on the Germans. Russian military attachés ran a highly successful network in Sweden, and a Colonel Potocki ran one in Denmark. Colonel DeMeier was in charge in Holland, and in Switzerland the Russians were able to run four different nets simultaneously, with the military attaché, Colonel Golovana, operating an entirely separate one.²⁰ A notable military intelligence success also was accomplished by a Russian military attaché who recruited Captain Alfred Redl, a master spy in the Austrian Intelligence Service.²¹

Russian military intelligence has a number of training facilities and schools during this period. A special school for sabotage at Minsk was a forerunner of later GRU schools. In 1916, a Colonel Terekhov sent out sabotage teams to operate behind enemy lines.²² This was only a part of the long intelligence tradition of the Tsarist Army and it was to continue with the Red Army.

History

Soviet military intelligence has been called the Registration Department of the Red Army, the Second Bureau of the General Staff, the Fourth Department, the Seventh Department, the Intelligence Directorate, and finally the Chief Intelligence Directorate. For the purposes of this article, however, it will be known as the GRU.

The first military intelligence organization was probably organized by Leon Trotsky around 1918, although it was originally attached to the Cheka, the first Soviet state security organization. Even though the Cheka was principally a counterintelligence agency, the Registration Department functioned as Red Army Intelligence and was responsible, for example, for supplying military intel-

ligence for a war against Poland in 1920. The Soviets were beaten during that war, in part because the Registration Department proved unable to acquire up-to-date information on Poland and estimated that the Poles would rise up and join the Soviets.

In the wake of the Polish debacle Yan Berzin, who had worked for the Cheka in the counterintelligence elements of the 15th Red Army, was directed to head up military intelligence. Berzin, an energetic and adept leader, was able to direct dozens of spies abroad in the 1920s and early 1930s. Berzin molded a professional military intelligence organization and perfected its spy system, and particularly its illegals, or deep-cover agents. He was also instrumental in fostering the military's use of enciphered radio and one-time pads. The one-time pad, developed by the Germans after World War I, was adopted by the Soviets.

Some have said that the GRU was originally slated to be the intelligence organization of the Soviet Union.²³ From 1918 to 1921, it appears to have had the only foreign intelligence functions and in the early 1920s, its responsibilities were expanded when the GRU was tasked to further the Soviet-German military collaboration and to win German officers over to the anti-French, pro-Soviet side, thus getting into a form of political influence operation.²⁴ Later, during World War II, the GRU met with western intelligence services as the *only* Soviet intelligence service in an attempt to obtain training and modus operandi data against the Germans.

Semen Uritskiy succeeded Berzin as chief of the GRU in 1935. Both Berzin and Uritskiy were caught up in Stalin's purges of the late 1930s although they have since been rehabilitated. According to the Soviet press:

Uritskiy took over the duties of Chief of the Intelligence Administration from the outstanding organizer of Soviet strategic intelligence, Yan Karlovich Berzin. Uritskiy adopted his methods and line of work as the basis for his further activities. His tremendous organizational talent, knowledge of his work, and inexhaustible energy, the total contact established with his assistants who fully understood and supported him had a very beneficial influence upon the operations of Soviet strategic military intelligence.²⁵

In July of 1926, Directive No. 390 officially established the GRU as one of the four departments of the Red Army

Staff. According to John Ericson's **Soviet High Command**, "The Red Army Staff occupied a strong position controlling as it did its own Military Intelligence organs" and was the military "brain" of the state. Further, having its own control over "powerful military intelligence," the Red Army developed an appreciable degree of autonomy to estimate military requirements and policy.²⁶

During the late 1920s and early 1930s, the GRU exceeded the KGB's clandestine operations abroad. The GRU became highly professional and had instructions to gather real military intelligence along traditional espionage lines. During this period, it appeared to have the edge in expertise and talent and became extremely expert in illegal clandestine techniques abroad. According to Walter Krivitsky, a defector from Soviet military intelligence, the GRU had a network in the US as early as 1924.²⁷ Soviet military intelligence also collected much data in France from 1928 to 1933.²⁸

The GRU, however, was very badly decimated by the purges of the late 1930s. When General Tukhachevskiy was arrested at the start of the purges against the military, the KGB nearly gained control of the Soviet espionage apparatus, particularly with the execution of its first two military intelligence chiefs. Still, despite the massacre inflicted on the GRU, the collection of military information was essential before World War II. In fact, the GRU was able to keep Stalin extremely well-informed of the 1936 Anti-Comintern Pact of Germany, Italy and Japan.²⁹ While the GRU did not perform particularly well during the 1939 Finnish campaign, it was able to establish networks of agents at high levels of the German government prior to World War II and to collect information on, *inter alia*, German military targets and industry. The GRU did mount a number of highly successful operations, and at least four of its spy networks reported that the Soviet Union would be attacked by Germany. For example, a Czech agent by the name of Shkvor sent a report through General Golikov, chief of the GRU, to Stalin that the Germans were massing troops on the Soviet borders, although Stalin declared it a provocation by British intelligence.³⁰

During the war, the GRU exercised some control over the Soviet partisan movement, thus getting back into "active measures," when they conducted guerrilla, espionage, sabotage and assassination operations behind German lines. Representatives of the GRU frequently sent other representatives to act as liaison between the partisans

and the army. A modern-day follow-on to these World War II partisan operations would be performed by the so-called "diversionary brigades," under the control of the GRU.

Most recently, in January 1980, the Tokyo Police arrested a former Japanese General and two active duty officers passing information to the Soviet Military Attaché, the first post-war spy case involving the GRU and the Japanese military.³¹ The GRU officer had received classified information for more than a year. Also in January 1980, Canada ordered the expulsion of two Soviet military attachés for espionage against the US. In Madrid in February, a high-level official of the Soviet national airline Aeroflot was expelled by Spanish authorities for involvement in military espionage activities. This abbreviated look at GRU history indicates a continuing, aggressive and independent program of espionage operations.

Operations

Since it exists exclusively for foreign activities, the GRU performs a number of espionage operations with approximately 1,500 officers abroad. These operations generally follow those of the KGB. The dividing line between the two in foreign operations has never been clearly defined.

The GRU has accomplished a number of highly significant operations that have either equaled those of the KGB, or, in some cases, have been superior to them. These include the use of illegals and the use of radio intelligence. Other types of operations are unique to the GRU, such as its intelligence coordinating and processing capability.

Illegals. The GRU has been highly adept at running agents and has perfected the illegals apparatus to a fine degree with an active, aggressive presence worldwide. A number of GRU operations using undercover agents abroad have been discussed publicly. Some examples of illegals and other agents follow.

Richard Sorge. The Soviet press called him a "hero-intelligence officer" and "... a symbol of devotion to the great cause of the struggle for peace, a symbol of courage and heroism."³² Although much romantic nonsense has been written about Sorge and he was certainly overrated by the Soviets, he is considered by some to have been the greatest spy of the twentieth century. Sorge was one of the most successful Soviet spies and was able to pass highly sensitive information on Japan during World War II.

Sorge was probably enlisted in the GRU about 1928 and after spending some years in China was assigned to Japan in 1933. He gradually succeeded in infiltrating the highest Japanese circles. Sorge is said to have warned Stalin of the impending attack on the Soviet Union.³³ The Soviets in fact pointed this out when they reported, "In April, 1941, Richard Sorge transmitted very valuable information about the preparation for Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union."³⁴ This press account said he named the date for the attack, 22 June, but Stalin paid no attention to it. He also was able to assure Stalin of Japanese neutrality.

Sorge was arrested by Japanese counterintelligence in October 1941 with other members of his spy ring. He was tried, convicted and executed, reportedly in November 1944 on the anniversary of the Bolshevik takeover. Later, he was made a "Hero of the Soviet Union," a street in Moscow and a tanker were named after him, a stamp bearing his likeness was printed and a play was written about him.

Leopold Trepper and the "Rote Kapelle." The term "Rote Kapelle" (Red Orchestra) was a cryptonym used by German security officials for the Soviet networks of espionage and subversion discovered in western Europe. It was that part of the GRU network which principally operated in Germany, Belgium, Holland, France and Switzerland and included the "Rote Drei." The espionage reports were transmitted primarily by radio. The "music" on the air had its pianists (radio operators), a maestro in the field (the Grand Chef), and its conductor in Moscow (the Director). The network was originally set up by "specially trained and first rate Red Army Intelligence Officers."³⁵

The "Grand Chef" and outstanding figure in the network was Leopold Trepper. More than once Trepper gave warning in advance of the German attack on the USSR.³⁷ Later, he was able to give warning of plans for the German offensive in the Caucasus.

The German Signals Service finally found and broke up the ring. In a criticism of the network, a CIA study of 1979 said that the Rote Kapelle had too many agents and was built up too fast.³⁸

William Whalen. Lieutenant Colonel William H. Whalen had served in US intelligence since 1947. He came under FBI surveillance in 1959 when he was observed meeting with two Soviet Embassy officials, First Secretary Mikhail M. Shumaev and Colonel Sergei A. Edenski. Whalen is believed to have become acquainted with one of the Soviet military attachés in 1955 and the

other in 1959. One of them was promoted by the GRU to two star general rank for his handling of Whalen.

Whalen was arrested by FBI agents in July 1966.³⁹ At the time of his arrest, he had the distinction of being the only US officer ever charged with spying for the Soviet Union. He was recruited "in place" while he was serving with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon. Whalen was charged with receiving "information pertaining to atomic weaponry, missiles, military plans for the Defense of Europe, information concerning the retaliation plans of the United States Strategic Air Command, and information pertaining to troop movements, documents and writings relating to the National Defense of the United States."⁴⁰

Jack Dunlap. Sergeant Dunlap earned a small fortune in the early 1960's by photographing secret US documents for the Soviets. He was recruited by the GRU while on duty with the US Embassy in Moscow. When he returned to the US, Dunlap was assigned to the National Security Agency where he served the Soviets by producing classified documents for which they paid him \$60,000. He passed a number of items to include top secret CIA estimates of Soviet army, navy and nuclear capabilities. Dunlap committed suicide when US counterintelligence started to focus on him.

Giorgio Rinaldi. In 1966, western counterintelligence uncovered a GRU network extending from Scandinavia to Somalia. This net was run by a skydiver, Giorgio Rinaldi and his wife. The network's mission was to penetrate NATO and obtain details on military bases and operations, troop and ship movements, weapons and new equipment.⁴¹ Italian counterintelligence discovered that 200 agents were serving in the network.

Radio Communications and Cryptography. The GRU has had a long history in radio intelligence. Jan Berzin's efforts in the field of cryptography have already been mentioned. In the late 1920's, Major Ismail Akhmedov was to take a course in Moscow at the top secret Radio School of the GRU when "... radio was taking its place as a weapon of intelligence."⁴³

The advent of World War II brought about an expanded Soviet use of radio for intelligence purposes. It is known, for example, that there was a cryptanalytical group in the GRU in 1941, and a Lieutenant Colonel Kravchenko had a separate branch handling cryptography in 1943.⁴⁴ Each of the Soviet armed forces also had a component for communications intelligence at this time. Radio communications between

military spies and headquarters reportedly played a prominent role during the war. The Sorge ring in Japan and the Rote Kapelle in Germany all used the same standard Soviet espionage cipher, which at the time was unbreakable by the Germans.

Intelligence Coordination and Processing. The GRU coordinates the information which it receives from the intelligence sections of the five Soviet armed forces components due to its strategic intelligence responsibilities, something the KGB presumably does not do. It receives periodic reports by area and subject from these intelligence sections. Secrets are delivered to GRU personnel in Moscow by various methods. One of the simplest is to hand-carry it by diplomatic pouch. The Soviets have created a system where significant military and technical intelligence is diverted immediately to GRU headquarters and other GRU centers.

Pertinent information from the military intelligence services of other Warsaw Pact countries is also forwarded to GRU headquarters for processing. In his article, *The Surrogate Forces of the Soviet Union*, Brian Crozier wrote, "Like the Soviet Military Intelligence (GRU), the satellite military intelligence services have tactical and strategic tasks ... The methods used by the satellite services are for the most part on the lines of those taught and practiced by their Soviet masters."⁴⁵

In its strategic military intelligence role, the GRU receives all this informa-

tion and forwards it to the Information Directorate for processing and from there to the military and Party leadership. Thus, the GRU has its own separate informational channel to the hierarchy.

Conclusions

The GRU contributes vigorously and effectively to the overall Soviet espionage effort as a separate, autonomous agency under the Soviet Ministry of Defense. The entire agency is devoted to foreign operations and is for the most part similar to other major military intelligence agencies, including those in the West.

At times, the GRU has surpassed its rival in state security, the KGB, in espionage operations. It has accomplished some significant independent operations and, most importantly, a number of GRU networks functioned as early warning and tipped off Stalin to the imminent invasion of the Soviet Union during World War II. It appears to have had no constraints on its foreign operations work and has even gotten involved in "active measures," much like the KGB. The GRU has led the intelligence field in the development of radio communications and communications devices, showing extraordinary competence in technical matters.

The GRU's functions are wide in scope and dedicated exclusively to foreign operations. Traditionally, the

GRU has had a long history in foreign espionage, even longer than the KGB: its roots go back to Russian Army Intelligence. Both Soviet Military Intelligence and Tsarist Army Intelligence have led the field in communications intelligence and cryptography. The GRU's objectivity was proven during World War II when it correctly predicted the German invasion of the Soviet Union. Its early military leadership was especially competent. The GRU has shown itself to be particularly expert in technical communications intelligence. The typical GRU officer, holding an advanced military degree, is at least the professional equal of his KGB counterpart. The KGB supplies all the security for the GRU, and while this certainly has caused antagonism between the services, the KGB undoubtedly is effective in shielding the GRU from hostile counterintelligence forces. Therefore, although the GRU is subordinate to the KGB in a security sense, it must be considered an equal in the operational sense.


The GRU is a defense intelligence agency not subjugated to the KGB, and its operations are independent. Further, Peter Deriabin, himself a KGB defector, related that the "GRU is independent of the KGB except for security."⁴⁶ Finally, Oleg Penkovskiy, in referring to "our neighbors," the KGB, said "We constantly compete with each other in espionage. We try to prove that we work better and they try to prove the opposite."⁴⁷

Footnotes

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MI Training and West Point: How Tight a Fit?

by CPT (P) William C. Spracher

Background

Despite a rich, exciting heritage of intrigue embodied by the infamous exploits of Benedict Arnold and John André, West Point and the United States Military Academy have never been especially renowned sources of large numbers of high-quality Military Intelligence officers. Indeed, MI annually receives one of the lowest proportions of USMA graduates of any of the combat or combat support arms. Traditionally, the branch has been stocked with officers (many from the Reserve Components) having highly specialized academic backgrounds in languages, electronics and foreign area studies. Such credentials might be thought rare or non-existent among West Point graduates who are often perceived as Regular Army diehard careerists, hell-bent on being combat commanders and weaned on a generalist academic diet of math, engineering and tactics.

Of course, traditions die hard and the above observations have been at least in part true. Until fairly recent times, a Cadet First Captain (as Brigade Commander, the most senior cadet) who let it be known in advance that he might consider a branch other than Infantry was likely to find himself in a counseling session in the Commandant's office, being admonished that he must be the role model for the rest of the Corps.

But times have changed, albeit slowly. Indicators were evident even before their root causes. Beginning with the Class of 1969, four consecutive First Captains defied tradition by choos-

◀ These students are conducting a graded research project as part of the elective course in cartography taught by the Department of Geography and Computer Sciences. Their goal is to produce an atlas of computer-generated maps of all the Latin American countries. Equipment being used include (far left) a digital plotter and a Tektronix Graphic Display Terminal. The micro-computer along with the entire work station are connected to a Univac computer.



Aerial View of West Point ▲

ing Armor, Armor, Field Artillery, and Corps of Engineers respectively. Moreover, the current First Captain recently hinted that he too was planning on joining the Engineers. Although these branch choices hardly reflect what would normally be considered outside the mainstream of the combat-oriented Army, they nevertheless represented something just short of heresy at the time.

The apparent root causes of a change in cadet attitudes are four in number: 1) the gradual move to a peacetime Army, with the accompanying disillusionment over the glory of automatically "going combat arms;" 2) the reclassification of branches into combat, combat support and combat service support arms (graduating cadets could choose the new combat support branches MI and MP beginning in 1968), and the realization that all branches make positive contributions to the overall effort; 3) the increasing proportion of women in the services and at the academies which has required expanded assignment opportunities in as many specialties as possible consistent with the statutory limitations on combat roles; and 4) the liberalization of the USMA curriculum beginning in 1969, with more elective offerings and the chance to specialize

in certain "areas of concentration," obviating the totally generalist-oriented, common academic experience of all previous USMA graduates.

West Point has yet to graduate a First Captain into MI, but such an occurrence would not be revolutionary nowadays. MI has proven to be one of the most popular branches with first classmen, usually "going out" in the branch draw no lower than third. The only branch that has always seemed to top MI in cornering the market of academic achievers has been the Corps of Engineers. This is not at all surprising considering West Point's heritage as the earliest training ground for engineers in this country and its continued standing as an engineering institution of high quality. The MI selection statistics for the Class of 1980 are provided in an accompanying chart.

As indicated by the chart, choices are now being made by entry specialty, not only by branch. In 1980, cadets interested in MI were offered specialty codes (SC) 35 (Tactical/Strategic Intelligence), 37 (Electronic Warfare/Cryptology), and 15M (MI/Aviation). The 36 (CI/HUMINT) specialty has not been offered as an option by MILPER-CEN for the past two years. Although Engineers as a **branch** exhausted its maximum quota of cadets earlier than MI, the **specialty** snatched up most quickly of all was MI—15M—no doubt

due to the fact that flight school has always been popular among cadets, and hard-to-get fixed wing training is a desirable carryover skill for all considering eventual civilian employment.

While earlier classes were required to select a detail branch from among the combat arms for from one to two years' duty following graduation, cadets choosing MI now pin on the rose immediately and head for the MI Officer Basic Course (MIOBC) and subsequent intelligence assignments, usually S2 positions. The detail requirement was eliminated about five years ago by the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (OACSI), allegedly because MI officers had not been fully accepted in their temporary branches and often found themselves victims of discrimination in OER scores. I personally found just the opposite attitude in the tank battalion where I spent my one-year Armor detail and the two remaining years of my tour in Germany. Having served as Tank Platoon Leader and in two battalion staff positions prior to becoming the S2, I found myself treated as "one of the guys" and respected that much more for having gone through the same training and field rigors as Armor officers. Of course, having attended the Armor Officer Basic Course, I was not able to obtain MI specialty training until after my return to CONUS, except for short TDY courses in theater.

In 1973, MI branch began its own basic course, usually sending graduates directly to specialty training prior to detail assignments. Consequently, many of these officers were given S2 assignments without having served as platoon leaders. The failure to undergo this "rite of passage" most likely produced among combat arms commanders the sort of attitude that led to the ACSI's decision to eliminate details. Unfortunately, opportunities available to officers under the old system, including the chance to gain the experience needed later to provide sound intelligence support to the tactical commander and to develop an understanding of and respect for the combat arms and their requirements from the combat support arms, were lost with the change to the new system.

Class of 1980 MI Specialty Selection

Specialty	Maximum No.	Minimum No.	Rank Order of First Selectee	Rank Order of Last Selectee	No. of Cadets Assigned	Order of Exhaustion
35	21	0	16	408	21	5
37	10	0	88	424	10	7
15M	4	3	26	203	4	1

Twenty specialties available for selection.

GRADUATING CADETS: 902

Training Opportunities

Many aspects of the course of instruction at West Point, both academic and military, are highly appropriate to the needs of young MI lieutenants. During their first summer at the academy, freshmen (or "plebes") undergo Cadet Basic Training (CBT), affectionately known as "Beast Barracks." As a tactical officer in last summer's CBT, I witnessed this training over the six-week period. Although most of it centers on such basic military skills as drill, conditioning marches, physical training, and weapons qualification, instruction in land navigation is included during the Fourth Class Bivouac at the end of CBT. This serves as a lead-in to the basic map reading instruction offered to plebes in tactics classes during the regular school year. Such military science (MS) courses are taught during all four years at USMA, working up gradually from small unit tactics to the integration of major Army systems.

Of special importance to potential MI officers is a course required for sophomores (or "yearlings") entitled Terrain Analysis which is taught by highly qualified instructors from the Geography and Computer Sciences (G&CS) Department. The course blends advanced map interpretation and remote sensing techniques with elements of landform analysis, weather and climate. The course begins with a discussion of weather and climatic impacts on terrain and is followed by the study of landform development, advanced map mechanics and imagery interpretation (aerial photo, some stereo and remote sensor imagery). The course culminates in the preparation of a series of terrain analyses of selected world locations, combining map interpretation skills with knowledge of physical geography. Students are exposed to a variety of US and foreign maps displaying diverse terrain features.¹

For those cadets desiring more advanced work, the G&CS Department has some of the finest computer graphics facilities anywhere. Using computer software under development by the Defense Mapping Agency, the Engineer Topographic Laboratories and several commercial agencies, cadets can produce three-dimensional terrain models on color or black-and-white TV and shaded maps and charts.² Many students pursuing these projects are enrolled in the Geography "field of study," one of the sub-categories of the National Security and Public Affairs (NSPA) "area of concentration," which roughly corresponds to a "major" in these fields at civilian institutions. Cadet concentration in Geography provides "increased awareness of

During the 1980 Cadet Field Training program, all sophomore students received a short class on terrain association which utilized three dimensional computer displays to graphically illustrate key teaching points.

man's physical and cultural environment and prepares them either for specialization in foreign area studies, intelligence, or civil engineering, or with the general knowledge of world and national man-land relationships needed by the career officer interested in national security or public affairs, or the understanding of terrain required by the combat arms officer maneuvering his units."³

The G&CS courses are supplemented by those from other departments heavily involved in the NSPA curriculum, including the Social Sciences Department, which sponsors the Political Science, Economics, and International Relations fields of study, and the History Department, which sponsors the Military History and Military Studies fields. Foreign Area Studies, a new interdisciplinary area of concentration this year, draws on the assets of several departments to provide the sort of background that a future officer with a primary/alternate combination of SC 35/48 (Foreign Area Officer) would find invaluable. For instance, a cadet interested in China could enroll in the NSPA area and take some courses on China. However, should he choose to narrow his specialization focus, he can now choose the Foreign Area Studies track and take such electives as Chinese Geography (G&CS Department), Chinese Politics (Social Sciences Department), Chinese History (History Depart-

ment), and Chinese language courses (Foreign Languages Department). Every cadet is required to take a minimum of three semesters in one of seven foreign languages.⁴ Should he later decide to use his language background in SC 37, the core course in Electrical Engineering given junior (or "cow") year will suit his purposes nicely. In short, the USMA curriculum incorporates a broad range of courses covering virtually every aspect of knowledge that a college graduate entering MI today could be expected to possess.

Many offerings beyond the academic curriculum itself help lead a cadet toward his branch choice. Within the Department of Military Instruction (DMI), a non-academic department falling under the purview of the Commandant rather than the Dean, each branch is represented by a Senior Branch Representative, an instructor who, in addition to MS course teaching duties, serves as the point-of-contact with MILPERCEN on assignment policies, branch training, etc. The "Senior MI Rep," a focal point for cadets interested in MI seeking information on the branch, is, in effect, the senior "recruiter" for MI branch. He also enlists the aid of other MI officers who serve as assistant recruiters. Several regular events during the school year enlighten cadets to the benefits of "going MI."

The first event on the agenda is a series of four "Branch Orientation" nights, usually held in early October, at which the seniors (or "firsties") from one regiment at a time are exposed to what amounts to a job fair. Each branch available for selection has a table set up with literature discussing branch op-





Utilizing an AUTOTROL digitizer, this cadet is creating a digital data base of a small study area by tracing the image with an electronic recorder. Once completed, the data can be manipulated and redisplayed at any time.

portunities. Several officer "recruiters," drawn from a variety of specialties, field specific questions. A month later comes a "Meet the Branches" night, a more formal, but voluntary, session which includes a slide presentation by the Senior MI Rep and a question-and-answer period. Other MI officers are asked to participate in this event. During his spare time, the Senior MI Rep works to improve instruction on the foreign military threat included in MS courses, with emphasis on providing a progressive, mutually-reinforcing, and increasingly sophisticated appreciation of threat doctrine, operations and equipment. Upon completion, this effort should complement previously mentioned G&CS courses so that cadets are attuned to "enemy, weather and terrain" long before they make a branch/specialty selection.

Specialty selection itself occurs in late January after a straw poll in December provides an indication of the seniors' interest in each specialty. Between specialty selection in January and initial assignment selection in late February, "firsties" have the opportunity to attend a "Recent Graduate Seminar," at which lieutenants from several branches return to USMA to relate their experiences at various posts in the US. Last year, a 2LT from the 313th MI Battalion, 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, NC, represented the branch at this seminar. During the same time frame, a reception is held during which

new "MI cadets" are welcomed into the branch by MI officers assigned to USMA and by assignment personnel from MILPERCEN.

Throughout the cadets' final semester prior to commissioning, the Senior MI Rep provides branch instruction to MI seniors, including assignment orientation, a briefing on MIOBC, service orientation conferences, self-paced study, and other branch-relevant material. The capstone of the semester is a voluntary three-day trip (on cadets' leave time and at their own expense) to the Washington area in April for an orientation on strategic-level MI activities. In the past, MI cadets have been briefed by such elements as the US Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), OACSI, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the 11th MI Battalion at Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD. I was one of three MI officers escorting the cadets last spring after having become acquainted with some of them during branch orientation. Two-thirds of the cadets selecting MI made the trip and found it extremely educational and rewarding. After graduation in May, the new MI lieutenants are on their own and, according to all reports, put all the training they have received at West Point to good use.

Critique

While most MI cadets head out into their first assignments with more knowledge about their branch than their ROTC or OCS counterparts, there is much room for improvement.

First of all, USMA cadets get their best MI training *after* they have made their branch selections. Of course, it is

more feasible to provide concentrated instruction to some 30 senior cadets who know where they are headed than to 3,000-plus underclassmen whose futures are less certain. Still, West Point could do a far better job educating cadets on the vital role of intelligence in military operations so they might go to Branch Orientation night with a better understanding of the branch. This can be achieved by integrating more information into MS courses concerning the responsibilities of the S2 in support of the commander, along with more threat information, especially during the summer when the bulk of military training occurs. Little more can be done with CBT other than the introduction of land navigation. This is due to time constraints ("Beast" is now six weeks long instead of eight because of the re-scheduling of the academic year) and the fact that the top CBT priority is teaching new cadets basic soldiering and cadetship skills.

The most money can be made during Cadet Field Training (CFT) the following summer, when yearlings spend about seven weeks at Camp Buckner on the USMA reservation and at Fort Knox acquiring AIT-type skills taught by various branch committees. Historically, there has been *no* MI training during CFT with the exception of a brief follow-up on land navigation, the standard recon patrols during Recondo, and a cursory treatment of the importance of communications security (COMSEC). During the period of the most intense field training of a cadet's four years at the academy, MI branch is hardly mentioned. No wonder cadets do not associate MI with the tactical Army but rather with James Bond movies and CI agents ringing doorbells to conduct security investigations.

At times this mystique is useful. Many cadets select MI because it sounds intriguing and so it goes out early, drawing cadets with excellent academic credentials. But the central issue remains the continued accession by MI branch of officers best-qualified for MI, regardless of academic rank: those who recognize early in their cadet years the importance of combat support and combat service support arms in the success of the combat arms. I often hear: "Oh well, I'll never have a chance at MI because my grades are too low. I'll leave MI to the bookworms and just plan on going Infantry. Anyway, MI is bad for your career, so I'll coast along to graduation and take whatever combat arms go out late in the draw." I would prefer to hear: "MI is a small and competitive branch, but it is vitally important to the Army and suits my interests. So I'll start hitting the books to insure that it won't

Cadets doing a laboratory exercise, Department of Foreign Languages.

be out of reach."

The key to a change of attitudes is better orientations during the academic year and more relevant training during the summer months. The Senior MI Rep is exploring the feasibility of reviving an MI committee to plan integration of intelligence training into the CFT phase at Camp Buckner, with the initial focus on the CEWI concept. There is also the possibility of establishing some MI slots for Cadet Troop Leader Training (CTLT), the month-long on-site assignment of cadets to small unit leadership positions during their junior or senior summers. MI units have never participated in this program, and most cadets serve as "third lieutenants" in infantry, armor, artillery, engineer, or signal units. During his visit to the DC area last spring, the INSCOM Commander queried the MI cadets on the desirability of MI CTLT. The response was overwhelmingly favorable. Should this come about, cadets will probably be assigned to CEWI units or to S2 shops at battalion level. At present, the only non-USMA contact most MI cadets had with the branch was while participating in summer internships with such organizations as DIA and OASD/ISA. While invaluable for strategic background, these internships are highly competitive and available to only a handful of cadets during their "firstie" summer.



Instructors can increase their efforts to "get out the poop" about MI, sharing experiences, exploding myths, and distributing literature, including *MI Magazine*. Too many cadets have never seen it. Many company day-rooms receive branch publications, but not surprisingly *Infantry* and *Armor* are in greatest abundance. The Cadet Library did not, until recently, receive *MI Magazine*, and does not receive *American Intelligence Journal*.

I found what is probably the most telling evidence that we have a long way to go in pushing MI at West Point while conducting an informal survey of first- through third-year students in 1979-1980.

"MI Cadets" in the Class of 1980 during branch orientation trip to the Washington, DC area.

Most cadets felt that they need more exposure to MI; many were genuinely interested in the branch. At the same time, however, the survey revealed a disturbing lack of understanding of S2 requirements, especially in light of the fact that almost all graduates selecting MI soon become S2s of battalion or brigade-size units. While cadets will know what an S2 does by the time they graduate, they should know such basics *before* they select the branch.

One of many challenges before MI officers today is to help produce the best future MI officers possible. We indeed have the raw materials and the tools here at West Point, reflected in the enormous human potential within the Corps of Cadets and in the intelligence training assets at our fingertips. It is up to us to be equal to the task of providing the catalyst for action.

Footnotes

1. "The Department of Geography and Computer Science: A New Name for an Old Department," *Assembly* (quarterly publication of USMA Association of Graduates), Vol. 38, No. 4, March 1980, pp. 13, 33.
2. CPT David R. Bowen, "Three Dimensional Computer Maps and Graphics: New Tools for Terrain Analysis," *MI Magazine*, Vol. 5, No. 3, July-September 1979, pp. 6-10.
3. Office of the Dean of the Academic Board, USMA, *Academic Program: AY 1980-1981*, Spring 1980, p. 4-13.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 2-1.

Acknowledgement

The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of CPT John J. Charland, Assistant Professor, Department of Geography and Computer Sciences, who provided many of the photos accompanying this article along with background information on the fields of computer graphics and terrain analysis. He also wishes to thank CPT Daniel W. Henk, Senior MI Representative and Instructor, Department of Military Instruction, for his help in describing the MI branch orientation program designed for cadets. CPT Henk has expressed a desire to solicit from *MI Magazine* readers any information and materials they might have relevant to branch training or threat instruction. His office telephone is AV 688-4816/3965.



Tailoring Your Military Intelligence Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP)

by Fred H. Fernengel

Introduction

What is an ARTEP? We all have our own ideas: some are valid, others are not. Some commanders and trainers believe an ARTEP is used as an evaluation tool like the former Army Training Test. Others believe an ARTEP is a training guide, but they don't know how to use it because all the tasks do not apply to their particular unit, and some tasks that do apply are not included. Hopefully, this article will assist in putting the ARTEP in its proper perspective, and answer questions you may have. In this way the ARTEP will become the "capstone" manual for your unit's training.

AR 310-25, Dictionary of United States Army Terms, defines an ARTEP as:

A Department of the Army Publication providing guidance for training and evaluating units. It provides a list of tasks, ranked according to criticality, which must be accomplished by each element of the unit in order for it to accomplish its table(s) of organization and equipment mission. In addition to the tasks, it lists corresponding training objectives, references, conditions for testing and standards which must be attained.

From this definition it would seem that an ARTEP is a complete training program that will solve all your unit's training problems. However, this is not the case. In actuality, an ARTEP for a military intelligence (MI) unit is a guide that must be used with other training documents. For combat arms, the tasks, conditions and standards remain relatively constant, but for MI units this constancy is the exception and not the rule. To understand why, let's take a quick look at how USAICS develops an ARTEP.

Development

To develop an ARTEP, key docu-

ments must be researched (i.e., field manuals, training circulars, the Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE) to determine the unit's mission and tasks. A pure, DA-approved, TOE is used for this purpose. The unit's Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment, special operations, or unique contingency missions and tasks are **not** considered. If a pure TOE were not used, then each separate unit would need an individual ARTEP developed by USAICS. Missions and tasks are also based on current doctrine, with the unit at 100 percent strength in personnel and equipment, even though we all know a unit is not afforded this luxury. A mission and task list is then prepared and sent to field units for validation. If the unit agrees with the mission and task list, a concurrence is provided; if not, the field unit provides USAICS with revisions to the mission and task list. These comments are then evaluated and, if consistent with current doctrine and generally applicable to all MI units, they are incorporated into a final mission and task list.

Using the final mission and task list, a coordinating draft ARTEP is prepared. The coordinating draft ARTEP includes: conditions and standards for each task; standard ARTEP chapters and annexes; and individual soldiers' tasks relating to each collective task (individual/collective interface). The coordinating draft ARTEP is then sent to the field for comment. When USAICS receives these comments, the same evaluation and incorporation parameters are applied. A Department of Army ARTEP is then published.

Using the ARTEP

From the above discussion, it can be seen that a unit commander or trainer should use the ARTEP as a basis for developing his own unit training program. Because many unit commanders and trainers are not sure how this is done, let's look at how the ARTEP should be used. The first step in developing a unit training program is a review of the ARTEP:

- To identify those missions and tasks which are performed as written.
- To identify those missions and tasks which apply, but must be modified because of personnel, equipment, mission, or other differences. For example, a task applicable to PPS-4 radars would require modification to fit PPS-5 radars.
- To determine those missions and tasks which do not apply. For example, a task requiring use of interpreters in interrogation would be eliminated if no interpreters are available.
- To add new missions or tasks. These tasks are obtained from: The unit's modified TOE, standard operating procedures, personnel and equipment capabilities, contingency missions, and the G2. Conditions and standards must be prepared for each of these.

While conducting a mission and task review, be sure to consider what the unit is doing now, and how it will have to perform in combat. For example, in the Analysis and Production Section of most ARTEPs, a task for maintaining a formal Order of Battle (OB) journal is required. If the unit SOP requires that a modified OB journal be maintained, then make that modification to the ARTEP and train accordingly. On the other hand, if the unit is required to maintain a formal OB journal, then train to the ARTEP standard. Notify USAICS of any modifications, so future ARTEPs can reflect field doctrine more accurately.

If the ARTEP is modified, the individual skills relating to the modified tasks must also be identified. This is important because unit personnel must be proficient in individual skills before they can hope to successfully perform collectively.

When finished, the unit will have a modified ARTEP that meets its training needs. A training program can now be developed, based on the modified ARTEP and training initiated. There are many manuals which explain in detail

how to train. Two are: **FM 21-6, How to Prepare and Conduct Military Training**, and **FM 25-2, How to Manage Training**. These two manuals along with soldier's manuals, field manuals, training circulars, CEWI "How to Fight Manuals" and, of course, your modified ARTEP are excellent sources.

An MI unit is faced with problems that combat arms units never encounter. That is, an MI unit rarely trains or operates as an integral unit, but normally trains at a section or team level. This is a difficult problem, but it can be overcome if properly managed. Each section must be viewed as an independent unit, with training planned and conducted accordingly. A good example is the Ground Surveillance Radar (GSR) section, which is normally deployed with the line brigades and battalions. For realistic training the GSR section should deploy, operate, and support these units. The GSR section does not have to train with the MI unit to remain proficient. This makes sense, but what about Order of Battle (OB) personnel. They normally support the G2 on a day-to-day basis with real-world intelligence support, and have little time to train. If OB personnel are actively engaged in real-world support, they are improving their skills and in fact, training. Make a note in the ARTEP of what skills they have performed because they obviously do not require additional training in these skills. What about missions and tasks not being performed (trained) on a daily basis? When a brigade or battalion goes on a field training exercise (if the G2 agrees), additional OB personnel can be provided to support the S2 section. Similarly, division and corps exercises can be used. The additional support is useful to the supported element, and the OB personnel receive valuable training. This same technique works with other sections as well.

Another valuable training technique is for MI personnel to provide intelligence training to divisional elements. Although the MI unit is not responsible for providing such training, it would be beneficial for divisional elements and provide a valuable training experience for MI personnel if it could be arranged. An example is to have interrogators demonstrate to division personnel what to expect if captured. This could include an actual interrogation in a foreign language with an interpreter present. All personnel involved would gain from this training experience and training in the ARTEP task of interrogating with an interpreter would be accomplished. These are only a few examples. More and better techniques can be envisioned by using imagination. What's

important is to train on missions and tasks not performed daily, to train on those tasks which cannot be performed proficiently, to train with other division elements, and to train for combat.

Many unit commanders and trainers are concerned about internal and external ARTEP evaluations. Internal evaluations are used to determine how effective training has been, and the current training readiness of the unit. This is a continuous process and adjustments made to the training program are made based on evaluation results. There are several ways to make internal evaluations.

- Personal observation during training activities.
- Performance of day-to-day operations.
- Discussions with unit leaders and other trainers.
- Unit individual or collective test results (SQT, military stakes, former ARTEP evaluations).
- Assessment of new personnel and equipment capabilities.
- CPX/FTX after-action reports.
- Support of other units' training.

These are only a few examples. The important thing is to maintain records of the internal evaluation, and adjust the training program according to these results. The importance of maintaining records will become clearer as we discuss external evaluations.

External evaluations cause problems for MI units. Unlike combat arms units, it is difficult for MI units to be formally evaluated as an entire unit. In combat, MI units support other organizations throughout the operational area and are not centrally organized and located. For MI units to be externally evaluated, the entire supported force would have to be deployed, but because of money, time, and other constraints this is almost impossible. Here is a technique used by some units, to meet external evaluation requirements. If higher headquarters requires an external ARTEP evaluation, the evaluator can be shown the documented training and internal evaluation records reflecting the current status of the unit's training readiness. For these records to be acceptable to higher headquarters, it must be shown that the unit has met the ARTEP standards and accomplished all training requirements. In this way, a full-scale external evaluation may not be necessary. Let's look at two situations where this methodology could be used:

- During the training year the GSR section provided support to a brigade on six occasions and

satisfactorily performed all ARTEP tasks. The section was evaluated internally, while providing this support and the evaluation results fully documented. In this case, after reviewing the records and obtaining the supported unit's comments, the evaluator determined that there was no need to conduct an external evaluation of the GSR section.

- The Imagery Interpretation section concentrated training on photogrammetry, tactical identification, reports, terrain analysis, and target folder preparation. Internal evaluations were made and documented on photogrammetry and tactical identification. No internal evaluation was made of the remaining tasks because of the lack of opportunity. In this case, the evaluator, having records on some of the training conducted and internally evaluated, could concentrate on the areas not internally evaluated.

The key is to maintain accurate, complete training records to include: what was trained and internally evaluated; when, how and by whom; and how well it was done. If, however, higher headquarters won't accept internal evaluation, with all the inherent problems, then there is no choice but to make the best of it.

Conclusion

Much has been discussed in this article, and hopefully it has answered some of your questions. The ARTEP concept is a good one, and with a little work from all of us, we can reach our goal—**combat-ready MI units**. The key is "feedback." Let USAICS know what the problems are, how they were corrected or what assistance is needed. Call the training hotline at AUTOVON 879-3609 or the ARTEP office at AUTOVON 870-3185/5769; or write Commander, USAICS, ATTN: ATSI-TD-CT, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613.

The CEWI ARTEPs for Corps, Division, and Brigade/ACR are currently being developed. When you receive a draft mission and task list or coordinating draft ARTEP, take the time to review it, and make comments. By doing this, many of the problems discussed in this article will be overcome, and the ARTEP will truly be the "capstone manual" for your training program.

The Polish Struggle

by Capt. (P)

Dennis Mroczkowski

If ever a country has been destined to suffer greatly in the cause of freedom, surely that country is Poland. For the past four months, observers around the world have watched as events have seemingly led, step by inevitable step, towards an unfortunate end. Even as these words are written, or before they are published, it is possible that Poland will have been invaded once again. Of course the destiny of a country, like the course of an individual's life, can never be predicted with any certainty. But in the case of Poland, there are certain factors that make this country, of all the countries of Eastern Europe, the most likely to threaten the hold of the Soviet Union.

Poland is the most liberal of all countries within the Soviet Bloc. Religion is openly practiced, with a minimum of official harassment; dissidents are tolerated in Poland more than elsewhere in Eastern Europe; over the past 25 years workers have established a "de facto" right to strike; farmers have successfully escaped collectivization. This liberality is not a gift bestowed magnanimously upon the Polish people by the ruling Communist Party, however. These are rights that have been conceded by the government, rights which the Poles have struggled for. Indeed, much of the difficulty in today's uneasy situation in Poland results from the workers' demands that these hard-won rights be formally recognized by the government. Unlike other countries within the Soviet Bloc, political power in Poland is not held solely by a monolithic Communist Party. Other groups have demonstrated their power in Poland, and have forced the government to recognize it.

Not too surprisingly, the first organization to begin to erode the sovereign power of the Polish Communist Party was the Catholic Church.

At the end of World War II, the Polish Government-in-Exile found itself unable to return to its homeland, as it had hoped to do for nearly six years. A Soviet-backed Communist government had moved into Poland with the advancing Red Armies, and this government very quickly and ruthlessly consolidated its position and power. By 1948, any opposition parties had either been eliminated or absorbed into the Communist-dominated Polish United Worker's Party. As in the Soviet Union

and in the other countries of Eastern Europe which were behind the newly fallen "Iron Curtain," political power in Poland was to be held exclusively by the Communist Party. But in this most Roman Catholic of European countries, the Communists would have to destroy the authority and power of the Church. This was not going to be an easy task; Poland's post-war borders gave her a population that is 99 percent ethnically Polish and 95 percent Roman Catholic. Fully 75 percent of Poland's citizens, including many Party members, today are practicing members of the Church.

The Party began its attack on the Church in the late 1940s. While freedom of religion was "guaranteed" in the Constitution of 1952, Church schools were closed, the teaching of religion was severely restricted and the Party claimed the right to appoint priests to Church positions. Many priests, brothers and nuns were imprisoned, including finally the Primate of Poland, Cardinal Wyszyński. But Wyszyński did not remain in prison long. The Communist Party had failed to account for two things. The first was the historic attachment of the Polish people to the Church, and the second was that the Party itself needed the Church's support to be able to implement its own policies. By 1956, the Party had to cease its oppression of the Church in order to gain this important support.

Although there has been some harassment of the Church since 1956, the Party has implicitly recognized the power of the Church in Poland. For its part, the Church has repeatedly stated that it does not seek political power, but intends to continue as the moral and spiritual guide of the Polish people. Nevertheless, the Church has used its support for government programs to gain various concessions for itself and some freedom for the people. Church leaders realize that the concessions they have won are unique in the Communist world. It would be unrealistic, therefore, to expect the Church to issue a call for the overthrow of the present system or to give the Party any excuse to institute repressive measures against religion. At this time, the Church is a powerful force in Poland, as the government well knows. If Hitler could once facetiously ask, "How many divisions does the Pope have?" it now appears that the present Polish Pope has quiet a few, indeed, especially in his native country.

Since August 1980, the world has watched with keen interest as another

group has begun to make its bid for power in Poland. The workers, like the Church, have demonstrated since 1956 that the Party must reckon with them. In 1980, as in 1956 and 1970, the Polish workers forced a change in government. But the strikes of 1980 differed greatly from those of 1956, 1970 or 1976. What began in August 1980 as a strike against economic conditions soon became a strike to achieve political aims as well. The most important demands were the right to strike, the right to collective bargaining, the establishment of free trade unions outside of Communist Party control, the easing of censorship and the access of the Church to the media. The first three, in particular, were direct threats to the exclusively-held political power of the Party. Nevertheless, a series of fortuitous circumstances forced the new government of Stanislaw Kania to at least agree to the strikers' demands.

Three industries which were struck in August and early September were among Poland's most vital. The shipyards on the Baltic are among the world's most modern and active; Poland has built more than 100 vessels for 37 other countries. In January 1979, Polish ship-building capacity was booked up with foreign orders that could keep the shipyards busy through 1985. Poland's steel-producing industry is of course important to the shipbuilding, and Polish steel mills have been the object of a massive modernization effort over the last 10 years. Poland's coal mining accounts for 15 percent of the country's hard-currency exports, and provides 85 percent of the country's energy. Considering the amount of income derived from these three industries alone, and the crushing \$21 billion foreign debt, the Polish government could not allow the strikes to continue for very long. Additionally, two other important weapons were on the side of the strikers. First, the peacefulness and orderliness of the strikes gave the government no excuse for the use of force in breaking them. Equally important, the unprecedented amount of television and newspaper coverage of the strikes left the government little choice but to meet and negotiate with the strikers.

Throughout the negotiations, the strikers insisted that they were not seeking to usurp any of the Party's political power. Unfortunately, in a totalitarian state, any loss of power by the ruling group necessarily results in an increase of power by someone else. In Poland, the new union will be a political force which will take some power away from the Party, and the government quite correctly recognized the

threat that an independent union will pose. Consequently, the government has insisted upon formal union recognition, in the charter of Solidarity, of the Party's superior position. This has been the cause of much delay in the establishment of Solidarity and in dissatisfaction by the workers who believe that the government is trying to stall the implementation of their recently-won rights. There may be a lot of truth in this. Stanislaw Kania, the new Party Chief, was chosen at least with Moscow's approval, if not on Moscow's recommendation. It is believed in the West that the Soviets are hoping that Kania will be able to dilute or delay full implementation of the agreements.

The events in Poland pose a very real danger to the Soviet Union. The expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform in 1948, the invasion of Hungary in 1956, and the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 all prove that the Soviet Union is highly intolerant of any liberalization within the Eastern Bloc. In particular, the Soviet Union cannot allow one country to become an "exporter" of dissatisfaction to other East European communist countries. After the successful strikes in August and September, Poland began to occupy just such a dangerous position; rumors and reports of strikes in other East European countries and even in the Soviet Union itself only serve to make the Soviets blame Poland for any instability within Eastern Europe. Philosophically, the events in Poland are an embarrassment to the Soviet Union. Such crises are to be expected only in capitalist nations. A strike by the proletariat of a communist nation is inconsistent with communist dogma, and this inconsistency may cause grave doubts, among peoples around the world, about the inevitability of the triumph of communism. Also, Poland is strategically important to the Soviets. The broad Polish plains are an excellent corridor for the westward movement of troops and supplies to Germany. In the event of a war with NATO, the Soviets need a reliable Poland.

The Polish people have lived with the possibility of a Soviet invasion for several months now, and the Soviets have not been subtle in their use of threats. The warnings of "straying from the socialist path" were also given to Yugoslavia in 1948 and to Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the same phrasing was used as justification for the invasion of Afghanistan 15 months ago. Twice in three months, units of the Soviet and other Warsaw Pact armies have been maneuvering close to the

Polish borders. Of particular importance is the fact that the second series of "maneuvers" took place in December, a highly unusual time for Warsaw Pact training activities.

The situation is extremely tense and dangerous, but it is unlikely that the Soviets will resort to an invasion just yet. Militarily, the Soviets have extended themselves heavily in many areas. There has always been concern for the Soviet Union's border with China where several divisions are maintained. The Soviet Union has provided arms and advisors to African and Persian Gulf nations. The Soviet Union maintains 29 divisions in the Warsaw Pact countries surrounding Poland and two divisions in Poland itself. Finally, the Soviet Union has been caught up in an embarrassingly expensive war in Afghanistan. A military adventure in Poland would mean a further costly use of men and supplies.

The Soviets must also recognize certain political realities. Their image as friends of the Third World was terribly damaged by their invasion of Afghanistan. An invasion of Poland could only serve to reinforce their new image as imperialists and aggressors. More importantly, an invasion would certainly mean the end of detente, which the Soviets have found advantageous in their struggle with the West. Such costs could outweigh the advantages of making an example of Poland through military intervention.

Finally, the Soviets must consider the reaction of the Poles themselves to an invasion. The Soviets are well aware that over the past two centuries, the Poles have established a tradition of fighting for their independence, often against the Russians themselves. In more recent times, it should be remembered that although Poland was overrun by the Germans and Soviets during the Second World War, the Polish government never surrendered, nor was any Vichy or Quisling-style government established in Poland. Throughout the war, the Polish Government-in-Exile maintained contact with the Polish Home Army, the largest and most active underground movement in Occupied Europe. It is likely that the Poles would fight Soviet invaders as hard as they fought the Germans.

The Polish Army today is the largest numerically and the best-trained and equipped of any armed forces in the Warsaw Pact, except for those of the Soviet Union. This does not mean, however, that the Polish Army can be expected to be an unquestioning instrument of the Party's will. The Polish Army is, at any time, composed of two-thirds conscripts. Like other Communist

Parties, the Polish Communist Party is a minority party: only 6 percent of the population are Party members. Party membership in the ranks of the Army is also low. While 80 percent of officers are Party members, Party membership averages only 13 percent throughout the Army. Therefore it is likely that the great majority of Polish Army soldiers will be more concerned with the welfare and independence of their country than with Party loyalty. An indication of possible reluctance on the part of soldiers to act against their countrymen came during the rioting of 1970 when leaders in the Army and the Militia (a national police force) failed to fulfill some of their orders. In the face of a general insurrection or invasion, the government may find that its Armed Forces are more loyal to their nation and people than to itself.

So it remains unlikely that the Soviet Union will actually invade Poland at this time. Their present strategy appears to be two-fold. On the one hand, they will continue to keep the threat of invasion before the Polish people. Soviet newspaper and television commentaries use threatening phrases; the Soviets now have a reported 30 divisions near their own border with Poland; and the recent Warsaw Pact summit meeting has demonstrated the gravity with which the Soviets and other Communist governments view the Polish situation. In addition, the Soviets are isolating Poland. Recent actions and accusations by Czechoslovakia and East Germany and again, the recent Warsaw Pact summit, all demonstrate that Poland will stand alone against her Pact allies. In addition, Poland can expect no aid from the West. The Soviet accusations that the Polish troubles have been created by anti-socialist elements in the West serve not only to discredit the new union, but also to frighten away any additional aid such as the AFL-CIO sent to the strikers earlier. One effect of these harsh threats and isolation has already occurred. The leaders of Solidarity are assuming a more moderate tone, trying to halt any further strikes, especially those which, like the recent transportation strike, could be regarded by the Soviets as a threat to their own security.

A recent poll reported in *Time* magazine reveals that 34 percent of the Poles regard no nation as their best friend. Indeed, they are right; as so often in Polish history, Poland again stands alone. The economic and political problems facing Poland today can only be fully resolved by the Polish people and the Polish government. Should Poland be invaded (and the Soviets will invade if they perceive

(continued on page 3)

ACSI Viewpoint

The Training Challenge



by Major General
Edmund R. Thompson

Preparing our soldiers today to fight tomorrow's battle stands as one of the Army's toughest challenges. Recent international events have forced the Department of Defense to closely examine its capabilities as well as current doctrine and tactics. Further, growing threats in weapons, mobility and target acquisition capabilities have also contributed to that self-examination. The fact is that the US Army today is undergoing an intense modernization program to keep pace with the Soviet Army, its most likely major antagonist. Meeting these challenges will require increased use of technology and better trained soldiers.

Clearly, the Army's trainers face a formidable task in ensuring that the American soldier will be able to function effectively in the new environment. While relying more heavily than ever on machines to offset numerical disadvantages, materiel systems sometimes are developed and fielded without the full development of the personnel, training and maintenance subsystems needed to support the effective functioning of the total system. Thus, one training problem is ensuring that the soldiers can use the increasingly complex equipment on which we must now depend.

As an example, our trainers must develop doctrine and training for our soldiers hand-in-hand with fielding new equipment so as to have the complete system available at a single fielding date. To accomplish this, they must determine early in the development cycle man-equipment interface requirements, identify job skills and tasks, as well as expertise and manning levels. TRADOC's creation of Systems Managers (TSM) to coordinate this effort is an indication of progress in this area.

A second consideration, and probably the most important for the trainer, is the educational approach he must use with today's soldiers. This confronts us in MI directly; the methods we used during the era of the draft were tailored to soldiers who more frequently had achieved a high level of formal education. Today, a significant number of our soldiers do not share the same experience as their draft-era predecessors, and also, in common with their civilian contemporaries, respond to different training approaches and methods. In short, methods which were successful 10 years ago need to be reviewed. We must develop innovative approaches which will effectively prepare our soldiers in the numbers and capabilities needed by the field commander.

Further complicating this issue, the training base itself today faces significant resources constraints because it does not enjoy a high priority on the Department of the Army Master Priority List (DAMPL). When translated into people and support, this means that the training base will probably never be staffed to its full requirement level for people, nor will its logistics and maintenance requests be met with the same degree of alacrity as the requests of our deployed forces. Army Cohesion and Stability Study (ARCOSS) initiatives may provide some relief in this area.


Realizing it must somehow do more with less, the Army's institutional intelligence trainer, the US Army Intelligence Center and School (USAICS) with facilities at Fort Huachuca, Arizona and Fort Devens, Massachusetts, stands ready for its mission. USAICS is charged with:

- The development of intelligence doctrine, materiel requirements

and organization.

- The development of individual training programs and literature.
- Training selected personnel to perform intelligence, surveillance, security and electronic warfare duties for the US Army, selected sister services and foreign military personnel.

As seen from USIACS, the training organization of the Army is as depicted below:



The school at Fort Devens provides instruction and training development in **signals intelligence** related areas for officers and enlisted personnel. Non-SIGINT intelligence and security training and doctrine development is provided at Fort Huachuca. Courses taught at these schools range from the MI Officer Advance Course to Signals Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Systems Maintenance.


An example of a specific MI training challenge is the need to develop intelligence officers who are knowledgeable in all aspects of their profession. This may require the intelligence community to review its method of training and managing of intelligence officers. Experience with CEWI for the past four years, as well as management and training studies, clearly indicate the need for the intelligence officer, regardless of his grade, to have a basic capability in all intelligence disciplines. The recent OPMS intelligence specialty restructuring and the creation of the SC 30, Intelligence Management position, is indicative of the path we must follow.

A second challenge which also faces the schoolhouse is how to determine and meet the required soldier job tasks and skill level standards. Determination of these items in the intelligence field is made difficult by the variety of intelligence systems in this field; limited density of these systems and a variety of

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Military Intelligence Prospectus



Preface

This prospectus is designed to acquaint you, a potential commissioned officer or enlisted person, with career opportunities available in the United States Army's Military Intelligence branch. It is not intended to provide a detailed report on all aspects of this career field.

For more details on how to join the Military Intelligence (MI) Team, contact your local Army Recruiting Office, Reserve Officer Training Corps Representative, Army Reserve MI unit, or the Public Affairs Office, United States Army Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613, telephone (602) 538-2952.



Symbols of Military Intelligence



The Unit Crest

The tactical and strategic phases of intelligence are symbolized by the checked background representing a chessboard on the crest worn by the staff and faculty of the US Army Intelligence Center and School. The three divisions of the field denote the collection, production and dissemination of intelligence. Wisdom and silence are symbolized by the sphinx. The lamp of knowledge symbolizes enlightenment, and military leadership is represented by the sheathed saber.



Intelligence School Patch

The diamond-shaped US Army Intelligence Center and School Patch has a silver-gray border surrounding a blue field with a yellow demi-sun and flaming torch in the center. The colors blue and gray represent the Military Intelligence branch, while gold signifies achievement. The torch represents education and the sun depicts light and guidance with its seven rays spreading wisdom and strength.



MAIN EXCHANGE



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Military Intelligence in History

To prepare for the upcoming battle, Joshua sent two men into Jordan secretly, saying, "Go view the land, especially Jericho."

The Chinese philosopher and writer Sun Tzu wrote in *The Art of War*, "If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear a hundred battles."

Little happened in Rome that Hannibal didn't know about through his system of espionage—he had an excellent information collection system.

In Caesar's time, each Roman Legion of 3,000 to 6,000 men had ten speculators assigned to intelligence duties.

Genghis Khan sent agents throughout the world under the guise of merchants and traders.

During the English Civil War, Oliver Cromwell employed a bishop of the House of Commons to collect information on the Roundheads through the use of informants and spies.

In Europe during the 1500s and 1600s, 10 percent of the British government's budget was devoted to support embassies and establish informant networks.

General Von Steuben served as Washington's combat intelligence officer during many campaigns in the fight for Independence. A product of the Prussian system, Von Steuben provided a great deal of intelligence expertise.

In the spring of 1863, Union Colonel Benjamin Grierson led a regiment 600 miles in 16 days through the heart of the Confederacy. The success of the raid was credited to Grierson's scouts, who were dressed in Rebel uniforms.

After our entry into World War I, Colonel Ralph H. VanDeman, the father of American Military Intelligence, was placed in charge of a newly formed Military Intelligence Branch of the War College Division, the forerunner of today's Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence.

The most publicized Military Intelligence activities of World War I were carried out by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). General Alexander Patch, commanding General of the Seventh Army, credited the OSS with providing 67 percent of the intelligence used in the invasion of Southern France.

The importance of photographic intelligence was recognized early in the Korean War. The interpretation of aerial photographs was an invaluable source of information for commanders.

During the Cuban Missile Crisis, reconnaissance aircraft provided the photographic intelligence necessary to prove the existence of Soviet missiles in Cuba.

Vietnam provided the impetus for the continued development of combat surveillance aircraft and many types of sophisticated electronic sensing systems, both manned and unmanned.

Today, computer technology is being used to increase the speed, accuracy, and availability of intelligence data.

Mission

The Military Intelligence (MI) Branch is responsible for development of intelligence concerning potential or real enemies and areas of military operations to assist the tactical commander in decision-making.

The intelligence assets of the United States are vital to our national security because they provide the means by which we assess the capabilities and intentions of our potential adversaries.

The Army plays a vital role in the tactical intelligence arena. It manages assigned Military Intelligence assets which support ground force commanders and interfaces with national (strategic) level intelligence systems. Military Intelligence has two primary missions. They are:

1. Providing the Battlefield Commander with knowledge about the enemy's intentions and actions.

(With this knowledge the commander is able to employ his combat power at the critical moment to achieve decisive results.)

2. Denying the enemy access to our intentions and actions.

(An understanding of enemy information collection assets and tactics is critically important in order to deny the enemy access to information about US forces.)

The Military Intelligence needs of the defense establishment are enormously complex. In tactical units, combat intelligence enables the commander to **see the battlefield**, and to grasp the significance of terrain, weather, and the enemy situation as they impact upon his tactical decisions. Strategic intelligence provides the basis for planning and strategy at the national level and is essential to the formulation of policy.

Good intelligence is no accident. It results from the careful analysis of many kinds of information collected from a variety of sources.

The mission of the United States Army Intelligence Center and School is to conduct general intelligence and cryptologic/electronic warfare training, training developments, combat developments and operational testing.

The United States Army Intelligence School, Fort Devens (USAISD), formerly the United States Army Security Agency Training Center and School, officially became part of USAICS in 1976.

USAISD training detachments are located at Goodfellow Air Force Base, San Angelo, Texas and Corry Station Naval Base, Pensacola, Florida. (See training locations.)

Although separated by considerable distance, the training and training developments of USAICS and USAISD are fully coordinated to insure the full integration of intelligence disciplines in classroom instruction and training publications.

USAICS functions as part of the US Army



Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) of Fort Monroe, Virginia.

The role of military intelligence personnel is to collect and/or analyze information. Information may be true or false, important or irrelevant, positive or negative, confirmed or unconfirmed. The information forms a picture of enemy capabilities and provides clues about his intentions. Intelligence is developed from the analysis of this picture.

Military Intelligence includes three distinct disciplines:

1. Electromagnetic Intelligence is derived from electronic detection and exploitation of enemy communications, radar emissions and movement.

2. Imagery Intelligence involves the analysis of information collected by airborne radar, infrared and photographic sensors.

3. Human Intelligence results from the interrogation of prisoners, examination of documents and equipment, counterintelligence activities, and most importantly, reports from frontline friendly troops about the enemy.



Career Opportunities

Officers

Six percent of the Army's officers are in Military Intelligence. They serve in a variety of positions from tactical units to the Army General Staff.

Military Intelligence officers are assigned to one of three specialty areas—Tactical/Strategic Intelligence, Counterintelligence/Human Intelligence, or Electronic Warfare/Cryptology.

While specialization is necessary there is a requirement to render an intelligence product from all sources of information. To be effective, MI officers must understand the importance of this all-source collection and production effort. Therefore, while officers are trained in one of the three specialties, they are encouraged to develop proficiency in the two remaining specialties.

After assignment to MI Branch, officers will be assigned a specialty based primarily upon the needs of the Army. However, individual preferences will be considered.

All Military Intelligence officers complete the Military Intelligence Officer's Basic Course (MIOBC) before beginning specialty training courses.

Military Intelligence Officer's Basic Course

Regardless of the MI entry specialty selected, every MI officer must first complete the Military Intelligence Officer's Basic Course (MIOBC). MIOBC is a nine-week course offered at Fort Huachuca, Arizona; it includes individual and small-unit skills associated with combat arms (Infantry, Armor, Artillery), map reading, communications, and maintenance. Unlike other branch basic courses teaching company and platoon tactics, the MIOBC orients its tactics instruction to battalion and brigade levels.

Fifty percent of MI officers are assigned to the Tactical/Strategic Intelligence (35) field. Approximately 25 percent are in the Electronic Warfare/Cryptological (37) field, which is the most technically oriented of the three specialties. The remainder are assigned to the Counterintelligence/Human Intelligence (36) field.

Command positions in MI detachments, companies, battalions and groups are available to officers in any of the Military Intelligence specialties.

Specialties

Tactical/Strategic Intelligence (35) encompasses the application of the intelligence functions to tactical and strategic missions. Military Intelligence officers in this specialty direct and supervise intelligence collection resources, analyze information collected and produce intelligence from all sources.

1—Tactical Intelligence Officer (35A):

Most new officers entering this subspecialty serve at the tactical level, in battalion and squad-

ron S2 positions, or as assistant S2s at brigade, regiment or group level. Other tactical assignments are available in Division and Corps G2 sections. Emphasis is placed upon collection, analysis, and dissemination of combat intelligence and resource management.

Tactical Intelligence officers attend a nine-week **Tactical Intelligence Staff Officer Course** at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. This course provides training in collection resources, terrain analysis, security services, counterintelligence, electronic warfare, preparation of staff appraisals and instruction in Soviet, North Korean, and Chinese military doctrine, weapons and equipment.

2—**Strategic Intelligence Officer (35B):** Assignments within the 35B subspecialty occur at echelons above corps, primarily on joint staffs at theater and national levels. Collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence concerning the geography, sociology, natural resources, industrial capacity, and military forces of potential adversaries are emphasized. Officers entering this subspecialty as captains or majors have demonstrated proficiency in tactical intelligence assignments. The nine-month **Postgraduate Intelligence Course** and shorter orientation courses at the Defense Intelligence School (DIS) in Washington, DC, are available to officers selected for this subspecialty.

3—Tactical Surveillance Officer (35C):

These officers manage the Army's aerial reconnaissance resources and interpret aerial imagery. Assignments include: Imagery Interpretation Section Leader in corps MI units. Assistant Tactical Surveillance Officer on division and corps G2 staffs, Tactical Targeting Officer at corps, Imagery Interpretation Officer in an MI Battalion, and with national level agencies.

Officers in this subspecialty attend the 18-week **Tactical Surveillance Officer Course** at Fort Huachuca. The course teaches the fundamentals of imagery interpretation, the plotting of aerial imagery, preparation of overlays and mosaics, terrain analysis, identification of objects found on imagery and resource management.

Counterintelligence/Human Intelligence (36)

This specialty involves the collection and processing of information acquired from human sources, both friendly and enemy. Counterintelligence thwarts hostile intelligence efforts at espionage, sabotage and subversion.

1—**Counterintelligence Officer (36A):** Most officers entering the 36A subspecialty are assigned to nontactical assignments although some are assigned as battalion S2s. Duties may include personnel security investigations, counterintelligence special operations, and CI inspection services.

Counterintelligence Officers attend the 22-week **Counterintelligence Officer Course**

at Fort Huachuca. Instruction develops skills required in operations security, security support programs, general counterintelligence activities, security investigations, special operations, tactical human intelligence operations and tactical counterintelligence support and signal security. Specialty 36A officers are trained to recognize the hostile intelligence threat and recommend viable countermeasures to it.

2—Human Intelligence Officer (36B): These officers direct and coordinate collection operations to obtain information concerning enemy dispositions, intentions, tactics, logistics, morale and national strategy as suggested by the political and economic climate.

This subspecialty is open to a few experienced CI officers and requires specialized training and schooling.

Electronic Warfare Cryptology (37)

This specialty encompasses the fields of signals intelligence (SIGINT)—acquisition and interpretation of intelligence gained from the enemy's use of electronic equipment, signals security (SIGSEC), and electronic warfare (EW)—denying or curtailing the enemy's use of the electronic spectrum. Subspecialties are:

1—Electronic Warfare/Signal Intelligence Tactical Operations Officer (37A): EW/SIGINT officers are prepared for division and corps assignments with tactical SIGINT and EW units. Lieutenants assigned to Military Intelligence (Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence) groups serve as Collection and Jamming Platoon leaders and Assistant EW officers on division or corps staff.

Officers attend an 11-week **Electronic Warfare Cryptologic Tactical Officer Course** at Fort Devens, MA. The course provides training in the principles of electronics, and electronic wave propagation, antenna theory, radio and radar electronic emitters and their military applications, tactical collection equipment, reporting techniques and preparation of staff estimates.

2—Strategic Signal Intelligence Officer (37B): The 37B subspecialty prepares officers for initial duty assignments in the field of SIGINT operation management in support of national-level SIGINT collection analysis programs. Officers with this subspecialty can expect assignments in the Army Intelligence Command (INSCOM) field stations, other strategic collection units and the National Security Agency.

Officers attend an eight-week **Strategic Signal Intelligence Officer Course** at Fort Devens. Like the 37A Course, 37B provides an introduction to electronic theory and military applications while concentrating on national-level collection programs, analytical techniques, computer applications and managing SIGINT systems.

MI Officer Advanced Course

The Military Intelligence Officer Advanced Course is designed to prepare officers for Company Grade assignments. Officers usually attend the USAICS-conducted, 26-week course as senior First Lieutenants or junior Captains. The management-oriented course is designed to increase the professional qualifications of the MI officer through study of the US national defense organization, Army intelligence doctrine, combat operations and intelligence management. All-source intelligence activities are stressed, with special emphasis on command of CEWI assets at Corps and Divisional level. Successful completion of this course, plus the necessary experience, marks the officer as "branch-qualified" in Military Intelligence. Officers must have completed a Branch Officer Basic or equivalent Branch qualifying course in order to attend the MI Officer Advanced Course. Final top secret security clearance is required and officers must also meet the requirements for cryptoilogic and special intelligence access prior to course enrollment.

Pre-Command Course

Commissioned Active Duty and Reserve Officers in the grades of Major, Lieutenant Colonel or Colonel who have been designated to assume command of a Military Intelligence company, battalion or group, are selected to attend a four-week Pre-Command Course. The two-week intelligence phase of this course is conducted at USAICS and provides Military Intelligence command designees a review and update of US doctrine and tactics; training, logistics and personnel management; tactical, strategic and national intelligence systems; operations security (OPSEC), Threat target array and SIGINT doctrine; defensive electronic warfare (EW); and other specific Military Intelligence or general subjects. After completing the two-week Intelligence Pre-Command Course at USAICS, these officers proceed to Fort Leavenworth, KS, for the final two phases of Army Pre-Command training. These phases are devoted to the legal aspects of command; human resources development; personnel management and Threat; and current offensive and defensive tactics.

Progression Lieutenant

A lieutenant's first assignment provides the opportunity to apply skills learned in the basic and specialty courses.

Lieutenants should be aware that initial assignments provide the junior officer with the chance to become familiar with the people, methods and structures that comprise the Army in general and Military Intelligence in particular.

Too often, lieutenants arrive at their first assignment expecting duties to precisely match

what they have learned in their specialty courses. In addition to specialty related tasks, lieutenants should expect other duties such as morale officer, physical security officer and safety officer. The wide variety of jobs a junior officer must perform provide opportunities for leadership that cannot be obtained elsewhere. The key to success in the Army lies with the individual's motivation and desire to do the best job possible.

Captain

As captains, officers will continue to work in their entry specialties while beginning to develop alternate specialties. Captains should still seek positions that develop practical leadership skills.

All captains attend the Military Intelligence Officer Advanced Course (MIOAC). During MIOAC intelligence activities which will prepare the Military Intelligence officer for command and staff duties at battalion, brigade, or division and nondivision levels are stressed.

Before the eighth year of commissioned service, officers are asked by their branch to choose an alternate specialty. The final designation will be based upon the Army's needs and the officer's desires and qualifications. Officers are encouraged to develop one of the two other MI specialties as their alternate.

Major

Majors continue developing primary and alternate specialties. They are assigned to positions that will employ previously acquired skills while developing expertise in new areas. Some majors will be selected to attend the Command and General Staff College or the Armed Forces Staff College. Others may complete Command and General Staff College requirements by correspondence. These courses prepare majors to serve as commanders or staff officers in tactical level commands or in joint service staff assignments.

Lieutenant Colonel

Lieutenant colonels further their professional development through assignment to positions of higher responsibility in either of their specialties. Assignments are progressively more challenging and require the application of management and leadership ability and an overall understanding of the military.

Lieutenant colonels are considered by the Department of the Army for command positions and attendance at one of the senior service colleges.

Colonel

Colonels are automatically considered for assignment to key positions in Military Intelligence. At this point in their careers, maximum utilization of acquired skills is critically important.

General

General officers make a great contribution to the Army and to the nation. Emphasis is shifted from career development to maximum utilization of the officer's talents. General officers serve in executive and supervisory capacities on joint staffs or command major units, installations and activities in both Military Intelligence and related positions.

Warrant Officers

Warrant Officers are highly skilled specialists who fill positions of experience above the enlisted level. Warrant Officers provide a depth of knowledge in a single area which commissioned officers, although widely trained in many areas, cannot.

Warrant Officers are appointed from Active and Reserve Army (and other services) enlisted men and women, Reserve Component Warrant Officers, Active and Reserve Component commissioned officers and occupationally qualified civilians. In addition, Warrant Officers may receive their appointments through Warrant Officer Candidate Training (Aviators, Physicians' Assistants), reclassification of their respective specialties, direct appointment and recall to active duty.



Specialties

1 — Attaché Technician (961A): Attaché Technicians are responsible for the administration and management of the internal activities of Defense Attaché Offices in embassies around the world.

2 — Imagery Interpretation Technician (962A): Imagery Interpretation Technicians serve as the chiefs of or technicians within teams, sections, or platoons engaged in imagery interpretation. They are also responsible for the supervision and training of enlisted specialists in

the imagery interpretation field.

3—Interrogation Technician (963A): Interrogation Technicians direct and participate in the collection of military intelligence through the interrogation of prisoners of war. In addition to an extensive knowledge of enemy forces and friendly tactics and organization, this field requires an appreciation of the history, political organization, geography, customs and habits of the country to which assigned.

4—Order of Battle Technician (964A): Order of Battle Technicians collect and evaluate information concerning enemy tactical and strategic order of battle. They study and interpret changes in force organization, logistics, strength, composition, disposition, tactics, and leadership while establishing and maintaining liaison with other order of battle teams.

5—Counterintelligence Technician (971A): Counterintelligence Technicians are responsible for personnel and document security; sabotage investigations; photography operations; technical surveillance countermeasures, surveys, and inspections; and OPSEC surveys and inspections.

6—Area Intelligence Technician (972A): The functions of the Area Intelligence Technician are classified and cannot be listed here.

7—Traffic Analysis Technician (982A): Traffic Analysis Technicians supervise cryptanalysis activities and are involved with the identification, classification, and reporting of selected radio traffic parameters.

8—Emanations Analysis Technician (983A): Emanations Analysis Technicians supervise activities engaged in applying signal analysis techniques to intercepted noncommunications emanations and evaluate the results of this analysis.

9—Morse Intercept Technician (984A): Morse Intercept Technicians use a thorough knowledge of SIGINT operations and reporting procedures in their supervision of Morse Intercept Operations.

10—Non-Morse Intercept Technician (985A): Non-Morse Intercept Technicians intercept and analyze Non-Morse transmissions, using a wide variety of equipment ranging from reception and recording devices to computerized intercept systems.



11—Emitter Location/Identification Technician (986A): Emitter Location/Identification Technicians use their skills in radio direction-finding, radio fingerprinting and cryptosystems in identifying radio communications.

12—Voice Intercept Technician (988A): Voice Intercept Technicians use a thorough knowledge of a designated language and voice intercept techniques in the translation of voice communications, including difficult idioms, phrases, and terms.

Courses

MI Warrant Officer Advanced Course

The 15-week MI Warrant Officer Advanced Course is designed to prepare MI Warrant Officers for duties at corps level and below. The course is specialist-oriented and is designed to increase professional knowledge, skill, performance, and understanding of the interrelationships of the intelligence disciplines. Subjects taught include Strategic/Tactical Intelligence, Combined Arms Operations, Interrogation, Counterintelligence, Signal Intelligence, Electronic Warfare, leadership, management, and Threat organization and doctrine.

Warrant Officer Senior Course

The highest level of professional education available to Warrant Officers is the Warrant Officer Senior Course, taught at Fort Rucker, AL. Its purpose is to prepare carefully selected individuals for successful performance in a variety of demanding positions Armywide and in the Department of Defense.

Open to Warrant Officers with nine or more years of experience from all specialties, the six-month Warrant Officer Senior Course is composed of a core curriculum supplemented by elective blocks of instruction.

Progression

Warrant Officer career patterns are three-phased, based upon years of warrant officer service, so as to facilitate assignment and school selection processes and the optional use and professional development of Warrant Officers. Each phase offers a wider range of duties and responsibilities and requires a greater knowledge and broader preparation than the one before it.

Phase 1—(0–5 years): During Phase 1, time is devoted to a variety of entry level assignments, and establishment of the foundation or experience needed for election of subspecialties within the career field.

Phase 2—(5–11 years): Phase 2 is devoted to assignments at intermediate echelons of responsibility, and is characterized by attendance at the Warrant Officer Advanced Course, expanded skill training, and development of exper-

tise in the appropriate subspecialties of the career field.

Phase 3—(11 years to termination of service): During Phase 3 the warrant is used in the highest level assignments in his career field. The best qualified will be selected to attend the Warrant Officer Senior Course in preparation for this phase.

Enlisted Personnel

Enlisted personnel have a variety of specialties from which to choose.

Each Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) offers its own challenges and provides the enlistee with career-enhancing opportunities.

Specialties

1—Electronic Warfare/Signal Intelligence Emitter Identifier/Locator (05D): Identifier locator operators identify and locate radio transmitters using specialized radio antennas, oscilloscopes, light sensitive recorders and radio receivers.

Personnel attend a 28-week course at Fort Devens.

2—Signal Security Specialist (05G): Signal security specialists monitor and record friendly radiotelephone and conventional telephone communications. They analyze friendly communications for security violations.

Personnel attend a 17-week course at Fort Devens.

3—Electronic Warfare/Signal Intelligence Morse collector (05H): Morse collectors are trained to use code and radio intercept equipment in order to search for, detect and record foreign communications using the International Morse Code.

Personnel attend a 23-week course at Fort Devens.

4—Ground Surveillance Radar Operator (17K): Radar operators are trained to deploy radars and other devices designed to detect enemy ground activity and to report collected information.

Personnel attend a four-week course at Fort Huachuca, Arizona.

5—Remote Ground Sensor Specialist (17M): Sensor specialists emplace and recover remote sensors which provide data on the direction, rate of travel, type of target and density of enemy ground forces.

Personnel attend a four-week course at Fort Huachuca.

6—Interrogator (96C): Interrogators question enemy prisoners of war, civilians and defectors.

Most interrogators attend the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, CA, upon completion of the interrogator course to acquire the foreign language skills required in their specialty.

Personnel attend a seven-week course at Fort Huachuca.

7—Intelligence Analyst (96B): Intelligence analysts evaluate information, maintain intelligence records and files, prepare reports and update situation maps showing identification, movement and strength of enemy units.

Personnel attend an eight-week course at Fort Huachuca.

8—Image Interpreter (96D): Image interpreters study from aerial photos, infrared and airborne radar readings in order to identify enemy units and equipment. From this, they prepare targeting information using map overlays, charts, mosaics and other graphics.

Personnel attend a 12-week course at Fort Huachuca.

9—Counterintelligence Specialist (97B): Counterintelligence (CI) specialists conduct security investigations, special operations and security inspections in order to keep the enemy from exploiting the vulnerabilities of friendly forces. They recommend responsive and viable countermeasures to the commander.

Personnel attend a 13-week course at Fort Huachuca.

10—Electronic Warfare/Signal Intelligence Analyst (98C): Signal intelligence analysts intercept, sort and analyze enemy communications to develop tactical information concerning enemy forces. Analysts must be familiar with enemy capabilities and equipment. They are trained in data processing procedures for storing and transmitting information.

Personnel attend a 13-week course at Goodfellow Air Force Base, Texas.

11—Electronic Warfare/Signal Intelligence Voice Interceptor (98G): Voice interceptors detect, identify, record and process foreign voice radio transmissions. They also provide translation assistance to nonlanguage qualified intelligence analysts (96B).

Personnel are trained at the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, California, and attend a 14-week course at Goodfellow Air Force Base.

12—Electronic Warfare/Signal Intelligence Non communications Interceptor Analyst (98J): These analysts search for electro-optical signals generated by enemy emitters. They operate electronic equipment to identify and distinguish categories of electronic signals.

Personnel attend a 14-week course at Fort Devens.

13—Electronic Warfare/Intercept Equipment Repairer (33A): Intercept equipment repairers are trained in circuit analysis and repair of transportable direction-finding devices, digital/logic systems, magnetic recording theory, and electronic countermeasure systems.

Personnel attend a 34-week course at Fort Devens.

14—Aerial Sensor Specialist (96H): Aerial sensor specialists plan for and participate in aerial reconnaissance, search missions and radiological surveys. They operate infrared,

radar and photographic systems, as well as navigational radio equipment in the OV-1D Mohawk.

Personnel attend an eight-week course at Fort Huachuca.

15—Combat Area Surveillance Radar Repairer (26C): Combat area surveillance radar repairers perform unit, direct and general support maintenance on ground based surveillance radar sets.

Personnel receive basic electronic and specific equipment training in a 23-week course at Fort Huachuca.

16—Aerial Surveillance Sensor Repairer (26E): Aerial surveillance sensor repairers perform unit, direct and general support maintenance on sidelooking airborne radars, and infrared and photographic camera systems on the OV-1D Mohawk aircraft.

Personnel receive electronic training in a 45-week course at Fort Huachuca.

17—Aircraft Survivability Systems Equipment Repairer (Formerly MOS 26K, now planned as Additional Skill Identifier W6 to MOS 35K and 35R): Aircraft survivability systems equipment repairers perform unit, direct and general support maintenance on electronic systems designed to increase an aircraft's chances of survival in a combat situation.

Personnel are given basic electronics instruction in a 12- to 26-week course at Fort Huachuca.

Progression

E-1 (Trainee)

E-2 (Private)

The trainee begins active duty within six weeks of basic training. The training may be conducted at one of several locations throughout the United States. It is designed to teach basic military skills and provide insight into military life. If the trainee does well in basic training, his chances of excelling during the remainder of his stay in the Army are excellent. Privates receive advanced individual MOS (Military Occupational Specialty) training in areas enlisted for, or selected for, based upon their qualifications and the needs of the Army. After MOS training, Privates begin their first assignment.

E-3 (Private First Class—PFC)

E-4 (Specialist Four—SP4)

PFCs and SP4s apply and refine skills learned in basic and MOS training. Besides MOS-related duties, they perform other duties as required.

The soldier who does his best with whatever task is assigned him will normally be successful in the Army.

PFCs and SP4s should attend a unit-sponsored Primary Leadership Course or Basic Leadership course at the earliest opportunity. Enrollment in courses given at local civilian

institutions and in the Army Correspondence Course Program is encouraged. These opportunities provides for professional development and acquisition of promotion points.

E-5 (Specialist Five-SP5)

The SP5 will be assigned to jobs requiring a high degree of proficiency in his MOS, and will be given increased responsibility in his work environment. It is at this level that the soldier receives his first Enlisted Evaluation Report, documenting his job performance based on his supervisor's observations. E-5s should concentrate on development of resource management and leadership skills.

Soldiers in the remaining grades/ranks are noncommissioned officers (NCO). They are the backbone of the Army; and hold important positions throughout the Army.

E-6 (Staff Sergeant-SSG)

SSGs may directly supervise the work done by lower ranking soldiers or serve in staff or operational positions. At this level, soldiers must acquire a second MOS through correspondence courses, resident MOS-producing courses, or on-the-job training. E-6s are selected by a centralized board at Department of the Army (DA) to attend a basic NCO development course designed to prepare them for duties as E-7s.

E-7 (Sergeant First Class-SFC)

Promotions to this grade are decided by DA under a highly competitive centralized promotion system unlike previous promotions granted by local commands. E-7s continue to develop their primary and secondary MOS skills. They are primarily assigned to supervisory and staff positions in tactical support units as Operations and Platoon Sergeants. SFCs should continue to refine their skills in preparation for E-8 duties.

E-8 (Master Sergeant or First Sergeant-MSG or 1SG)

Assignments are progressively more challenging. E-8s serve in staff positions in major commands or as First Sergeants in tactical or strategic units. They play key roles in insuring that the Army accomplishes its overall mission. A small percentage of E-8s will be selected to attend the Sergeants Major Academy.

E-9 (Staff Sergeant Major, Command Sergeant Major, Sergeant Major of the Army-SGM, CSM, SMA)

Sergeants Major (SGM) make significant contributions to the Army and the nation. Emphasis is on maximum utilization of the SGM's talents and experience. They serve as principal advisors to commanders of major commands, joint staffs, and generally in responsible positions throughout the Army.

Training Locations

Fort Huachuca

Fort Huachuca, Arizona, located outside Sierra Vista, is approximately 15 miles north of Mexico in the Huachuca Mountains. (Huachuca, used by the Sobaipurei Indians to describe the area, means "**place of thunder**" or "**place of wind and rain.**") Established in 1877 to protect settlers and travelers, it became what was the advance headquarters in the campaign against Geronimo in 1886 and played a key role in the Indian Wars.

Fort Huachuca's symbol is the **Buffalo soldier**. So named by the Indians, these black soldiers distinguished themselves in the Indian Wars of the 1870s and 1880s. In 1916, Buffalo Soldiers joined General "Black Jack" Pershing on his futile expedition to capture Pancho Villa in the hills of Mexico.

In recognition of the history of the Army in the Southwest, Fort Huachuca sponsors B Troop, 4th US Cavalry, Memorial, which recreates an 1885 cavalry unit in parades and historical reenactments throughout the state of Arizona. Its 30 mounted troopers, with authentic uniforms and equipment, commemorate the unit which played a key role in the 1886 capture of Geronimo.

In 1971, The United States Army Intelligence center and school (USAICS) was established at Fort Huachuca joining the US Army Communications Command and the 11th Signal brigade. Elements of USAICS are the US Army Intelligence school, Fort Devens (USAISD), and US Army Special Security Detachments at Pensacola, Florida and San Angelo, Texas.

Fort Huachuca facilities provide personnel with a variety of services and recreational opportunities.

Fort Huachuca is 75 miles from Tucson. Huachucans drive to Tucson for shopping, sight-seeing, cultural events, and to attend courses at the University of Arizona. Historic Tombstone, "**The Town Too Tough to Die**" is a 30-minute drive from Fort Huachuca.



Fort Devens

Fort Devens, located outside the city of Ayer, Massachusetts, is named in honor of Major General Charles Devens, a native of Massachusetts who served in the Union Army during the Civil War as US Attorney General under President Rutherford B. Hayes.

Fort Devens was established as a temporary training camp during World War I and grew with America's rapid build-up of the Army following the war. Today, Fort Devens trains regular Army units and supports Reserve Components throughout the New England area.

The United States Army Security Agency Training Center and School became the United States Army Intelligence School (USAISD), Fort Devens, October 1976. Fort Devens is also the home of the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), Army Readiness Region I, Headquarters Command, United States Army Garrison, and the 39th Combat Engineer Battalion.

To further enhance unit pride and troop morale the School Brigade maintains a special voluntary activities program. The 14th Continental Army, which marches and drills with fife and drum in authentic Revolutionary War regalia, is best known of these activities and is a regular participant in parades and other events in the New England area.

Fort Devens is located 30 miles northwest of Boston and 12 miles south of the New Hampshire/Massachusetts border. The post offers a variety of entertainment, recreation, and athletic activities.

Personnel stationed at Fort Devens are truly **"in the heart of the Nation's heritage."** Historic Lexington, Concord, Salem, Boston, and Cambridge are minutes from Fort Devens.

Two subordinate USAISD detachments coordinate Army affairs and training at the Air Force and Navy cryptologic schools.

1—The Air Force 3480th Technical Training Group; Goodfellow Air Force Base; San Angelo, Texas. Students receive advanced individual training in traffic analysis and cryptology. Graduates of the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, California, are also trained at Goodfellow as radiotelephone interceptors and transcribers.

2—The Naval Technical Training Center, Corry Station, Pensacola, Florida. Personnel are trained in basic and advanced non-Morse collection techniques.

Most graduates of these programs usually return to Fort Devens for mission-specific training.



U S ARMY
FORT DEVENS

Accreditation

The United States Army Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca, is accredited by the North Central Association of Colleges and Schools.

The United States Army Intelligence School, Fort Devens, is accredited by the New England Association of Schools and Colleges.

Today's soldiers may find this accreditation an incentive to choose a career in the military intelligence field. Credits earned in certain USAICS and USAISD courses may be combined with college courses available through Army education centers in the pursuit of an Associate or Bachelor degree.

Educational Opportunities

The Army emphasizes the importance of the continuing education of all military personnel. All Army posts have Army Education Centers offering educational opportunities and counseling classes to military personnel.

Officers

Degree Completion

This program allows officers to attend college for up to 18 months to complete a baccalaureate or master's degree.

Officers entering this program should expect to serve in a degree-related position for a minimum of three years. Officers are considered for this program between the 3rd and 14th year of service. Priority of selection normally goes to those individuals who can complete their degree requirements in the least amount of time.

Academic Delay to Pursue Graduate Studies

Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) college seniors may apply for an academic delay to pursue an advanced degree before entering active duty. The student is responsible for tuition and books and draws no pay or allowances. While attending school the officer accrues time in grade for purposes of pay and rank. Additional active duty obligations are not incurred. The officer generally has three years to complete a law degree or two years for graduate studies in other disciplines.

Top 5 Percent of US Military Academy and ROTC Graduate School Program

This program offers up to 18 months advanced education at the Army's expense to ROTC and US Military Academy cadets graduating in the top 5 percent of their class. Selected cadets may begin graduate school anytime between the 4th and the 10th year of military service.

Foreign Area Officer

The Foreign Area Officer Program provides Army officers with expertise in a particular geographic area.

This program involves study at a civilian graduate school, language training at the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, California, and in-country training over a 5-year period. After training, the officers' assignments are divided between their branch skills and foreign area skills.

Foreign Area Officers serve with the Secretary of Defense, the State Department, Joint Chiefs of Staff, military assistance groups and liaison officers. They analyze military problems as they are affected by political, economic and social variables.

Aviation

The MI Aviation Program is fixed-wing oriented, although new aviators are first qualified in rotary-wing aircraft. Aviation requirements are found exclusively in the fields of aerial surveillance and cryptologic intelligence. The MI Aviator can expect to remain in one of these two areas. Cryptologic Aviators fly the U-21 aircraft while aerial surveillance aviators fly the OV-1D Mohawk.

Individuals interested in the aviation specialty must pass the Army flight test and flight physical.

The MI aviator flies intelligence-configured aircraft on intelligence missions. Enlisted personnel accepted for aviation training are commissioned warrant officers upon completion of rotary-wing aircraft training.

Enlisted Personnel

Basic Skills Education

Basic Skills Education allows commanders to improve the educational level of trainees who have difficulty communicating in English. It is designed to raise competencies to the ninth grade level and provide training in English as a second language.

High School Completion

This program provides all enlisted personnel with the opportunity to earn a high school diploma or an equivalency certificate during off-duty hours. Soldiers in this program generally enroll in a local high school completion program. The Army pays 75 percent of tuition costs.

All Personnel

Airborne

Airborne School is a rigorous 3-week course offered at Fort Benning, Georgia, which trains personnel as Army paratroopers. The course it-

self consists of ground week, tower week and jump week.

Airborne training is completed once the trainee has made five jumps from a military aircraft. Airborne Wings are presented to each graduate.

Ranger

Ranger School is the most physically strenuous course offered by the Army. The school was established to provide training in small unit tactics. Emphasis is placed on patrolling, exposure to various terrain and climatic environments and individual leadership qualities.

At the completion of training, students return to Fort Benning for graduation and the coveted black and gold Ranger tab.

Soldiers who wish to attend Ranger School must be in excellent physical condition. Soldiers must score a minimum of 400 points on the advanced physical fitness test with at least 70 points in each event and pass the combat water survival test in order to be accepted for Ranger training.

Advanced Degree Program

Personnel may be selected for advanced degree training in areas corresponding to Army needs. MI personnel are eligible to participate in this program between the 5th and 13th years of service.

Serviceman's Opportunity College

Serviceman's Opportunity College is a network of colleges and universities which allows soldiers to work toward degrees without extended residency requirements. This allows military personnel to take a variety of correspondence courses from different institutions to meet degree requirements.

Independent Study Programs

More than 7,000 independent study courses are available to active duty servicemen through the Defense Activity for Nontraditional Education Support. Courses are available to support training at all levels, including vocational training.

Some courses may satisfy certification requirements while others are designed to meet students' occupational, career or professional needs rather than academic ones. The Army pays 75 percent of all tuition costs under this program.

Veterans' Educational Assistance Program

Under this program, the Veterans' Administration contributes \$2 for every \$1 contributed by personnel to a personal education fund. To be eligible for this program, Army personnel must contribute between \$50 and \$75 a month to the fund. The maximum amount that may accumulate (including Veterans' Administration matching funds) is \$8,100.

Soldiers must use these benefits within 10 years after discharge.

Reserve Components

If you would rather serve as a member of the Army Reserve, you may do so through Reserve units nationwide.

More than half of the Army's intelligence personnel serve in Reserve and National Guard Units.

More than 100 Reserve organizations are staffed by approximately 1,300 officers and warrant officers and 5,000 enlisted personnel.

Reserve personnel are eligible for the same education and training available to members of the active Army. Additionally, personnel in the Reserve may receive training at Intelligence Training Army Area Schools during the summer months or at the Intelligence Center and School, under the auspices of the Office of Reserve Training, throughout the year.

If you're interested in joining a Reserve Component please call St. Louis, Missouri, (toll free) 1-800-325-1864 for further information.





The Soviets as Arms Merchants

by 1LT Richard N. Warne

Introduction

Since the Bolshevik Revolution, arms exports have been an integral part of Soviet foreign policy. The USSR provided weapons to Turkey during the Turko-Greek War of 1921 and supplied some arms to the Yemeni Revolution of 1928.¹ It also played an important role in rearming the Germans after Hitler's rise to power and supplied weapons to Spanish Loyalist forces during Spain's civil war.

Arms transfers outside the Soviet Union were temporarily halted during World War II. But since the surrender of the Axis powers, the number of Soviet arms clients has gradually increased. During the last decade the USSR has supplied arms to 44 Third World governments.²

In addition to increasing the number of arms recipients, the Soviet Union has also increased the value of its arms transfers to the Third World. In 1953, at the height of the Cold War, Soviet arms exports to the Third World totaled less than \$25 million. Today, estimates of Soviet arms transfers to the Third World range from \$1.2 to \$2.8 billion annually.³

What factors have contributed to the increase in Soviet arms exports? What does the USSR hope to achieve through arms transfers? And how successful have the Soviets been in achieving their political and military objectives through their arms exports to Third World clients?

World Conditions

The increase in Soviet arms exports reflects an insatiable demand for arms in the post-World War II era, especially that of the more than 100 countries which have won independence in the past 35 years. Anxious to demonstrate their independence and acquire the trappings of power and prestige, many have sought Soviet weapons. Kremlin leaders have been willing to provide a wide range of military hardware to these countries whether or not such weapons were compatible with the country's terrain or met a reasonable military threat. Some nations lacked both the manpower and resources to

operate the equipment they purchased from the USSR. In 1963, the Soviet Union sold Somalia jet fighters even though its population of two million had a per capita income of \$50, a literacy rate of 10 percent, fewer than 100 college graduates and no technicians or pilots even remotely capable of operating them. The USSR provided Indonesia with a navy that never left port and tanks that proved useless in its jungles. Guinea was provided anti-tank guns complete with white side wall tires even though none of its neighbors had any armored vehicles.⁴

Ancient tribal conflicts, ethnic animosities and regional rivalries once held in check by colonial armies are today more likely to erupt into armed conflict. One of every three countries in the world has fought a war or attempted to quell an internal revolutionary movement in the last 10 years.

While some countries have sought weapons for prestige, many have purchased arms to defend themselves against external aggression or internal subversion. Ancient tribal conflicts, ethnic animosities and regional rivalries once held in check by colonial armies are today more likely to erupt into armed conflict. One of every three countries in the world has fought a war or attempted to quell an internal revolutionary movement in the last 10 years.⁵

The Soviet Union has successfully peddled its military wares in a world obsessed with arms and filled with centuries-old conflict. It has been aided in part by the refusal of some Western powers to supply arms to certain countries. Government policy in Canada, Sweden, and West Germany prohibits arms transfers to regions where tensions are likely to erupt into armed conflict. The United States has followed a similar policy in certain cases where an arms embargo would decrease the likelihood of conflict or where it has felt

the recipient country could not afford the munitions it was requesting.

As a result of such decisions by Western powers (whether good or bad), the Soviet Union has often been the only power willing to supply weapons to Third World nations. Algeria bought Soviet weapons when Western nations refused to fill her munitions shopping list after a 1963 border conflict with Morocco.⁶ After the US Congress prevented the sale of jet aircraft and other sophisticated weapons systems to Latin America in the late 1960s and early 1970s, these countries turned to Europe and the Soviet Union for the desired hardware.⁷ A Western arms embargo against India and Pakistan during their 1965 war permitted Soviet arms sales to both antagonists. In the five years following the conflict, the Soviet Union supplied 80 percent of all Indian arms while selling Pakistan the spare parts for Russian-made equipment previously provided by China.⁸

Some nations have turned to the Soviet Union for arms to free themselves of all dependence on former colonial masters or rid themselves of any vestige of the West. In 1955 Nasser purchased arms from the Soviets partially to demonstrate his independence of all French and British influence in his country's foreign policy. Nkrumah and Sukarno followed similar policies in Ghana and Indonesia when their countries achieved independence.

Some Western-oriented countries have purchased Soviet equipment during periods of strained relations with the West or when they sought, if temporarily, to pursue a more independent policy, as was the case with Morocco, Tanzania, Mali, Ghana, Pakistan, Sudan and Iran which generally purchase Western munitions and have only rarely preferred Soviet weapons. With few exceptions, these arms purchases have been one-time deals rather than long-term commitments.⁹

Characteristics of Soviet Arms Exports

In examining Soviet arms exports, three things should be kept in mind. First, arms transfers are only one tool used by the Kremlin in pursuit of its foreign policy objectives. Arms sales are generally combined with diplomatic

initiatives or economic aid in the form of large, highly visible industrial projects. For example, in addition to supplying arms to Egypt, the Soviet Union agreed to finance and build the Aswan Dam. The USSR built the Bhilai Steel Mill in addition to supplying weapons to India.¹⁰ Soviet arms exports to Algeria have in recent years been accompanied by agreements to build a two million ton capacity steel mill at Annaba and an aluminum plant at M'Sila.¹¹

Second, the decision-making process involved in determining which nations receive Soviet arms is a closely guarded secret although evidence indicates that decisions to sell arms are made at the highest government and party levels. Top military officers and civilian defense managers from the ministries for Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade often advise and may assist in actual negotiations with the recipient country.¹² Once a decision is made, it is carried out openly through the Soviet embassy in the recipient country or clandestinely if the "situation" warrants it. Deliveries are usually made by KGB operatives.¹³

Third, Moscow will supply any country with arms if the transfer is in its interests. It is no surprise that some of the most tyrannical and unstable leaders of the post World War II period, Idi Amin of Uganda, Moamer Qaddafi of Libya, Pol Pot of Cambodia, Fidel Castro of Cuba, and Francisco Macias Nguema of Equatorial Guinea have all been supplied with Soviet arms.

Arms are usually sold to developing countries although they are sometimes offered in exchange for port or airfield facilities. The price of Soviet military commodities is usually substantially lower than that of similar Western equipment—a fact not overlooked by many Third World arms purchasers.¹⁴

Additionally, interest rates charged by the Soviets are substantially lower than Western standards, varying from 2 to 2.5 percent on loans extending from 10 to 12 years.¹⁵ Lower Soviet prices and interest rates are cited as the USSR argues that the West is more interested in profiting from the sale of arms than in the welfare of the poverty-stricken peoples of the Third World.

The Soviets prefer arms sales to direct grants, unless grave extenuating circumstances, such as the presence of US combat forces in Vietnam, exist. Sales, as opposed to gifts, allow recipient countries to retain feelings of sovereignty and national pride.

The Soviets will accept payment in desperately needed foreign currency or in locally produced commodities at fixed negotiated prices. Egypt bartered

cotton and rice for \$225 million in arms in 1955.¹⁶ The Soviets have accepted gold, copper, bauxite, sugar and a wide range of foodstuffs in return for weapons.

Commodities payment is often preferred by the Soviets because it guarantees long-term supplies of specific goods while tying up a nation's long-term exports and further reducing its commercial and political ties with the West.

In some cases, the Soviet Union has acquired large quantities of products from its arms clients with the understanding that they would be shipped only to the USSR. Once the products left port, however, they were diverted to Western markets and sold for hard currency.¹⁷

Occasionally, the Soviet Union has had to force its allies to accept commodities of little value to their totalitarian economies. Because its economic structure can only absorb so many dates and coconuts, the Soviet Union has been known to send such items to another developing country as Soviet foreign aid or dump them on the open market.

Needless to say, the Soviets have not always been paid for their military wares. India, Cuba and South Yemen have been unable to pay or slow in making required payments while Indonesia and Somalia have repudiated their debts and Egypt has postponed payment indefinitely.

The Soviets make arms transfers through communist bloc allies where clients feel it important that they maintain a facade of nonalignment with the USSR. Intermediaries are also used where the presence of Soviet equipment might provoke an undesirable confrontation with the West. Should the United States or its allies be provoked by the actions of Eastern European arms traders, the Soviet Union can disavow any knowledge of or responsibility for them. Arms sales to Guatemala in 1954, Egypt in 1955 and Somalia in 1964 were conducted through Czechoslovakia. East Germany provided arms to the rebels of Zanzibar in the 1960's and with Poland, supplied the Viet Cong long before the massive United States involvement in Vietnam.¹⁸ In 1968, the Soviet Union agreed to supply the Palestine Liberation Organization through Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and East Germany.¹⁹ Bulgaria has also supplied weapons to the Eritrean rebels in Ethiopia,²⁰ while Soviet arms more recently made their way to Nicaragua and San Salvador through Cuba.²¹

The USSR has also shipped military wares to world trouble spots through non-communist intermediaries like

Egypt, Algeria, Libya and Guinea.²² Egypt supplied weapons to the Congolese guerrillas through the Sudan in 1964.²³ Soviet arms exported to Libya and Algeria have been re-exported to the Palestine Liberation Organization. Libya has more recently supplied Soviet arms to the Moslem guerrillas fighting in the Philippines.²⁴

The primary foreign policy of arms exports is to increase Soviet political and military influence worldwide. Weapons are considered a means to this end because they reduce Western and Chinese political and military influence while providing the Soviet Union with forward deployment facilities for its naval and air forces.

Objectives of Soviet Arms Exports

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Reduce Western Political and Military Influence. The Soviet Union's effort to reduce Western political and military influence was initially focused on the system of defense belts the US and its allies attempted to build around the Soviet Union to "contain" communism after World War II. The Soviet Union offered arms to Mid-Eastern and Asian nations reluctant to join pro-Western defense treaty organizations for ideological or political reasons in order to bring them under its influence or keep them neutral in the East-West struggle.

Shortly after Egypt accepted \$225 million in Soviet arms, Syria, Iraq and Yemen closed their own Soviet weapons deals. By 1960, the USSR had provided \$390 million in weaponry, some 40 percent of all arms shipments to the Middle East.²⁵ In concert with Arab nationalism, Soviet economic aid and diplomatic initiatives, Soviet arms exports successfully frustrated the efforts of the Eisenhower administration to form a Middle East anti-communist

treaty organization similar to NATO or SEATO.

The Soviet Union also provided arms to the Third World governments in an attempt to neutralize SEATO. Having rebuffed a US invitation to join SEATO, Indonesia received the bulk of Soviet aid beginning in 1958. In the next five years, the Soviets sold Indonesia small arms, tanks, aircraft and enough ships to make the Indonesian navy the largest naval force in the Far East outside the United States.²⁶ Large amounts of arms and substantial economic aid were provided India, Afghanistan, Burma and North Vietnam.

After 1965, the USSR supplied increasing quantities of arms to the Middle East. From 1965 to 1969, the Soviets sent \$520 million in arms to Egypt, Syria and Iraq or 50 percent of all arms shipped to the Middle East and 40 percent of all Soviet arms exported to the Third World countries during that period, including North Vietnam.²⁷

India also received large quantities of tanks, ships and modern aircraft from the Soviet Union. By 1972, the Soviet Union had delivered or committed itself to deliver more than \$1.1 billion in weapons since the early 1950s.²⁸

The Soviets also used their arms to reduce the military presence of the Western allies in countries outside the Soviet perimeter. Weapons exported to Ghana and Cyprus were intended to reduce British influence, isolating each country from Western political and cultural ties.²⁹ J.D. Esseks argues that the "magnitude of Soviet military and economic aid... was a significant factor in persuading Algerian leaders that they could afford to press the French to evacuate their bases before 1972 as provided by the Evian Accords."³⁰

The sale of MiG 15 jets and T-33 tanks to Morocco in the early 1960s and spare parts in 1967 was used to undercut Western influence and hasten the closing of US Strategic Air Command bases in that country.³¹ The 1968 closing of the US electronic intelligence facilities at Bedaber, Pakistan preceded secret negotiations with the Pakistani government over arms transfers. Two months after the US was notified its lease at Bedaber would not be renewed, a major Soviet-Pakistani arms pact was signed.³²

During the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s, the Soviet Union sold weapons to increasing numbers of Third World governments in an effort to reduce Western political and military influence. Some of these governments had traditionally purchased arms from the West. The Soviet Union sold \$110 million in weapons to the Shah of Iran in 1968, shocking the US and leading

to Congressional hearings on the subject.³³

The Soviet Union also sold South Africa tools, replacement parts, explosives, electronic sets and support equipment for Cape Town's armed forces in violation of the 1963 United Nations trade embargo.³⁴ Soviet arms also found their way to Aden, Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Indonesia, Libya, Guinea, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Uganda, Ethiopia and 32 other countries.³⁵

While supplying established governments, the Soviets also provided arms to myriad guerrilla movements to weaken pro-Western governments and gain influence with those nations' potential future leaders.

Guerrilla operations in Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bolivia, Cambodia, Congo, Ethiopia, Guinea, Lebanon, Mozambique, Nicaragua, the Philippines, South Vietnam, South-West Africa, Thailand and a host of other countries were well-supplied. Soviet arms have played a significant role in nearly every crisis and in nearly every guerrilla conflict since World War II.

While supplying established governments, the Soviets also provided arms to myriad guerrilla movements to weaken pro-Western governments and gain influence with those nations' potential future leaders.

Reduce Chinese Military and Political Influence. The Soviets have also attempted to neutralize Chinese influence in the Third World and establish their leadership of the world Marxist revolutionary movement. The decision to sell arms to Indonesia in the late 1950s was made to reduce Western and Chinese influences and re-orient the Indonesia Communist party toward Moscow.

Arms sent to India after the 1962 Chinese invasion brought the non-aligned country closer to the USSR while warning the Chinese that the Kremlin intended to maintain the independence of the New Delhi government. William J. Barnard argues that the 1968 Soviet-Pakistani arms deal was meant to offset Chinese influence as much as it was intended to reduce the US political and military presence.³⁶ The Soviet Union sent military aid to Nigeria after the Chinese were discovered training and supplying a small amount of arms to the Biafran Seces-

sionist Army during the 1968 Nigerian Civil War.³⁷

Perhaps the most successful use of arms to re-orient a socialist country occurred in North Vietnam. In the early 1960s relations between the Chinese and North Vietnamese governments were very close and the North Vietnamese were even persuaded to condemn the Soviets for revisionism.³⁸ After the US military buildup in South Vietnam, it became obvious to Hanoi that only the USSR could supply the vast amounts of munitions needed to sustain its conflict with the United States. As North Vietnam became increasingly pro-Soviet in its foreign policy statements, the Soviets stepped up arms deliveries to Hanoi.³⁹

Soviet support of guerrilla movements has often been used to undercut Chinese influence. Soviet arms poured into the Congo in the 1960's to overthrow the central government and counter Chinese support of the rebels.⁴⁰ Arms were supplied to the Algerian Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) to expel the French from Africa while neutralizing Peking's influence on the movement.⁴¹ The 1968 PLO arms deal was concluded partially out of fear that the organization might come under Chinese influence. Red China had been supplying limited quantities of arms to the PLO for years while Moscow ignored it in favor of established governments such as Egypt, Syria and Iraq.⁴²

Elsewhere in Africa, the Soviets have supplied pro-Moscow guerrilla groups like the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA), Frente de Libertação de Mocambique (FRE-LIMO), Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), African National Congress (ANC) and the South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO) in order to counter Peking-organized subversives.

Third World governments have learned they can sometimes obtain concessions from the Soviets by flirting with the Red Chinese arms traders. Syria made overtures to China when the USSR was reluctant to supply it with advanced aircraft after the 1967 war with Israel. Syria got its aircraft from the Soviets.⁴³

The Soviet Union has often overreacted to its Chinese competitors. Red China cannot compete in the arms field because most Chinese weapons are copies of items phased out of Soviet inventories or are technologically inferior to Soviet equivalents. Additionally, the Chinese cannot supply weapons or spare parts in the quantities desired by most arms recipients.

Gain Forward Deployment

Facilities. While attempting to undercut Western and Chinese influence around the world, the Soviet Union has also used arms in the past 15 years to obtain access to port and airfield facilities in developing countries. These "forward deployment facilities" have been used to project Soviet combat power beyond the Soviet borders.

Requirements for port facilities to refuel, refit and acquire provisions have become especially acute for the Soviet navy as its ships have been employed in increasing numbers outside Soviet territorial waters. While the Soviet navy spent only 1,500 ship days in the Mediterranean in 1965, this figure had increased to 18,600 days by 1977. The average Soviet daily deployment increased from five ships in the Mediterranean in 1965 to 50 thirteen years later, while similar increases were achieved in the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian Oceans.⁴⁴

Access to airfields have also become increasingly important as the Soviets have attempted to influence the outcomes of Third World conflicts, especially in remote parts of Africa and Asia, by airlifting supplies to their arms clients.

The Soviet Union directed initial efforts to gain access to Third World ports and airfields toward Egypt. After making a June 1963 shipment of weapons including T-54 tanks, MiG 21 interceptors and TU-16 bombers, the USSR approached President Gamel Nasser concerning the use of Egyptian port facilities.

Nasser initially rejected the Soviets request but after the decisive defeat of Egyptian forces in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, Egypt accepted substantial economic and military aid in return for a five-year port facility agreement. This formally signed treaty allowed the USSR to establish command post facilities, repair shops, storage depots and barracks complexes on Egyptian soil and permitted the expansion of Alexandria's Al-Gabbari shipyard to facilitate major overhauls on diesel submarines. Egypt also allowed the Soviets to develop a second major naval complex at Mersa Matruh. Anthony Nutting, one of Nasser's biographers, quotes him as saying in a private interview that "only Russia helped us after the June War ... with everything from wheat to fighter aircraft ... what's more, the Russians asked nothing in return except for facilities for their warships in Alexandria."⁴⁵

Soviet access to Egyptian ports was not permanent. In 1976, Sadat expelled all Soviet military and naval personnel from Egypt. But the deterioration of

Soviet-Egyptian relations in the early 1970s resulted in an intensified effort to gain greater access to Syrian airfields near Damascus and the ports of Latakia and Tartus long before the Soviets were expelled from Egypt. MiG 21's, SA-3 anti-aircraft missiles and T-62 tanks, President Assad permitted Soviet access to Syrian ports and airfields. After the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Syria agreed to increased Soviet access to ports in return for increased arms deliveries including MiG 23 interceptors, and a Soviet commitment to come to Syria's aid if it were attacked.⁴⁶

The Soviets have used arms to gain access to air and naval facilities in other parts of the Middle East. In 1967, Aden reported a Soviet Union offer of direct military aid in exchange for facilities at Janad Airport, 14 miles from Sana'a. Under Soviet supervision, its runway was extended to 11,500 feet, making it the largest airfield in the Middle East at that time and making all points in the Mediterranean, Africa and India accessible to the Soviet Union.

Beginning in 1964, the Soviet Union signed a series of military agreements with Somalia in which the Somalis were given weapons in return for Soviet access to airfields and port facilities. Under Soviet direction, the airfields at Galacio, Mogadishu and Hargeisa were expanded. At the port of Berbera, the Soviets built a 1,500-man barracks complex, a naval communications site and storage facilities for anti-ship missiles and petroleum while the channel approaches to the port of Hodeida were dredged to accommodate Soviet missile-carrying destroyers and submarines.

India was offered Soviet-built submarines in 1968 in return for access to Indian ports.⁴⁷ Nigeria reportedly permitted Soviet ships to use port facilities at Lagos after the delivery of jet fighter aircraft.⁴⁸ In the late 1960s, the African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and the Cape Verde Islands secretly agreed with the Soviet Union to provide the USSR with a naval base in return for support of the guerrilla movement against the Portuguese. So far, the Soviets have built an airfield and provided MiG 15 and MiG 21 interceptors to the newly independent government. They have also staged reconnaissance flights from the country and, at last report, were negotiating the expansion of port facilities on Tamara Island in return for the exclusive use of a portion of them.⁴⁹

The Soviet-backed government of Mozambique permitted the Soviet establishment of substantial naval facilities at Nacala for its arms ship-

ments and the USSR is believed to be developing an airfield five miles inland from Nacala.⁵⁰ In Angola, where Soviet arms and Cuban troops brought about a Marxist revolution, 200 Soviet military experts, 200 Cubans and 60 North Vietnamese were reportedly operating the port of Luanda and the country's two airfields.⁵¹ Ethiopia, which has received substantial quantities of Soviet arms, granted the Soviets permission to build a naval base on Dahlak, an Ethiopian island in the Red Sea.⁵²

The August 7, 1975 edition of the *New York Times* reported that when the Burmese Deputy Premier U Lwin went to Moscow to discuss possible arms shipments to Burma, the Soviets "suggested" that Burma grant it naval facilities in the Coco Islands in return for Soviet weapons.⁵³

Earlier in the year, the *New York Times* quoted qualified military sources as saying that the Soviet Union had asked the North Vietnamese and Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam for the use of Cam Rahn Bay as a naval and air base "in compensation for the huge amounts of aid extended by Moscow during the Vietnam War."⁵⁴ While the North Vietnamese hesitated at first to provide these facilities, they relented when it became apparent that they would need Moscow's support to fight the Cambodian rebels and offset a second Chinese invasion of Vietnam.

Success or Failure?

How successful have the Soviets been in achieving their objective through arms exports? In some countries Soviet arms transfers, coupled with economic aid and political support, have cut off or severely limited Western and Chinese political, economic and military ties. In South Yemen, Angola, Afghanistan, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Iraq, Syria, Cuba, Libya and Vietnam, the Soviet Union enjoys significant influence or virtual domination.

Elsewhere, Soviet weapons have been used to topple pro-Moscow leaders. Sukarno of Indonesia, Ben Bella of Algeria and Nkrumah of Ghana were all ousted from power by pro-Western generals using Soviet weapons. Sadat of Egypt and Barre of Somalia, dissatisfied with the Soviets, expelled Soviet technicians and turned to the West for weaponry.

Some Moscow-supplied nations have used Soviet weapons to topple pro-communist regimes. On July 19, 1971, a group of pro-communists seized power from General Dzhafer Numeiry, a Soviet-supported nationalist leader of Sudan. Egypt's Sadat and Libya's Qaddafi, both long-time recip-

ients of Soviet arms, realized the Sudan takeover might serve as a model to topple their own governments. Qaddafi arrested a number of coup leaders coming from England when their BOAC aircraft made an unscheduled stop in Benghazi. Sadat then transported in a Soviet-armed Sudanese paratroop brigade to Khartoum. With Egyptian assistance, the Sudanese paratroop brigade initiated a counter coup and returned the government to Numeiry.⁵⁵

Some arms clients have used Soviet weapons quite effectively in advancing their own political aims while ultimately achieving Soviet objectives. Arms supplied to the North Vietnamese have enabled them to conquer South Vietnam, Laos and most of Cambodia while weapons provided to the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) and the Frente de Libertação de Mocambique (FRELIMO) in Mozambique have brought Marxist regimes to power.

Significant amounts of weaponry have been lost in wars fought by Soviet arms clients. In the six-day 1967 Arab-Israeli War, Egyptian forces lost 356 aircraft, 700 tanks, all SA-2 anti-aircraft batteries and enough infantry equipment to arm 15,000 men while Syria lost more than one-half of its Soviet-supplied tanks and aircraft. Arab arms clients lost additional equipment in the 1956 and 1973 wars with Israel.⁵⁶

Soviet arms shipments have occasionally lacked coordination. During the 1963 Moroccan-Algerian border conflict, the USSR sold arms to both antagonists, alienating both governments in the process.⁵⁷ Lack of coordination has cost the Soviets dearly on the Horn of Africa. As mentioned above, the Soviet Union supplied arms to Somalia in exchange for air and naval facilities there. After a 1977 Marxist coup in Ethiopia, the USSR continued supplying weapons to Somalia while arming Ethiopia, traditionally a Somali enemy. When Ethiopia began using its Soviet weapons to drive Somali-supported guerrillas from the Ogaden Desert, Somali president Mohammed Siad Barre was so angered by Soviet arms exports to Ethiopia that he expelled all Soviet technicians and closed all airfields and ports to the Soviets.

Soviet arms have been used by both pro-Soviet and anti-Soviet forces in some conflicts. The 1976-1978 battle for Beirut was fought by Syrians, Palestinians and Christians all armed with Soviet weapons. Afghanistani rebels are using captured Soviet arms or imitations in their guerrilla war against the Soviets.

The USSR has not always been successful in using weapons to influence their arms clients and, ultimately, world events. It attempted to keep Egypt from initiating a third war with Israel by withholding certain offensive weapons (SCUD rockets and MiG 25s) and placing conditions on other weapon supplies. The Soviets knew that if Egypt were to go to war, the Arabs would probably lose and that defeat would result in substantial losses of equipment while exposing the USSR as an ineffective ally. Sadat reported to the Central Committee of the Arab Socialist League that he protested "any limitation in relation to the use of weapons of any type . . . Egypt's political decision must remain in the hands of Egypt's political leadership without having to ask permission for anything of this kind from anybody abroad." The USSR dropped all conditions but supplied only 30 SCUD rockets prior to the war and no MiG 25s until hostilities had been initiated.⁵⁸

The Soviets have only been partially successful in trading weapons for forward deployment facilities. The Soviet navy enjoys almost unlimited access to port facilities in Mozambique, Angola, South Yemen, Ethiopia, Cuba, Vietnam, and Syria. Despite substantial Soviet investment in port facilities in Egypt and Somalia, those nations have expelled the USSR. Even with substantial amounts of Soviet arms, India has only allowed a few "official visits" by Soviet ships to Vishakapatnam and Vizianagaram.

When Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin visited Algeria in 1971 to discuss the use of Algerian airfields and the port of Mers-el-Kebir, rumors suggested that Algeria had allowed the Soviets to base two submarines there and freely use Algerian airfields.⁵⁹ By 1978, however, the Soviet Navy had yet to use the facilities at Mers-el-Kebir, while Soviet aircraft have only been permitted to stage airlifts to Angola and periodic supply flights to Guinea and Cuba from Algeria.⁶⁰

In January 1973, Libyan President Qaddafi refused to permit Soviets use of any facilities previously used by the US and its NATO allies. Qaddafi reportedly stated that such permission would have merely replaced the Sixth Fleet with the Soviet Navy.⁶¹

The Future

Can we expect a reduction in Russian arms exports? NO! In the coming years, the Soviet Union will export larger quantities of weapons to established governments and "national liberation movements." The absence of any

East-West conventional arms agreements and the seemingly insatiable demand for arms by the Third World will create a large market for Soviet military wares. The USSR will also find itself under increasing pressure to supply larger quantities of more sophisticated weapons to Third World clients as China, through its own exports, makes its bid for influence among the world's Marxist movements.

It is naive to expect that any conventional arms agreement could be reached with the USSR and that the Soviets would unilaterally restrain weapons exports in the interest of world peace. Because Marxist philosophy of world revolution is built on the premise that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun," we can expect increased tensions, terror, and war to be created by continued Soviet arms exports to developing nations and revolutionary movements worldwide.

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(continued from page 20)

tailored intelligence missions. This situation makes it incumbent that the intelligence trainers have a comprehensive and functioning program to acquire timely and accurate feedback on individual soldier tasks in each MOS. The uniqueness in intelligence units' deployment and mission has another implication. Under the Army's present training methodology, initial entry training is not focused on qualifying the soldier above entry skill level one tasks. To compensate for this, field command-

ers must assume the responsibility for non-standard, mission-specific training above a specific apprentice level.

The challenge to the intelligence trainer is great, but I have full confidence that the trainers at Fort Devens and Fort Huachuca can meet this challenge. Recent actions by the Chief of Staff of the Army, which directed the study of proposals for a higher level of support to the trainer, indicate re-sourcing help is on the way. The battle, however, does not belong solely to the schools. All of us are trainers. Everyone—commanders, staffers and soldiers—

must get behind the effort and support the schoolhouse whenever possible. We need to push for higher levels of support for the TRADOC intelligence community so their programs can be achieved. We must actively support the training community's effort with timely feedback and information on soldier training. What is needed is that we, as a community, approach intelligence training with the same enthusiasm that we have exuded for past intelligence programs such as OPFOR or CEWI. Only with one total commitment will we be able to meet the training challenge.

(continued from page 51)

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Pearl Harbor: History and Implications

by CW2 William T. Rich

Introduction

The purpose of this article is to explore the events leading to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor with particular attention to the intelligence warnings available to those who might have precluded the surprise and devastation which was achieved. If sufficient warnings were available, why was Japan able to achieve surprise? Were intelligence sources lacking, or was available intelligence poorly utilized? Was there a failure to correctly interpret the information available or was some key piece of information missed?

The scope of this article is necessarily quite limited: the 1946 Congressional hearings on Pearl Harbor filled 39 volumes. I will, therefore, attempt to outline only the most relevant events leading to the attack. Specific individual responsibilities will be presented only briefly.

The Post-World War I Period

After World War I, the Army's principal concerns were the defense of the continental US, Panama and Oahu against coastal invasion. Hitler's rise to power and the increased range and striking power of aircraft during the late 1930s presented a far greater threat than invasion. After the Munich crisis in September 1938 made clear Hitler's power and intentions, the US adopted the doctrine of Hemisphere Defense which held that no hostile power could establish an air base or military installation from which the continental United States or the Panama Canal could be attacked.¹ The possibility that Japan would establish a base in the Aleutian Islands or the Hawaiian group was largely discounted due to the presence of the bulk of the US fleet in the Pacific.²

President Roosevelt's greatest concern was the German threat. The possibility that Britain would lose control of the North Atlantic appeared to constitute the greatest threat to the Western Hemisphere. In 1940 the defensive perimeter illustrating the doctrine of Hemisphere Defense was drawn up. It included Hawaii, Alaska and the Panama Canal.

Under the **Orange** plan adopted in 1924, the US Army and Navy had built up defenses on the island of Oahu. The plan envisioned a strong Navy base protected by the Army. In September 1935, Major General Drum indicated his desire to increase Army strength in Hawaii and establish Army airfields on the outer islands. The idea was rejected



by the War Department on grounds that the defense of ocean areas was Navy business and that the deployment of troops away from Oahu would weaken the defenses of Pearl Harbor. General Drum's recommendations were resubmitted in 1937 with the added justification that the outer islands would be a necessary source of food in wartime. The War Department responded: "If the fleet is in the Pacific and free to act, Oahu will be . . . secure against any attack that may be launched against it."³

General Drum's 1937 justifications for strengthening the defenses of Oahu and Hawaii apparently aroused official doubts concerning the impregnability of the United States: in late 1937, President Roosevelt and Secretary of War Stimson orally instructed Colonel Markham, a White House advisor, to prepare a new survey of Oahu's defenses. In his report, Markham concluded that the island's defenses could easily be breached due to "the astounding advance in aircraft design over the past 20 years."⁴ Markham pointed out that an attack by carrier-based aircraft from the Northeast would be screened by the perpetual clouds over the Koolau mountain range and could be launched with almost no warning.

Markham recommended that the Army make 350 aircraft available to conduct long-range reconnaissance and defend against an estimated 379 enemy planes. We are not told how this estimate was made, but COL Markham was remarkably close—Japan attacked with 353 or 355 aircraft. In a prophetic conclusion to his report, Markham wrote:

War with Japan will be precipitated without notice. One of the most obvious and vital lessons of history is that Japan will pick her own time for conflict. The very form of its government lends itself to such action that its military and naval forces can, under the pretext of an emergency, initiate and prosecute military and naval op-

erations independently of civil control . . . If and when hostilities develop between the United States and Japan, there can be little doubt that the Hawaiian islands will be the initial scene of action, and that Japan will apply her available manpower and resources in powerful and determined attacks against these islands.⁵

Conn, Engelman and Fairchild write that "the slight impact of the Drum and Markham recommendations can be credited in good measure to the rising threat of Hitler's Germany, which from 1938 onward absorbed the attention of the Roosevelt administration and of the War Department in particular."

In January 1939, the Army Air Board again pointed out the need for long-range reconnaissance around the islands and recommended an increase in aircraft (to 256) to be used for reconnaissance and for attacking an invading fleet. In late 1939, the War Department's War Plans Division allotted 190 aircraft, including 68 medium bombers capable of long-range patrol, based on the assumption that the Japanese would use no more than two carriers in an attack on Hawaii. All available records indicate it was simply assumed that Japan would be unwilling to risk the loss of more than two carriers. Although American intelligence and actual sightings during 1938–1939 placed the number of Japanese carriers at eight, the War Plans Division continued to believe the total was six. (Pearl Harbor was attacked with six carriers. Even in the light of the great damages inflicted, Navy Intelligence reported several weeks later that no more than three carriers had been used.⁶)

In 1939, the War Plans Division, concluded that Army reconnaissance was necessary only if the fleet were absent or if the Navy asked for assistance.⁷ This reasoning eventually resulted in the Army's having only 115 aircraft at the beginning of 1941: all were obsolete or obsolescent and only six were capable of long-range reconnaissance.⁸

A firm belief in the impregnability of Oahu prevailed until June 1940. Hitler's successes in Europe led General Marshall to anticipate transferring the bulk of the Pacific fleet to the Atlantic.⁹ Suddenly, the security of Hawaii was in doubt; the Chief of Staff still believed Hawaii was vulnerable only in the absence of the fleet. Accordingly, General Marshall ordered the Hawaiian Department to "immediately alert com-

plete defensive organization to deal with possible trans-Pacific raid to greatest extent possible."¹⁰ Army General Herron reacted with a 24-hour manning of anti-aircraft positions and observation posts. Gun crews were, for the first time, issued live ammunition and given instructions to fire on foreign planes over restricted areas.

It would appear that, until then, the military had considered the possibility of a sudden attack by air only an academic exercise. Keep in mind that these alert measures were taken in anticipation of the departure of the fleet, not in response to any loss of warships.

The effects of the upgraded defense posture were negated a month later when the alert was relaxed due to President Roosevelt's decision that the fleet remain in the Pacific. With the end of the alert, the Army anti-aircraft gun crews returned their ammunition to the Ordnance Depot. The only lasting result was Admiral Richardson's institution of fairly regular, limited long-range reconnaissance flights. Admiral Richardson discontinued the patrols in December 1940 after the Chief of Naval Operations advised him that only naval operating areas needed reconnoitering. The discontinuation of these patrols appears to have gone unnoticed by the Army.¹¹

Admiral Richardson voiced his fear of a surprise air attack in January 1941. Through the Secretary of the Navy, he urged the Secretary of War to have the Army "... assign the highest priority to the increase of pursuit aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery, and the establishment of an air warning net in Hawaii."¹² His message arrived in Washington just after President Roosevelt forecast that Japan might be preparing a strike. General Marshall arranged to have 81 pursuit planes sent to Hawaii.

The deficiencies of Oahu's defenses appear not to have been a major concern in Washington after February 1941. In April, plans were again made to withdraw a large portion of the fleet from Pearl Harbor to the North Atlantic. General Marshall had the War Plans Division prepare a statement for the president which read in part:

The island of Oahu, due to its fortification, its garrison, and its physical characteristics, is believed to be the strongest fortress in the world. It has been carefully fortified against normal attack and its anti-aircraft defense is relatively complete ... carrier raids by the Japanese involve jeopardizing naval units that will not be lightly undertaken ... An attack in force against Oahu necessitates

an air superiority that can only be had by the establishment of land-based aviation. This can only be accomplished successfully within the Hawaiian group ... it is not believed that such an establishment can be accomplished.¹³

General Marshall had also reassured Secretary Stimson that he considered Oahu impregnable. It should be noted that the Army's primary concerns were sabotage by local natives of Japanese descent and the physical invasion of the islands. A note written by Roosevelt's military aide on the president's copy of Marshall's estimate appears to have been the deciding factor in Roosevelt's decision to keep the fleet at Pearl Harbor: "Modern planes have completely changed the situation as to defensibility."¹⁴ By leaving the fleet at Pearl Harbor, the president reaffirmed his belief that Oahu was safe from attack as long as the fleet was present.

In a joint paper signed on 3 March, 1941, Army and Navy commanders in Hawaii noted that the possibility of a surprise air attack by Japan was quite real and agreed that the best defense against such an attack was long-distance air reconnaissance patrols. They pointed out that full reconnaissance was impossible with existing aircraft. Intelligence that an attack was coming was needed before undertaking long-range patrols.¹⁵ Thus, the problem was again recognized. If intelligence said an attack was imminent, the greatest reason for conducting reconnaissance—detection of the enemy—would be negated. Instead of mounting reconnaissance patrols of likely areas, the Army and Navy appeared to have decided that unless a full-scale reconnaissance program could be put in force, there would be none at all.

In September 1941, the War Department listed the possible forms of attack on Hawaii in the following order of probability: 1) submarines, 2) sabotage, 3) disguised ships, 4) carrier-based aircraft, 5) surface ship raid, and 6) major attack in the absence of the fleet. It is evident that sabotage was a major concern. In November, the War Department limited the sea area supposedly needed for Oahu's defense to a 500-mile radius in spite of the fact that all previous studies indicated the necessity of detecting a carrier strike at a range of at least 600–700 miles if a warning were to be effective.¹⁶ In point of fact, no air patrols were ever initiated even to the 500-mile radius. Air patrols continued among the islands themselves, but only for training purposes. It is interesting to note that both Army and

Navy patrols were active around dawn, as this was believed to be the most likely time for an attack.

For several years, the Signal Intelligence Service (SIS) had been deciphering Japanese military and diplomatic communications. Deciphered messages, nicknamed MAGIC, were distributed daily to top officials in the State and War Departments beginning in 1939. During 1941, MAGIC also included traffic analysis in an attempt to keep track of the Japanese fleet. In February and July 1941, Japanese attacks in the South Pacific were preceded by changes of radio call signs, a heavy volume of messages directed south and radio silence. During each period, no radio traffic to or from Japanese aircraft carriers was intercepted. This was later found to be an indication that the carriers were in home waters.¹⁷

During July, and based primarily upon the MAGIC intercepts, Washington decided to try to defend the Philippines from Japanese invasion by stationing a large number of bombers along the Hawaii-Manila route. The possibility of an air attack upon Oahu was secondary to the prime concern, sabotage.

The Japanese aircraft carriers' July 1941 silence alarmed the War Department enough that it sent a message to General Short, then the Hawaiian Department Commander, indicating that while no immediate aggression was expected, he should take some precautions.¹⁸ General Short ordered a full alert under the guise of maneuvers, but called it off after 10 days. The only continuing effort was the posting of additional guards to prevent sabotage. No long-range air patrols were instituted.

From decrypted intercepts, the intelligence services knew that the Japanese consulate in Honolulu sent reports to Tokyo on a fairly regular basis of which ships were in Pearl Harbor. Similar reports were sent from other Japanese consulates in other parts of the world. On 15 November, 1941, Tokyo requested more frequent (twice weekly) reports from their consulate in Honolulu. No other consulates were asked to step up the frequency of their reports. During the three weeks preceding the Pearl Harbor attack, Tokyo made further requests for more details, including positions where two ships were tied to the same dock, exact docks in use, and reports of "no change."¹⁹

On 16 October, the Navy sent to Fleet Commander Admiral Kimmel in Hawaii a warning that Japan might be contemplating military action. The Army Staff in Washington disagreed and

so informed General MacArthur and General Short. Neither man took any actions directly related to the Navy's warning.

On 20 November, Japanese Ambassador to the United States Nomura delivered Japan's ultimatum to Secretary of State Hull. The Japanese government demanded that the United States reverse its foreign policy, resume trade, and make no objections to Japanese aggression. The United States' reply on 26 November was a request that Japan withdraw from China and Indochina and a promise to unfreeze Japanese accounts and resume trade in exchange.²⁰

Roosevelt and Hull had come to the conclusion on 24 November that negotiations with Japan were bound to be fruitless. They had a message sent to Army and Navy commanders in the Philippines and to Admiral Kimmel in Hawaii that warned of "a surprise aggressive movement in any direction."²¹

A MAGIC intercept of a 22 November message from Foreign Minister Togo to Ambassador Nomura was made known to President Roosevelt on 24 November:

There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we want to settle Japanese-American relations by November 25, but if the signing could be completed by the 29th, we would be willing to wait until that date ... This time we mean it that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen.²²

A more stringent warning went out to military commanders on 27 November "... that came then only after action by the Japanese and American governments that made an outbreak of war all but certain."²³ In spite of everything, the War Department G2 Division (Intelligence) said in a 28 November report that Japan was "completely extended militarily and economically" and was "momentarily unable to concentrate anywhere a striking force sufficient to insure victory."²⁴

On 27 November, the War Department's chief concern was still the possibility of Japanese aggression in the Philippines; thus the warning message sent to principal Army commanders after the Japanese ultimatum and the United States' reply was directed primarily at MacArthur's situation and was not directed or phrased to suit local situations. General Short's version read in part:

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest

possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future actions unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act ... Prior to hostile Japanese action, you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary.²⁵

It would appear that General Short was finally being directed to undertake air reconnaissance. The order was qualified, however, with the phrase, "... these measures should be carried out so as not to alarm civil population or disclose intent." The Navy's message to Admiral Kimmel was more definite: "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan ... have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days."²⁶

General Short's response was another alert, again directed at sabotage. He felt that this was still the most immediate threat and, lacking any further information on an external attack, decided that a higher state of alert would alarm the local populace.

Admiral Kimmel ordered only that new precautions against submarine attack be taken. He could have begun long-range air reconnaissance, but directed his efforts instead to readying his aircraft for wartime operations rather than "expending these efforts in partial and ineffective peace-time searches."²⁷

Oahu thus remained open to carrier-based attack, even in the face of warnings of imminent hostilities. The Japanese fleet's Striking Force had sailed into the North Pacific on 26 November. (The fact of the sailing is, of course, hindsight.)

By 1 December, three very explicit Japanese communications were known by the United States. The first was the decryption of a 29 November message from Baron Oshima in Berlin to Tokyo that he had been told by German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop: "Should Japan become engaged in a war with the United States, Germany, of course, would join the war immediately."²⁸ Tokyo replied on 30 November:

Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out may come quicker than anyone dreams.²⁸

Both messages were decoded and translated on 1 December. President Roosevelt, after reading this exchange in MAGIC, requested a copy for himself.

The second warning was an abrupt change of Japanese fleet radio call signs on 1 December. While Japanese normally shuffled their call signs every six months, the previous change had taken place on 1 November. Furthermore, radio traffic from the two main Japanese aircraft-carrier divisions had not been detected in two weeks. American intelligence assumed that the carrier divisions were in home ports, as during previous silences.

The third warning came from Admiral Kimmel's Fleet Intelligence Officer, Layton. On 1 December, Layton submitted a report on the Japanese fleet which made no mention of Japan's aircraft carrier divisions 1 and 2. Layton told Kimmel that the carriers were believed to be in home waters but that he was not certain of that.²⁹

While the lack of information on carrier locations was not in itself alarming, when added to the call sign change and the war warning from Washington, it should have provided more than enough cause for concern.

What was probably the clearest warning of attack during the entire period preceding the Pearl Harbor attack occurred on 3 December. The SIS deciphered a message from Tokyo to the Japanese ambassador in Washington in Japan's **Purple** code, the top diplomatic code which had taken the SIS years to solve. The message ordered the embassy to "burn all (codes) but those now used with the (**Purple**) machine and one copy of (two other lesser codes). Stop at once using one code machine unit and destroy it completely."³⁰

That same day, the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu received a similar message relayed by the Washington Embassy. This message concluded with the words, "Since these measures are in preparation for an emergency, keep this within your consulate and carry out your duties with calmness and care."³¹ A Navy officer in Washington was actually sent to the Japanese Embassy to see if the destruction was being carried out. He observed the destruction of the **Purple** machine in progress in the gardens behind the embassy. (The destruction had to be done outdoors as various sensitive parts of the complex machine had to be dissolved in acid—this had been determined by officials in Washington when previous **Purple** messages were deciphered a month earlier.)

Roosevelt's Naval Aide, Captain Beardall, called the president's attention to the MAGIC folder when he delivered the code-destruction message to the White House. Asked when he thought war would begin, Beardall replied, "Most any time."³²

The Japanese embassy in London and consulates in Manila, Hong Kong, Singapore and Batavia were also told to burn their codes. Instructions to the Washington embassy and consulate in Honolulu were to wire the word HARUNA when destruction was complete. The SIS intercepted this word from each of the embassies and consulates.

Admiral Stark's deputy said after the attack:

If you rupture diplomatic negotiations you do not necessarily have to burn your codes. The diplomats go home, and they can pack up their codes with their dolls and take them home. Also, when you rupture diplomatic negotiations you do not rupture consular relations. The consuls stay. Now, in this particular set of dispatches they not only told their diplomats in Washington and London to burn their codes, but they told their consuls in ... (Manila, etc.) to burn their codes and that did not mean a rupture of diplomatic relations; it meant war.³³

Kahn notes that both Army and Navy commands regarded the destruction of codes as a certainty that war would occur in a few days: this line of thought had existed for many years prior to 1941.

It is clear that the Japanese intent to go to war within a very short time was known on 3 December. It is also clear that none of our highest officials was willing or able to state that the time for action had arrived.

The final warning, a very carefully worded 14-part message from Tokyo to the US State Department, was to be delivered 30 minutes prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, thus giving the start of the war legality under the Hague Convention of 1907. The fact that the Japanese Embassy, slow in decoding and typing the message, delivered it after the start of the attack is of no particular importance. The first 13 parts of this message had been intercepted, decoded, and delivered to President Roosevelt at 9:30 on Saturday evening, 6 December. Roosevelt, upon reading part number 13, said in effect, "this means war."³⁴ The 14th part, the most critical, did not come to the president until 10:00 a.m. on the morning of December 7 (2:30 a.m. Oahu time). His only com-

ment was to the effect that it looked as though the Japanese were going to break off negotiations. The duplicity of this declaration of war can be seen in the text of part 14. The last paragraph read:

The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.³⁵

The message which instructed the Japanese Embassy to deliver the war declaration at 1:00 p.m. Washington time was in the same batch of MAGIC as part 14. This prompted General Marshall to send a message to General Short:

Japanese are presenting at 1:00 p.m. Eastern Standard Time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately Stop Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly Stop.³⁶

Because Marshall chose not to use his scrambler telephone to inform Short, the message didn't reach General Short until 3:00 p.m. Hawaii time, hours after the attack. Although the force of the attack could perhaps have been blunted had Short received the message in time, General Marshall believed that the phone could be intercepted and decoded, then used by the Japanese as an excuse to commence hostilities.³⁷

In Hawaii, standard procedures of the Navy called for a full alert any time submarines were sighted. All guns were to be manned, and all ships sorted in anticipation of a larger attack.³⁸ Submarines were regarded as evidence of an impending attack-in-force. At 3:42 a.m. Hawaii time on 7 December, the minesweeper *Condor*, on patrol just outside Pearl Harbor, spotted a submarine. An alert was sounded, and the destroyer *Ward* joined in the hunt. The search proved fruitless. At 4:43 a.m., *Condor* secured from General Quarters. The *Ward* asked for the submarine's course and direction. *Condor* then gave the *Ward* the information on what the submarine was doing when it was first spotted, neglecting to mention that the sub had changed course afterward. Thus the *Ward* went off to search empty seas.³⁹ The *Ward* spotted another submarine at 6:40 a.m. This sub was also seen by the tug *Antares* and a Navy PBY air-

craft. Both the *Ward* and the PBY fired on and depth-charged the sub and sank it. Rather than send the message in the clear or via blinker, the *Ward's* skipper decided to encode the message, which was sent at 6:51 a.m. The message was received by the duty officer at Navy headquarters at 7:12 a.m. The message of the sinking was relayed up the Navy chain of command, and Admiral Kimmel was finally informed at 7:40 a.m. The first bombs fell at 7:55 a.m.

Another warning of the attack should have been recognized by around 7:00 a.m. when a radar station at Opana on the northern tip of Oahu spotted incoming planes. The warning phoned in to the tracking center at Fort Shafter was disregarded by the officer in charge because he believed that since the carriers of the Pacific Fleet were out and possibly had patrol aircraft around and a flight of B-17s was due to arrive that morning, there was no cause for alarm. This was in spite of the fact that the radar operator reported a minimum of 50 aircraft. The radars, newly-installed, were operating only between 4 and 7:00 a.m. for training purposes. The Opana radar was shut down at 7:39 a.m.⁴⁰

After the attack, any chance of striking at the attacking fleet was lost. American ships and aircraft searched frantically for the Japanese. As examples of the confusion, a radio intercept from a Japanese carrier which could have come from due north or due south of Oahu was reported as coming from the south (the wrong direction). At 9:50 a.m., a report of carriers sighted 30 miles south of Oahu was sent by CINCPAC (Commander-in-Chief, Pacific). The *Minneapolis* sent a message, "No carriers in sight," which was read at CINCPAC as "Two carriers in sight." The radars were remanned during the attack and carefully tracked the Japanese aircraft as they headed north for their carriers. Yet, when CINCPAC asked the Army if it had any information, the radar data was not mentioned.⁴¹

From the background of events prior to October 1941, we can gain some insight into the thinking of Hull, Stimson, Roosevelt and the War Department. Precipitated by the breakdown of negotiations, the warning message sent by Hull and Roosevelt on 24 November was not regarded as a war warning by Admiral Kimmel, as similar statements had been sent before. The statement that Japan might make an "aggressive move in any direction" was not sufficient to cause undue alarm to any of the Pacific area commanders.⁴²

The 22 November message concerning the final extension of the deadline

for settling Japanese-American relations contained the line which read that things were going to happen "automatically" after 29 November. This should have been interpreted in a manner which would have placed all military commanders in the Pacific on a full alert after that date, as it appeared to be the beginning of a preplanned military operation against the United States. The War Department G2's 28 November report that Japan was unable to concentrate a force sufficient for victory anywhere may well have reduced the impact of this rather clear warning.⁴³ We must keep in mind that the War Department report was for the military establishment only.

Admiral Kimmel's warning message, sent from the War Department on 27 November, was quite clear in stating that it was a "war warning." Kimmel did not consider the message from the War Department urgent enough to justify a diversion from his primary mission of training for war: he would have had to cease using a large number of aircraft for training in order to conduct long-range reconnaissance. Admiral Kimmel's reactions might have been very different had he known of the change in MAGIC intercepts which showed that Tokyo wanted exact ship locations in Pearl Harbor. Speaking after the war, Kimmel pointed out that during the period immediately preceding the attack, the information requested by and transmitted to Tokyo "pointed to an attack by Japan on the ships in Pearl Harbor. The information... had no other conceivable usefulness from a military viewpoint." Admiral Kimmel was never informed of the change in the nature or frequency of these reports.⁴⁴

It is unfortunate that the secrecy surrounding MAGIC intercepts prevented Admiral Kimmel's receiving the information regarding the change in the nature of the reports being sent by the Japanese consulate in Honolulu to Tokyo. Admiral Kimmel, General Short and others in very high positions did receive MAGIC reports but were only given data which officials in Washington thought they should have. Both field commanders and War Department officials were short-changed by the security procedures which were utilized. Samuel Morison sums up the effects of the multitudinous problems associated with the use and distribution of MAGIC very well:

Fundamentally, however, it was the system, the setup both at Washington and at Pearl, rather than individual stupidity or apathy which muffled and confused what was going on. No one person

knew the whole picture that the intelligence data disclosed; no one person was responsible for the defense of Pearl Harbor; too many people assumed that others were taking precautions that they did not take.⁴⁵

Another example of the failure to communicate vital intelligence was that Washington did not inform Kimmel or Short of Baron Oshima's exchange with Tokyo and did not send out a new warning on 1 December, even though all factors were known by the officials in Washington. Roosevelt, Marshall and the Cabinet members had all received this information, but no new instructions were issued.

The news of the code-destruction message of 1 December was sent to Admiral Kimmel. Kimmel obviously did not realize the significance of this event. It would appear, since we are endowed with hindsight, that the least that could have been done would have been to order all ships to maintain sufficient steam to get under way at a moment's notice. It is also rather strange that official Army records do not show that General Short received the news of the code destruction. There is no explanation why the Navy did not follow standard procedures upon sighting the submarine on the morning of 7 December; the reason stated for not calling a full alert was that the *Condor* saw the sub only briefly and was reluctant to confirm that it was actually a submarine. The later sinking of a Japanese submarine by the *Ward* occurred too late for any meaningful action as word of such a sighting had to go through the chain of command before an alert of the fleet could be called.

General Marshall's decision not to use the scrambler telephone to inform General Short of the contents of part 14 of Japan's message to the State Department on the evening of 6 December may have been one of the most crucial decisions of the last hours. It is now obvious that Marshall made the wrong decision. He appears to have been preoccupied with a minor point and attempted to analyze the thoughts of the Japanese on this point when he knew the message to destroy the codes meant that war was imminent. It was as though the significance of all the preceding events meant little to him.

The same can be said of Roosevelt and Hull. It would appear that they were hoping for some miraculous change on the part of the Japanese. The words of part 14 alone could not be construed as a firm declaration of war, but the combination of all the intelligence gathered since 27 November and known to these

men could have had only one meaning.

Roberta Wohlstetter makes an accurate summation of the availability of intelligence information during the entire period preceding the attack:

If our intelligence system and all our other channels of information failed to produce an accurate image of Japanese intentions and capabilities, it was not for want of relevant materials. Never before have we had so complete an intelligence picture of the enemy. And perhaps never again will we have such a magnificent collection of sources at our disposal.⁴⁶

The fundamental problem was not lack of intelligence information but of combining what was available into some type of intelligence product which could have prodded the leaders of the nation to act. A secondary problem was the security safeguards surrounding the dissemination of MAGIC. A third problem is evidenced by the release of the 28 November report which said that Japan was unable to mass sufficient force to perform a strike which would result in a solid victory. This report makes it quite obvious that the writers were not in contact with the intelligence community or were simply working in a vacuum. This latter problem is all too prevalent today and may well suggest a lesson we did not learn, or have perhaps forgotten.

Roosevelt's reluctance to take action in the face of the evidence presented to him can be considered in one of two ways. We could say that he was awaiting a miracle which never occurred or that the intelligence community failed to present Roosevelt with a clear-cut analysis of all available information. Although attempting to be objective after the fact is difficult, the latter approach is probably correct. Let us hope that the present structure of the intelligence community is not so parochial or compartmented as to allow another such attack. In sum, it is essential that we never allow intelligence collection by any single means to be an end in itself; we must integrate all information in order to prevent any surprise such as Pearl Harbor in the future.

Footnotes

1. Conn, Stetson, Engelman, R. C., and Fairchild, Byron, *The United States Army in World War II, Guarding the United States and Its Outposts*, p. 4.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 154.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 155.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 155.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 195.

(continued on page 46)

Intelligence Training for Reservists

Between now and September, resident intelligence training for reservists will be offered in five locations, as shown in figures 1 through 5. Human Intelligence (HUMINT) skills are taught at the three Intelligence Training Army Area Schools (ITAA's): for First Army at Fort Bragg, NC, for Fifth Army at Fort McCoy, WI and for Sixth Army at Fort MacArthur, CA. Electronic Warfare and Signal Intelligence (EW/SIGINT) are taught at the US Army Intelligence School, Reserve Training, Fort Devens, MA. Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) is taught only at the US Army Intelligence School, Fort Huachuca, AZ.

Reserve unit commanders may request school quotas through command channels from Headquarters, First Army, ATTN: AFKA-OI-II: Headquarters, Fifth Army, ATTN: AFKB-IS; or Headquarters, Sixth Army, ATTN: AFKC-OP-IS. Members of the Individual Ready Reserve may request attendance at any of the courses through their Personnel Management Officers at Reserve Components Personnel and Administration Center (RCPAC), St Louis, MO. Requests must be received not later than 45 days before the class reporting date.

Course descriptions, prerequisites, and other details will be published in First Army Circular 350-7, Change 1 to Fifth Army Regulation 350-14, and Sixth Army Circular 350-2.

Special attention must be paid to course prerequisites, to prevent orders being issued for course attendance by persons who are not eligible. For example, some of the courses offered at Fort Devens require a Special Intelligence (SI) clearance. Should a prospective student arrive without the proper clearance, he will, of course, not be permitted to attend classes.

Points of contact for further information are:

First Army: MAJ Swift or SSG Imes,
AUTOVON 923-7815/6726; commercial
(area code 301), 677-7816/6726.

Fifth Army: Mr. Lopez or Major Hager, AUTOVON 471-4907/5516; commercial (area code 512), 221-4907/5516.

Sixth Army: Major Ray or SGT McArthur, AUTOVON 586-3114/5056; commercial (area code 415), 561-3114/5056.

**First US Army Area
Intelligence School
1981 Schedule
Fort Bragg, NC 28307**

**Sixth US Army
Intelligence Training
Army Area School
(ITAAIS)—1981
Fort MacArthur, California 90731**

Course	Phase	Period
Intelligence Analyst MOS 98B	I	31 Jun - 3 Jul
	II	19 Jul - 31 Jul
	III	5 Jul - 17 Jul
Interrogator MOS/973A, 98C	I	31 Jun - 3 Jul
	II	19 Jul - 31 Jul
	III	5 Jul - 17 Jul
Counterintelligence SS/MOS 36A, 971A, 97B	I	14 Jun - 3 Jul
	II	19 Jul - 31 Jul
	III	5 Jul - 17 Jul
Tactical Intelligence Staff Officer SS/MOS 35A, 984A	I	19 Jul - 31 Jul
	II	2 Aug - 14 Aug
Security Manager SSI/MOS—None	IIA	5 Jul - 17 Jul
	II	2 Aug - 14 Aug
S2 Combat Operations SSI/MOS—None	IIA	21 Jun - 3 Jul
	II	5 Jul - 17 Jul
	II	19 Jul - 31 Jul
Language Refresher SS/MOS—None	IIA	2 Aug - 14 Aug
		2 Aug - 14 Aug
		2 Aug - 14 Aug
Language Refresher SS/MOS—None	IIA	2 Aug - 14 Aug
		2 Aug - 14 Aug
		2 Aug - 14 Aug
Language Refresher SS/MOS—None	IIA	2 Aug - 14 Aug
		2 Aug - 14 Aug
		2 Aug - 14 Aug

See First US Army Circular 385-7 for details of above courses and courses available in other areas. Estimated publication date - February 1981

Figure 1.

**Fifth US Army Area
Intelligence School
1981 Schedule**

Fort McCoy, WI

The following courses will be presented at the Fifth US Army Area Intelligence School, Fort McCoy, WI, during the time frame indicated:

Course	Phase	Period
Tactical Intelligence Staff Officer (35A)	Phase I (2 weeks)	14 Jun - 26 Jun
	Phase II (2 weeks)	12 Jul - 24 Jul
Tactical Intelligence Staff Officer (35A)	Phase I (2 weeks)	28 Jun - 10 Jul
	Phase II (2 weeks)	28 Jul - 7 Aug
Intelligence Analyst (98B, 984A)	Phase I (2 weeks)	14 Jun - 26 Jun
	Phase II (2 weeks)	12 Jul - 24 Jul
Intelligence Analyst (98B, 984A)	Phase I (2 weeks)	28 Jun - 10 Jul
	Phase II (2 weeks)	28 Jul - 7 Aug
Interrogator (98C, 983A)	Phase I (2 weeks)	14 Jun - 26 Jun
	Phase II (2 weeks)	12 Jul - 24 Jul
Interrogator (98C, 983A)	Phase I (2 weeks)	28 Jun - 10 Jul
	Phase II (2 weeks)	28 Jul - 7 Aug
Counterintelligence Officer/Technician/Agent (36A, 971A, 97B)	Phase I (2 weeks)	14 Jun - 3 Jul
	Phase II (2 weeks)	5 Jul - 24 Jul
Counterintelligence Officer/Technician/Agent (36A, 971A, 97B)	Phase I (2 weeks)	5 Jul - 24 Jul
	Phase II (2 weeks)	5 Jul - 24 Jul
Counterintelligence Transition Course (36A, 971A, 97B)	Un-Phased (2 weeks only)	5 Jul - 17 Jul
	Un-Phased (2 weeks only)	14 Jun - 26 Jun
Security Manager	Un-Phased (2 weeks only)	12 Jul - 24 Jul
	Un-Phased (2 weeks only)	28 Jul - 7 Aug
S2 Combat Operations	Un-Phased (2 weeks only)	28 Jun - 10 Jul
	Un-Phased (2 weeks only)	12 Jul - 24 Jul

Figure 2.

Course	Phase	Period
Tactical Intelligence Staff Officer MOS 35A	I	28 Jun - 19 Jul
	II	12 Jul - 24 Jul
Intelligence Analyst MOS 98B, 984A	I	28 Jun - 19 Jul
	II	28 Jul - 7 Aug
	III	12 Jul - 24 Jul
Interrogator MOS 98C, 973A	I	28 Jun - 19 Jul
	II	28 Jul - 7 Aug
	III	12 Jul - 24 Jul
Counterintelligence Officer/ Technician/Agent (3 Week Phase) MOS 36A, 971A, 97B	I	28 Jun - 17 Jul
	II	19 Jul - 7 Aug
Counterintelligence Transition Course (36A, 971A, 97B)	Un-phased	12 Jul - 24 Jul
	NA	28 Jun - 19 Jul
S2 Combat Operations SSI/MOS—None	NA	28 Jul - 7 Aug
	NA	9 Aug - 21 Aug
Security Manager MOS—None	NA	28 Jun - 19 Jul
	NA	12 Jul - 24 Jul
Opposing Force Europe Operations and Intelligence MOS—None	NA	28 Jul - 7 Aug
	NA	9 Aug - 21 Aug
Foreign Language Refresher Arabic, Chinese, Mandarin, Korean, Czech, Hungarian, Polish, French, German, Russian, Spanish	NA	28 Jun - 10 Jul
	NA	12 Jul - 24 Jul
MOS—None	NA	28 Jul - 7 Aug
	NA	9 Aug - 21 Aug

See Sixth US Army Circular 385-3 for details of above courses and courses available in other Army areas

Figure 3.

**US Army Intelligence School
Reserve Training
Fort Devens, MA 01433**

Course	Phase	Period
EW Staff Officer Suffix 98	IIA	5 Jul - 17 Jul
	II	19 Jul - 31 Jul
	III	2 Aug - 14 Aug
EW-Crypto Tactical Operations Officer SIS 37A	IIA	Same as above
	II	Same as above
Jamming Techniques Suffix K3	IIA	Same as above
	II	Same as above
EW-Sight Morse Interceptor MOS 9501B 09425	IIA	5 Jul - 17 Jul
	II	19 Jul - 31 Jul
Signal Security Specialist MOS 9501B 09425	IIA	5 Jul - 17 Jul
	II	19 Jul - 31 Jul
EW/SHGINT Analyst MOS 96C1B 96C20	IIA	5 Jul - 17 Jul
	II	19 Jul - 31 Jul
COMSECT Custodian SSI/MOS—None	IIA	5 Jul - 17 Jul
	II	19 Jul - 31 Jul
EW/SHGINT Noncommunications	I	19 Jul - 31 Jul
	II	2 Aug - 14 Aug
Interceptor MOS 96C1B	I	19 Jul - 31 Jul
	II	2 Aug - 14 Aug

Figure 4.

Fort Huachuca: Mr. Bridges or SFC Kovary, AUTOVON 879-5650/5583; commercial (area code 602), 538-5650/5583.

Fort Devens: SSG Dailous, MAJ Casey or LTC Quinn, AUTOVON 256-2295/2360/3403/7491; commercial (area code 617), 796-2295/2360/3403/7491.

**US Army Intelligence Center & School
(Office of Reserve Training)
Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613**

Course	Phase	Period
Aerial Surveillance SSI/MOS 39C, 982A, 98D	I	29 Mar - 17 Apr
	II	17 May - 5 Jun
EW/SHGINT Noncommunications	I	19 Apr - 6 May
	II	7 Jun - 28 Jun
Interceptor MOS 96C1B	I	28 Jul - 14 Aug
	II	28 Jul - 14 Aug

Figure 5.

USAREUR Viewpoint

Military Intelligence in US Army, Europe

It is a privilege for me to introduce a new feature in this magazine entitled "USAREUR Viewpoint." We intend to use this forum for the purpose of exchanging views, stimulating ideas and acquainting the military intelligence soldiers, worldwide, with the activities of the USAREUR military intelligence community. The first of a series of articles, authored by one of my Division Chiefs, addresses the USAREUR environment. Many of the challenges facing us in the 1980s and some of the activities undertaken to meet those challenges are discussed. In future articles various aspects of the USAREUR intelligence scene will be explored. This exchange of information and ideas will hopefully stimulate thought and interest, making better soldiers of us all.

**Major General
James A. Williams**

By Major General

**James A. Williams and
Colonel Serge P.C. Demyanenko**

"From my viewpoint, the challenges for the next five years are indeed worthy of the talented intelligence people in uniform today and those who will follow."

**Major General
Edmund R. Thompson**

The United States Army Europe in general and the intelligence soldiers within that theater, in particular, are unique for many reasons.

Intelligence soldiers in USAREUR are faced with exciting challenges which make service in this theater particularly interesting and rewarding. Serving in an active intelligence environment, confronted by a hostile border, enemy agent activities, and the constant threat of aggression which compete for the attention and resources of the intelligence community, they find their efforts needed, appreciated and meaningful.

The United States Army Europe is unique for its size, constituting the largest overseas deployed command of the Army. It is unique for its clearly defined and compelling mission which engenders a sense of purpose in its soldiers. It is also unique because

it is faced by a host of well-trained, well-armed and well-indoctrinated armies, whose leaders have shown a callous willingness to commit them ruthlessly against freedom-seeking peoples in Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan. These same armies are now massed, able to strike against a Polish people who dared to challenge their "socialist" masters. In this environment USAREUR stands combat ready to help deter any possible aggressive designs of Warsaw Pact forces against the West, and failing to do so, defeat them on the battlefield. USAREUR, within the framework of the NATO Alliance has succeeded in helping to keep the peace for thirty-two years. This is a record of which every soldier who serves and who has served in USAREUR can be justly proud. Sharing in this success are the soldiers of military intelligence, be they assigned to the Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence (CEWI) units, located at remote field stations, serving at various headquarters on intelligence staffs, or as members of specialized units of the 66th Military Intelligence Group.

Intelligence, the eyes and ears of the combined arms commander, plays a role which cannot be over-emphasized. With it he is given the luxury of warning time to prepare, preposition and reinforce if necessary. It is in this environment then, compelled by the necessity for vigilance that the intelligence soldiers of USAREUR do their work, usually in a quiet, unassuming, unobtrusive yet professional fashion. They are dedicated to the twin propositions that their vigilance contributes to continued peace and freedom of the Western world and if deterrence should fail, provide a product which will be a combat force multiplier of significant proportion. In addition to the unique environment found in Europe, the constant challenges of rapid modernization complicate the intelligence tasks. New technology results in increasingly sophisticated equipment. Competing requirements vie for resources, rapidly increasing in cost. The information explosion requires intelligence experts to be able to manage this information with ever greater skill. The automation of the battlefield and of the intelligence sys-



Major General Williams is the Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Headquarters, United States Army Europe, and Seventh Army. A graduate of West Point, he holds an MA in Latin American Studies from the University of New Mexico. His military education includes the Intelligence School Counterintelligence Basic Course, the Artillery Basic and Advanced Courses, US Army Command and General Staff College and the National War College.

General Williams has served in such positions as Staff Officer, European Branch, Atlantic Division Operations Directorate, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations in Washington, DC; Exchange Officer, State-Defense Exchange Program, Office of the Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), Washington, DC; Chief, Counterintelligence and Collection Division, OACSI; Commanding Officer, 650th MI Group (Counterintelligence), Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe; Chief, Missile Forces/Strategic Arms Limitations Branch, Soviet/Warsaw Pact Division, Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC; and Deputy Director for Estimates, Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC. General Williams has been in his current assignment as Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence Headquarters, since July, 1980.

General Williams' awards include the Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit with OLC, Bronze Star Medal with V Device (OLC), Meritorious Service Medal (2 OLC), Joint Service Commendation Medal, Army Commendation Medal and Air Medals.

tems and the ever-increasing sophistication of the enemy place increased training demands on intelligence soldiers. In this environment, within the USAREUR military intelligence community, we face old challenges which require resolution and we face new challenges which test our ingenuity and dedication. As a result many dynamic things are happening here in order to meet the challenges peculiar to USAREUR as well as the challenges of the 1980s in general.

Training

One of numerous initiatives within USAREUR has been the establishment of a Training Branch within the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ODCSI) charged with staff responsibility for the training of all tactical intelligence units as well as the responsibility for advising and assisting Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations—(Training), in the intelligence training of all tactical units. This newly created branch will provide a focus for intelligence training advocacy and will bring to bear the interest and expertise of intelligence professionals. Nothing less than the revitalization of intelligence training in USAREUR is the goal of this staff unit.

Intelligence Production

Production Division, ODCSI, USAREUR unlike other major overseas commands, is chartered to do all source original analysis and production, and has been delegated specific production responsibilities by the Defense Intelligence Agency. The Production Division, ODCSI receives over 1,000 all source reports, cables, letters and studies on a daily basis. Skilled analysts fuse this huge "take," analyze the information against their own data base and produce daily and weekly intelligence cables, the daily Black Book, order of battle handbooks, original analytical and estimative studies and numerous briefings. Production Division also keeps its hand directly on the pulse of potential enemies by monitoring their daily activities in the USAREUR Indications and Warning Center. As a result, analysts, many of whom are young intelligence soldiers on their first assignment, become intimately familiar with our potential enemies and also make a direct contribution to the national and theater intelligence effort.

"CEWI" Activations

Approximately five years ago the Army initiated an intelligence force modernization which included the establishment of "Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence" units, with the mission of collecting and processing intelligence and conducting electronic warfare in support of the tactical commanders at Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR), division and corps levels. Two military intelligence battalions (DIV) (CEWI) have been activated in theater. The supported tactical commanders are highly complimentary of the improvements that these new units have caused. By the end of FY 83 two more "CEWI" battalions, two "CEWI" groups (Corps) and two "CEWI" companies (Armored Cavalry Regiment) will have been activated. The "CEWI" units provide exciting jobs for young military intelligence personnel. Here the intelligence professional works at tactical unit level in support of the maneuver commander. The intelligence product is of immediate concern and value to the supported unit. Opportunity for career progression exists for all grades within the "CEWI" framework.

Echelons Above Corps Architecture

TRADOC is in the final stages of designing the Army's echelon above corps (EAC) doctrine for the next decade. Addressing the immediate need of an "in place" EAC intelligence organization capable of providing strategic level intelligence interface, maximizing support to the tactical commanders at corps and below while concurrently supporting alliance (i.e. NATO) headquarters at army group (i.e. CENTAG) and regional command (i.e. AFCEM) levels, ODCSI, USAREUR has designed and is in the process of testing an EAC organization which will provide these services. Known as the All Source Analysis Center, Theater (ASAC-T) and part of the Army Intelligence Command, Europe (AICE) this organization, has been tested and is presently in the process of refinement. Once resourced, it will provide commanders at all levels with timely and accurate intelligence on the enemy follow on forces. Through this EAC organization collection resources available to the EAC commander will become responsive to the needs of the tactical commander.

Reserve Integration

Met with enthusiastic response by individual reservists and reserve unit commanders, ODCSI has planned for the integration of reserve components in the USAREUR EAC intelligence organization. Reserve component assets have been identified, their integration planned and their participation is about to be tested.

Equipment

Within USAREUR much new equipment is available or on the way to upgrade intelligence collection, processing and dissemination. The Interim Tactical ELINT Processor (ITEP) is operational in Europe and an additional GUARDRAIL/QUICKLOOK system will be issued in the near future. USAREUR's All Source Mobile Computer System, the Intelligence Information Sub-system (IISS) were deployed to Europe in June 1979.

Restructuring

To maximize intelligence support of the tactical commanders, ODCSI has restructured the intelligence collection effort in Europe. Collection management procedures have been streamlined and collection communications are in the process of a phased improvement effort.

Seeking new solutions to old challenges and facing new challenges with resolve and creativity, and more importantly, aggressively seeking new challenges against which to test our mettle and serve our country (and the NATO Alliance), the military intelligence team, ODCSI, USAREUR, tactical "CEWI" intelligence units, the 66th MI Group, active and reserve components, men and women, officers, noncommissioned officers and enlisted personnel, all are passengers on a moving train fuelled by ingenuity and dedication which is fast gathering speed on its journey toward an exciting and professionally rewarding future.

"The challenges for the next five years are indeed worthy of the talented intelligence people in uniform" as MG Thompson said. In USAREUR both the challenges and the talented intelligence people to meet them are plentiful.



Exercise Bright Star '81 (Egypt)

by LTC Jack W. McGuinness
and CPT (P) Frederick E. White

The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) was designed as the Army Readiness (ARRED) action agent and Army Force (ARFOR) for the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) sponsored, joint training exercise 'BRIGHT STAR '81' in Cairo West, Egypt during the period 7-27 November 1980. The division provided the ARFOR Headquarters, a maneuver air assault battalion (which included an aviation company and an air cavalry troop), and a DISCOM support element. The Battalion Task Force (TF) was required to provide one Infantry Company to act as the Opposing Force (OPFOR) for the exercise. In return, one Egyptian Airborne Company from the Egyptian Armed Forces was attached to the Battalion Task Force. The exercise consisted of a combined training phase and Field Training Exercise (FTX) phase.

The intelligence assets for the exercise included: A division staff section (two officers, two NCOs and two interrogators from the MI Company); one warrant officer and seven voice intercept operators from the ASA Company; and three Ground Surveillance Radar (GSR) teams from the MI Company. The warrant officer, voice intercept operators and GSR teams were attached to the Battalion TF. The interrogators served as interpreters for the ARFOR staff while the voice intercept operators served as interpreters for the Battalion Task Force.

Predeployment

Exercise Bright Star '81 was the first major overseas deployment of US Army forces to North Africa since World War II. MG Jack V. Mackmull, the division's commanding general, provided outstanding guidance and direction. Extensive prior coordination, planning, detailed studies and analyses were required by members of the military intelligence community. Detailed briefings were given. Weather and photo support had to be coordinated. Coordination trips were made to Fort Bragg, NC, and Moody Air Force Base, GA. The entire defense intelligence system assisted in preparing the unit prior to deployment.

The G2 published an unclassified "Soldier's Handbook" to prepare the Air Assault soldier for the exercise. Included in the pocket-size handbooks were sections on climate, light data, terrain, poisonous snakes, poisonous plants, dangerous insects and animals, treatment for specific medical problems, and Egyptian Army uniforms, aircraft, vehicles and weapons. It provided a guide for training in a desert environment, the basics of desert operations and the essentials of desert survivability. The handbook also included a general history of Egypt, a brief explanation of Arabic customs and a list of common Arabic phrases to familiarize the Air Assault soldier with the training areas and his Egyptian counterpart.

This handbook was especially valuable since the predeployment sensitivity of the exercise prevented the majority of the soldiers from receiving a pre-exercise country briefing. The handbooks were issued after the aircraft were airborne to prevent loss, protect exercise classification and insure that the maximum number of people read the handbook. The Soldier's Handbook served effectively as the introductory country briefing, provided a useful

reference guide for the duration of the exercise and provided Operational Security.


The individuals attached to the Battalion TF participated in a predeployment training program with them. The training concentrated on physical training, preparation of classes and desert orientations. Lesson plans used in the combined training phase of the exercise were prepared in detail and provided to the interpreters for translation into Arabic.

Lessons Learned

Some valuable lessons learned prior to and during the joint exercise are addressed here for military intelligence personnel to consider for further study. These observations are not all inclusive but will highlight a few of the key intelligence items.

One key to the success of the exercise was the preparedness of the Screaming Eagle linguists. During predeployment, the interpreters were selected, and began an extensive language program. The translation of classes for the principal US instructors on US weapons systems and air assault techniques from English to Arabic significantly upgraded their Arabic military vocabulary. In-country, the linguists had continual contact with Egyptian counterparts resulting in invaluable linguistic training for the personnel.

The Ground Surveillance Radar teams used the AN/PPS-5 radars. Prior to the field portion of the exercise in Egypt, the GSR teams conducted internal training at the base camp area, Cairo West. This training provided the teams an excellent opportunity to use the radars to the maximum ranges. During the exercise phase, the radars were deployed in defense, Tactical Operations Center (TOC) security, and



for target acquisition. The combination of a GSR team and a mortar forward observer was highly successful in locating and engaging opposing force units at long ranges.

The desert environment permitted the radars to be employed at ranges in excess of those in the local Fort Campbell training areas. However, the terrain also dictated that extensive desert camouflage be used. The extreme temperature variation and blowing dust and sand did not affect the operation of the radars. Because the surface of the desert was hard, tripods supporting the radars had to be pinned down with tent pegs to provide stability.

The task force ground reconnaissance and antiarmor capability was enhanced by using five motorcycles (street/dirt bikes). Assigned to the task force Scout Platoon, the bikes were modified to facilitate loading and exiting from the UH-60 Black Hawk. Ramps

were constructed for the Black Hawk which allowed the motorcycle easy access in and out of helicopters. Combat Vehicle Commander (CVC) helmets were procured which enabled the scouts to monitor and transmit reconnaissance reports while operating the bikes. The motorcycles provided the task force with excellent ground reconnaissance.

The RDJTF provided weather support to the division. Because it was the winter season, extremely high temperatures were not a problem. The 90-degree temperatures during the day dropped to 45 degrees at night. Heavy fog and dew blown into the desert from the Nile Delta degraded helicopter operations in the early morning hours.

Trafficability was not a problem on terrain in the exercise area. The predominant soil in the vicinity of Cairo West Air Field was well-graded, compacted gravel which provided trafficability equivalent to a well constructed gravel road. In many areas this gravel was covered by wind-blown sand ranging from one inch to several feet. This soil was more difficult for foot movement and occasionally hindered wheeled vehicular movement. Tracked vehicular movement was not inhibited by the soil. Areas of deep sand were detected at some distance and bypassed. Rock outcroppings were isolated and easily bypassed.

Blowing sand hindered aviation operations by restricting visibility and caused aircraft maintenance problems. "Brownouts" were the rule, not the exception. The sand and dust driven by the rotor wash of helicopters were a nuisance to ground troops and hook-up teams in sling-load operations. Wind and dust goggles were worn by personnel involved in helicopter operations. Landing zones and pick-up zones were located in gravel areas rather than in loose sand. Locations that were frequently used required dust suppression agents.

Extensive terrain studies are necessary in the desert. Desert terrain looks relatively uniform when depicted on a map. On the ground, the slightest knoll is key terrain. The slightest hill or ridge can mask helicopter movement, which was beneficial for air assault operations. Detailed terrain analysis is essential to determine "Slow/No Go" areas and for operational flight planning.

Members of the division noticed major discrepancies between US and Egyptian 1:50,000 scale maps. Differences of up to .7 kilometers at road intersections were noted. Roads and buildings existing on the US maps were not on the Egyptian maps and vice versa. Terrain features were more explicit on the Egyptian maps. These discrepancies were critical since this was a joint exercise. The Defense

Aircraft from the 101st Aviation Battalion, Fort Campbell, KY, fly by the Pyramids of Egypt on the outskirts of Cairo. The flight of helicopters is led by two OH-58 Kiowa Scout helicopters followed by four UH-60 Black Hawk utility helicopters and two AH-15 Cobra attack helicopters. The Kiowa and Cobra helicopters are from the 2/17th Cavalry of the 101st Airborne Division. These aircraft are in Egypt as part of the RDF Bright Star '81 exercises. ▼



U.S. Army photo by SSG Mi D. Seitelman released by the Department of Defense.

Mapping Agency is studying this problem.

FM radios did not transmit as far as expected even with relays. This was partially due to the effect of the desert on FM radio waves which degraded FM communications by as much as 50 percent. Radios and the various connectors had to be cleaned frequently.

Range estimation training on flat terrain is required. During the day range estimation was extremely difficult because of flat terrain and sun glare. One method ground observers used as a guide for range estimation assumed

that the average individual is five feet nine inches tall. At one kilometer he will appear to be one foot, three and three quarters inch tall. Based on vehicle noise during the hours of darkness, friendly forces perceived the opposing force vehicles to be extremely close when in reality the vehicles were 3 to 4 kilometers away.

Conclusion

The highlight of **Bright Star '81** was the great rapport developed between the officers and men of the Egyptian

Armed Forces, in particular the Egyptian Airborne Forces and the soldiers of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). Perhaps the relationship which developed will lead to a broader exchange between the armed forces of both nations and to stability in this part of the world.

The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) clearly demonstrated its strategic deployability and force readiness. An air assault force with its inherent mobility and considerable combat power can be rapidly deployed to combat in a desert environment and can fight and win.



TEC Account Changes

There are more than 8,000 Training Extension Course (TEC) account holders in active Army, Reserve Component, National Guard and ROTC units combined. Everyday, one or two units change address or designation. Units add or delete major items of equipment or MOSs, or the unit's mission changes. Sometimes, units receive lessons which they are not scheduled to receive, or separate TEC accounts are combined into a single account. Whatever the reason,

all existing TEC accounts must notify TEC Distribution at Fort Eustis when changes occur. It is especially important for National Guard headquarters or units to keep TEC informed. The numbers to call for prompt service are AUTOVON: 927-2141 or 3728 or Commercial: (804) 878-2141 or 3728 or, write to TEC at this address:

Commander
US Army Training Support Center
ATTN: ATIC-AET-TP
Fort Eustis, VA 23604

For prompt service, include the following information:

1. Unit designation and mailing address.

2. Unit Identification Code (UIC). This can be found on the MTOE or General Order that activated the unit.

3. MTOE or TDA number.

4. A list of enlisted MOSs (first three digits only) to be serviced by the TEC account and the number of personnel authorized in each MOS.

5. List other units to use the account and include their UIC, MTOE and MOSs.

6. A point of contact and AUTOVON or Commercial telephone number if additional information is necessary.

The California National Guard in "Battle"

The Golden State's own 40th Infantry Division (Mechanized) of the California Army National Guard fought a major "battle" during the weekend of October 18-19, 1980. Major General Frank Schober, commander of the California National Guard, recently announced.

Aided by other National Guard elements and reserve units of the Army, Air Force and Marine Corps, the 40th Infantry Division engaged and repulsed a superior attacking force in "Central Europe."

The exercise, one of the largest ever conducted, was a war game called a Computer Assisted Map Maneuver System (CAMMS). "War games and game theory have been used by military leaders for many years," said

Major General Robert Meyer, 40th Division commander, "but this October's battle was the largest and most complex of its kind ever attempted by American forces. Virtually all of the participants were part-time citizen soldiers."

The purpose of the simulation was to train National Guard leaders in roles they may be called upon to perform during wartime. The computer allowed the game to be played on a realistic basis in one weekend. The battle was "fought" at Fort Irwin and Camp Roberts, CA where identical game boards, representing the geographic area of the battle, were plotted with enemy and friendly forces based upon US force strength and intelligence on enemy

forces. Supplies and equipment were pre-positioned and division leaders "visited" the battle area to survey the terrain and other conditions.

Personnel from the Army Reserve's 75th Maneuver Area Command in Houston, TX, well-versed in enemy methods of operation, served as aggressors during the exercise.

The friendly forces included the 40th Division and National Guard, Army and Marine Corps Reserve units from California, Arizona, Nevada and New Mexico.

There were no actual troops or weapons systems in the field: the entire exercise took place "on the boards" with the help of the computer. Before the exercise commenced, however, each command set up headquarters in the field as though it were involved in a real battle.

The division was composed of three combat brigades, division artillery, a division support command and separate battalions comprising division troops. Each brigade and major command was composed of three to five battalions. There were some 30 headquarters established and manned by some 1,250 people at Irwin and Roberts.

As the game began, the aggressors attacked and information was relayed to each headquarters—division, brigades and battalions—just as though a real battle were in process. Soldiers at the play board served as forward observers, scouting parties and artillery spotters. In addition, aerial and satellite observed information was available.

Only data which would be available on a real battlefield was relayed. A camouflaged aggressor tank squadron waiting in ambush might well be clearly visible on the game board. If not spotted, however, information concerning it was not relayed to the friendly forces.

The computer kept score, as the battle progressed and resupply was played along with such factors as men, units, supplies, equipment, terrain and weather.

Commanders discovered the capabilities of their staffs and everyone realized the effectiveness of the command structure. Furthermore, significant savings were realized: had the game been a full field exercise, it would have taken weeks, involved some 20,000 soldiers and cost hundreds of thousands of dollars. But by training with a play board, maps and a computer, Guard leaders could participate in one weekend with available resources.

Because America has always relied on citizen soldiers for its defense, it is significant that the first time an exercise of this type and scope was attempted, it was performed by the National Guard.

Masked Minuteman



SFC Andrew Strauss pilots an M577A1 command carrier across the Mojave Desert during the recent CAMMS exercise at Fort Irwin, CA. Strauss is assigned to the California Army National Guard's 1st Battalion, 144th Field Artillery, 40th Infantry Division (Mechanized) in Santa Barbara (CAL NG Photo by SP5 Brian Deagon, 69th PAD, CAL ARNG).

Intelligence Training

Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Doctrinal Literature

The US Army Intelligence Center and School has received numerous inquiries about the status of doctrinal literature. We are well aware of the paucity of current doctrine in the field and are moving rapidly to overcome the problem. In February 1980, we met and overcame our greatest obstacle to doctrinal literature production — personnel shortages. We began a major effort to produce the literature needed by field users. However, it still takes time to produce the documents. Although the writing effort can be accomplished quickly, staffing, production of camera-ready mechanicals and printing require a great deal of time. Moving as rapidly as possible, it takes approximately 18 months to publish a field manual.

The final approved draft is the last stage in field manual production before printing. The draft usually is completed six months before the printed document is available in the field. It is a fully coordinated document, approved by all major elements included in the staffing process and can be used as published doctrine.

In order to reduce the time required to field new doctrine, USAICS prints a limited number of copies and distributes them to as many users as possible. Some are retained at USAICS to fill field requests. Copies can be obtained, as long as supplies last, by writing to CDR, USAICS, ATTN: ATSI-DT-RT-L, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613, or by calling AUTOVON 879-5516/2085. Requests for manuals produced at Fort Devens will be relayed to the appropriate office.

The status of doctrinal literature, as of December 1980, follows.

Dates for final approved drafts are tentative.

FM 34-10, Military Intelligence Battalion (CEWI) (Division), in final approved draft now.

TC 34-41, Jamming Handbook, in final draft. Available January 1981.

FM 34-13, Platoon Leader/Team Chief Handbook, in final draft. Available March 1981.

FM 34-11, Ground Surveillance Company, MI Battalion (CEWI) (Division), in final draft. Available March 1981.

FM 34-30, Military Intelligence Company (CEWI) (ACR/SEP BDE), in coordination draft. Available June 1981.

FM 34-20, Military Intelligence Group (CEWI) (Corps), in preliminary draft. Available July 1981.

FM 34-21, Operations Battalion, MI Group (CEWI) (Corps), in preliminary draft. Available August 1981.

FM 34-22, Aerial Exploitation Battalion, MI Group (CEWI) (Corps), in writer's draft. Available September 1981.

FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations, second coordination draft being produced. Available September 1981.

FM 34-12, Collection and Jamming Company, MI Battalion (CEWI) (Division), in coordination draft. Available September 1981.

FM 34-3, Analysis, in coordination draft. Available December 1981.

Other manuals have been begun although they are not sufficiently developed to project the availability date with any degree of accuracy. The status of these manuals and changes to the above list will be published in subsequent issues of MI Magazine.

The basic eligibility requirements are simple. An applicant must be:

- A citizen of the US or able to become a citizen prior to entering the Military Academy.
- At least 17 but not yet 21 years of age on 1 July of the year he or she enters the Preparatory School.
- Unmarried and having no legal obligation to support a child or children.
- In good health, with no disqualifying physical defects and vision correctable to 20/20.
- A high school graduate, or the equivalent, with a solid academic background. Ideally, applicants should have four years of English and three years of college preparatory mathematics. An individual with obvious leadership potential but a weaker academic background should not be discouraged from applying since many factors are considered.
- Applicants should be highly recommended by their commanders. A Commander's Counseling Guide is included as the Appendix to AR 351-12. All recommendations from the chain-of-command are closely reviewed in an effort to ascertain the applicant's maturity, motivation and desire.

Inclosures to the basic application are described in paragraph 9, AR 351-12, dated 1 October 1980. While school transcripts and SAT/ACT test results may be forwarded separately, MILPOs and commanders should insure that the following items are included with the basic application:

- Medical forms (SF 88 and 93) not more than 1 year old.
- GT score.
- ETS date.
- MOS.
- Most recent BPFT/APFT results, less than one year old (baseline PT scores cannot be accepted.)
- Current photograph.
- Commander's evaluation.
- Personal handwritten essay, subject: *Why I want to attend the Prep School and my goals in life.*

Further information may be obtained by calling the USMAPS Admission Office at AUTOVON 992-1807 or commercial (201) 532-1807 or by writing to the Commandant, US Military Academy Preparatory School, ATTN: MAP-AD-A Fort Monmouth, NJ 07703.

USMA Preparatory School

The United States Military Academy Preparatory School (USMAPS) at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, is now accepting applications for the class of 1981-82, which begins in August 1981. The application deadline for this class is May 1981.

USMAPS is an Army school which assists selected enlisted members in preparing academically, physically and militarily for admission to the United

States Military Academy at West Point. The 10-month academic year emphasizes English and mathematics. All students automatically receive a nomination to the Military Academy.

Applicants are urged to apply early in the academic year, as admission to USMAPS is highly competitive. Last year, more than 1,200 Regular Army soldiers applied for the 170 vacancies at USMAPS.

USAICS Academic Complex Dedicated

After 21 months and \$6.5 million, the new USAICS Academic Complex was dedicated and opened for business on January 14, 1981.

Participating in the ceremony were Mrs. Lorenzo Alvarado and SFC Lorenzo Alvarado Jr., the wife and son of the late MSG Alvarado, for whom the student support building was dedicated.

LTG William R. Richardson, Deputy Commanding General, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, gave the dedication address. In his address, LTG Richardson reflected upon the evolution of Military Intelligence and its growing importance on the battlefield today. He stated, "These facilities will foster a new vigor in the MI Community that the Army needs."

The new complex consists of three buildings, a solar energy plant and a solar collection field. The buildings,

which house the academic portion of the complex, are Walker Hall, Sisler Hall and Alvarado Hall.

Walker Hall, dedicated to CPT John D. Walker, is currently the largest solar heated and cooled facility in TRADOC. Its 11 classrooms will house 483 students attending the MI Basic Officer Courses, Tactical Intelligence Officer Courses, Warrant Officer Career Courses, NCO Career Courses and selected enlisted courses.


Sisler Hall, dedicated to 1LT George K. Sisler, contains three 78-man classrooms, and is designed to meet the criteria for presentation of highly sensitive classified instruction. The facility will be used primarily for the MI Officer Advanced Course students.

Alvarado Hall, the largest of the three buildings, is an administrative and student support facility. Inside this

facility are two 20-man general use classrooms, a 309-seat auditorium, an audio-equipped language lab, an audiovisual equipped learning center and both the USAICS unclassified and classified libraries.

Future plans for the complex include conversion of both Sisler Hall and Alvarado Hall to the solar heating and cooling system used in Walker Hall.

Others attending the dedication included BG James A. Teal Jr., Commander, USAICS; BG John T. Myers, DCG, USACC; and Mrs. Gerd S. Grombacher, wife of MG Grombacher, Commander, USACC at Fort Huachuca. The staff and faculty of USAICS also attended. Refreshments were served after the ceremony and the complex was opened to the public for touring.



Staff and Faculty Training: Trends and Innovations

by Mr. Russell W. Watson

In keeping with the philosophy of the Commanding General of TRADOC to professionalize the role of the Army Instructor, the USAICS Staff and Faculty Training Division, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, has implemented a three-phase Professional Development Program.

The initial thrust of the program began when USAICS received post-secondary accreditation from the North Central Association of Colleges and Schools. In order to qualify for accreditation, USAICS underwent an extensive educational evaluation conducted by a five-member team of college professors. The outstanding results of the evaluation provided the impetus for a five-year renewable accreditation granted USAICS in April of 1980. This honor reflects the same caliber of certification required of colleges and universities.

The first phase of the Professional Development Program concerns the awarding of undergraduate college credits for Staff and Faculty Training Division courses. Twelve credits may be earned through the University of Arizona, and up to 15 may be earned through Cochise College. Course work at either of the schools may be applied

towards degrees. In order to establish this phase, the personnel of the Staff and Faculty Training Division were evaluated and accepted as adjunct instructors by the two colleges concerned. Graduate level classes will be initiated in September 1981. The offering of these courses will be made possible by the awarding of Associate Professorships to two of the members of the Staff and Faculty Training Division who will receive their PhDs in May 1981.

The second phase of the Professional Development Program deals with the implementation of the Distinguished Instructor Award. This honor will be presented monthly to the most outstanding USAICS instructor. Criteria for achievement of this award are detailed in the USAICS memorandum entitled, "The Distinguished Instructor Award Program" and include professional self-development, as well as classroom performance. Each Instructor of the Month will be awarded a certificate, a letter of commendation/achievement, a three-day pass, and recognition from various local businesses. During December of each year, the 11 previous monthly winners will be eligible to compete for the title of "Instructor of the Year." In addition to the aforementioned awards, the Instructor of the Year will be excused

from the duty roster for 30 days and receive special recognition from a variety of local businesses.

The final phase of the program deals with the recognition of levels of instructor achievement. As each potential faculty member completes the Basic Instructor Training Course, he will become an Intern Instructor. He will remain at this level until he receives a satisfactory instructor evaluation by his supervisor and a recommendation for the award of an instructor designator. At this time he will progress to the level of Instructor. To achieve the next higher level of recognition, that of Senior Instructor, the individual must meet strict criteria. These include completion of training courses, contributions to the educational efforts of the USAICS, as well as outstanding classroom performance. The title of Master Instructor, the highest level of achievement, will only be awarded to those individuals who have exceeded all of the aforementioned criteria, as well as received special distinction in the realm of education and training.

The entire Professional Development Program has been designed and implemented specifically to provide the opportunities for educational and professional enhancement to all personnel assigned to the United States Army Intelligence Center and School.

Personnel desiring more information about any of the program's three phases should write to the following address: Commander, US Army Intelligence Center and School, ATSI-DT-SF, Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613.

Army ROTC Active Duty Scholarship Program

One plus one equals three—at least according to a new ROTC formula. One year of enlisted active duty plus one year of college could win eligible servicemembers three-year college scholarships. Not bad arithmetic—when it adds up to a commission as a second lieutenant.

In addition to the new program, the Army ROTC Scholarship Program offers two-year scholarships for those who have completed two years of college. Both programs are designed to give Army enlisted men and women a chance to earn a college degree and a commission as an Army officer.

The application period began January 15, 1981, with winners for the 1981-82 school year to be announced in June.

The awards pay full tuition, books and certain educational fees in addition to a subsistence allowance of up to \$1,000 a year each year the scholarship is in effect. Winners are also paid for attending ROTC Advanced Camp, normally held during the summer between junior and senior years of college. Winners may also take advantage of Veterans Administration benefits to which they would normally be entitled.

Competition for scholarships is limited to enlisted personnel who have:

- Served at least one year on active duty.
- Completed one year of college and have three remaining (for the three-year award).
- Completed two years of college and have two remaining (for the two-year award).
- Not reached their 25th birthday on June 30 of the year they are eligible for commissioning.

• Been accepted by a college for next fall's enrollment and have a GT score of 115 or higher.

• US citizenship.

Winners may attend any of the colleges and universities offering Army ROTC or one of the more than 500 non-host colleges having a cross-enrollment agreement with a nearby host school. Enlistment in the US Army Reserve is required prior to enrollment in the Army ROTC Advanced Course.

Upon successful completion of their military science and baccalaureate degree requirements, these former enlisted personnel will be commissioned as second lieutenants and obligated to serve four years on active duty.

Applications must be requested by April 15, 1981 and submitted not later than May 1. For more information and applications contact HQ TRADOC, ATTN: ATRO-CM, Fort Monroe, VA, 23651.

BOOK A



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